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INTRODUCTION
With the end of the Cold War, a popular parlor game in foreign
ministries, think tanks, and academia has been to develop a theory of
international relations that best explains the new international order.
Although there is widespread agreement that the United States is
the world’s most powerful country in military, economic, and
diplomatic terms, and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future,
there is little agreement as to how the rest of the world will react
to America’s lead. Concepts such as “balancing,” “bandwagoning,”
“buck-passing,” and “free riding,” to name just a few, have been
advanced and debated. And although none presents a uniﬁed ﬁeld
theory, each explains some aspect of international relations.
Theory has an even more difﬁcult time explaining the relationship
between the United States and the United Kingdom (UK), especially
its remarkable endurance over the past 6 decades. The U.S.-UK
partnership ﬂourished during World War II, deepened during the
long twilight struggle with the Soviet Union, and has prospered
further since the end of the Cold War. It is likely to survive any new
challenges that may loom on the horizon.
The United States has the same track record with no other state,
even those who were also once part of the British Empire. America’s
relations with Canada, our neighbor and largest trading partner, and
with Australia, with whom we share a common heritage of mass
immigration and frontier-taming, are robust, yet do not attain quite
the same scope and depth as the U.S.-UK special relationship.
Many observers and commentators, even former ofﬁcials who
should know better, ascribe the success of the relationship to an
afﬁnity of purpose, rooted in a shared heritage of law, traditions,
blood ties, and culture. They have a tendency to place the relationship
on a pedestal, to be handled reverently as if by liveried servants. They
conjure up endless vistas of Anglo-American harmony, unblemished
by harsh words or furrowed brows—vistas of sunny days and clear
skies, of unanimity on all matters, large and small.
Nothing could be further from the truth. An accurate history, not
hagiography, is essential to understanding the relationship and what
makes it special. Our interests are similar, but not always identical.
Our strategic goals may overlap, but our tactics may differ.
v

Almost from its inception, the relationship has been fraught with
disagreement and acrimony, often over existential matters of war and
peace. No sooner had our extensive wartime collaboration succeeded
in defeating the Axis powers than Washington passed the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946, which terminated all atomic energy cooperation
with the UK. Quickly forgotten was the immense contribution
British scientists had made to the Manhattan Project. Less than a
decade later, Washington and London had a fundamental and very
public disagreement over Suez, with the United States eventually
compelling the removal of all British forces from Egypt by forcing a
sterling crisis that threatened to bankrupt the UK. These were two
of the earliest, and in some ways the most startling, of a series of
disagreements the two countries have had, and continue to have,
on issues that affect their interests and the world. More recently, the
United States and the UK have worked closely together to advance
the peace process in Northern Ireland. But it hasn’t always been
smooth sailing.
During the 1960s and 1970s, American politicians like Hugh
Carey, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Thomas Phillip “Tip” O’Neill,
Jr., and Edward “Ted” Kennedy were among the ﬁrst to draw
international attention to the discrimination against the Catholic
community in education, employment, and housing in Northern
Ireland. The Clinton administration weathered a ﬁrestorm with the
British over its decision to grant a visa to Gerry Adams, entertain
him at the White House, and generally elevate the proﬁle of Sinn
Fein. On Northern Ireland, there have been other disagreements over
the years, although no one doubts the fundamental commitment of
all American administrations, and especially President Bush, to the
peace process.
It is in these disagreements that the true nature of the special
relationship can be found. It is our ability to disagree, to argue
passionately, candidly, and forcefully with each other ― and then
to pick up the pieces, place our anger behind us, and go forward
together—that makes the relationship special and explains why it
has thrived. Disagreement and resolution are the hallmark signs of a
healthy partnership. Despite being a cliché, it nonetheless is true that
the United States has no more reliable, trustworthy, or stalwart ally
than the United Kingdom. I believe the UK feels the same way about
the United States.
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So how best to explain this special relationship? It may simply
defy categorization. Like the theater owner in the ﬁlm Shakespeare in
Love (another Anglo-American collaboration) explaining how plays
are produced, “It’s a mystery.” But it is very special nonetheless.

AMBASSADOR MITCHELL B. REISS
Special Envoy to the Northern Ireland Peace Process
Washington, DC
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CHAPTER 1
THE U.S.-UK SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT:
LESSONS OF THE PAST
Ray Raymond
Winston Churchill once wrote, “Learn all you can from history,
for how else can one even make a guess what is going to happen in
the future . . . in history lie all the secrets of statecraft.” Churchill
was right, and his advice is especially appropriate to the study of
the special relationship. Properly understood, the lessons of the past
not only help us keep the problems of the present in perspective,
but also point to one central conclusion: some kind of intimate and
unbreakable link does exist between the United States and Britain,
and its roots are very deep.
Throughout the deliberations of the two conferences that form the
basis of this book, I was struck that so many of my fellow participants
knew so little of the history of the Anglo-American relationship.
Stereotypes abounded, particularly in the British delegation. Many
of these participants appeared eager to deny the existence of a shared
heritage so critical in helping us resolve disputes past and present.
This chapter attempts to explain what the special relationship is and
to provide a more balanced view of its value.
KEEPING THE PRESENT IN PERSPECTIVE
To begin, the lessons of the past put our current problems in
perspective. Anti-Americanism is one example. Throughout the
Carlisle and Shrivenham conferences, many participants expressed
serious concern about the extent, intensity, and nature of antiAmericanism in the United Kingdom. They were right to do so.
The current level of anti-Americanism is indeed disturbing and,
in my judgment, poses the biggest single threat to the special
relationship. But anti-Americanism in Britain is nothing new. It has
been a prominent feature of the ideology of the left and right wings
of British politics ever since 1945. Yet, over the past 60 years, the
special relationship has not only survived but prospered, making a
vital contribution to international security.
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The years immediately following World War II offer a very
good example. The war had marked a substantial shift in economic
power—and hence political and military power—from Britain to the
United States. This was a terrible shock to a proud nation accustomed
to controlling the destiny of much of the world. The psychological
repercussions of this transfer of power were clearly identiﬁable in a
strongly anti-American mood intensiﬁed by moral unease over the
dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan, resentment at the abrupt
termination of Lend Lease, and fear that the rapid demobilization
and withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe would leave a weakened
Britain unable to deter Soviet aggression. In August 1948, U.S.
Ambasador Lew Douglas reported to Washington that “there is
an undercurrent of feeling here against the U.S., both in and out of
government . . . at times their attitude towards the U.S. borders on
the pathological.” But this intense anti-Americanism did not prevent
Britain and the United States from collaborating closely to ensure the
success of the Marshall Plan in 1947, nor did it impede the AngloAmerican diplomacy that led to the foundation of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949.
History also reminds us that vigorous arguments between
London and Washington are nothing new. There was never a
golden age of Anglo-American relations free from acrimony.
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Churchill had profound disagreements
on the desirability of the continuation of the British Empire in Africa,
Asia, and the Middle East, and of the continued existence of British
imperial trade preferences in the postwar era. These disagreements
were compounded by difﬁculties over the detailed arrangements
for Lend Lease, over British sterling and dollar balances, and over
access by U.S. companies to protected markets within the Empire
and Commonwealth. On military strategy and tactics, Churchill—the
incorrigible worshiper of the periphery—had ferocious arguments
with Dwight Eisenhower and George Marshall, who remained
wedded to a cross-channel attack on the core of Nazi power.
The true essence of the special relationship was captured in a
lunchtime conversation in Washington in the late 1980s when Lord
Franks, who had been British Ambassador during the Harry Truman
administration, asked the then current Ambassador Sir Oliver
Wright, “How are things?” Sir Oliver replied, “Oh, just ﬁne. I have
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got about six rows going on with the administration and Congress at
present.” Lord Franks replied, “Oh, good . . . sounds normal to me.”
The point is that, over the decades, there have been frequent strong
disagreements between London and Washington, but they have
never prevented us from working effectively together to achieve
shared objectives so long as the disagreements were conducted in
private like family squabbles. Picking ﬁghts in public with the United
States is utterly counterproductive.
History also shows that the other grave threat to the special
relationship is the continued miniaturization of the British armed
forces. As Lord Renwick, one of our greatest Ambassadors in
Washington, has shrewdly observed: “Britain has inﬂuence on
American policy to the extent that it still has some power and inﬂuence
itself in various parts of the world . . . the price of consultation is
presence and participation.” In other words, sound, unvarnished
advice and diplomatic support—though welcome—will not be
enough. The more and the more relevant military capability we
have, the greater will be our inﬂuence in Washington. The reduction
of the British armed forces must stop.
THE LONG-TERM ROOTS OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
Some years ago, the elder President George Bush described the
special relationship as “the rock upon which all dictators this century
have perished.” He was referring to the importance of the special
relationship in combating fascism and communism in the 20th
century. In the 21st century, the special relationship has confounded
the skeptics by emerging with renewed vigor. President George W.
Bush, for example, frequently describes Britain as America’s most
important global ally in the war on terror. British Prime Minister
Tony Blair commands the stage in Washington and the admiration
of the American public as no other British leader since Churchill.
Among the cynical British chattering classes, it has long been
fashionable to dismiss the special relationship as mere “rhetorical
nonsense, sometimes majestic and often moving, yet nevertheless
nonsense.” And yet even the most hardened cynics have been forced
to admit that some kind of intimate connection does exist between
the United States and Britain. But deﬁning it is not easy. The special
3

relationship is not like a sentence that you can parse or a treaty
that you can analyze. The most intriguing clue I have found is in a
speech given in London by John Hay in the early 1890s when he was
U.S. Ambassador to the Court of St. James. Describing the AngloAmerican relationship, John Hay said that Britain and the United
States “are bound by a tie we did not forge and which we cannot
break; we are joint ministers of the same sacred mission of liberty.”
Hay’s insightful phrase suggests to me that to unravel the mystery of
the special relationship we need a longer historical perspective; that
we need to understand the American Revolution in its full complexity
as well as the three pillars of the relationship—the shared common
law heritage, the mutual economic investments, and the diplomatic
and security ties.
What I am suggesting, contrary to conventional wisdom, is that
this relationship does have the “patina of antiquity,” and that the
usual view of Anglo-American relations—warm and close since
1941, cold and distant before—is mistaken. Instead, I want to offer
a provocative working hypothesis: that the solution to the mystery,
the real reason the special relationship is special, is that so much
of the basic DNA of the infrastructure of the American political,
legal, and economic system is British. And I will go further: the basic
assumption of Roosevelt’s security policy in World War II—the idea
that the United States and Britain shared a common strategic interest
in preventing a single hostile power from dominating the European
continent—can be traced back to the Federalists’ foreign policy of
the 1790s. In a very real sense, therefore, the United States, however
foreign it may sometimes appear to many modern-day Britons,
is—to borrow David Hacket Fisher’s memorable phrase—“Albion’s
seed.”
Therefore, let’s linger a moment on the American Revolution, a
subject on which the latest British and American scholarship offers
some fascinating insights. To begin with, this scholarship suggests that
the secession of the American colonies and the birth of the American
Republic were not inevitable. Until well into the 1770s, whatever
differences the colonies may have had with London or with each
other, few questioned their common allegiance to the crown or their
intense pride in their common British identity. Some—including the
illustrious Benjamin Franklin—thought the center of gravity of the
4

British Empire and perhaps even its capital eventually must shift to
the United States.
The Founders of the British Empire in America envisaged a loose
maritime commercial empire cemented by the 17th-century Puritan
concept of liberty which was rooted in resistance to the idea of an
Absolutist Monarch. This concept of liberty meant parliamentary
consent to taxation, representative government, habeas corpus, trial
by jury, and protection of the individual citizen from arbitrary arrest
and from a corrupt government. As Simon Schama has written, this
concept of liberty also included,
the constant reiteration of its historical epics—Magna Carta, the Petition
of Right, and most recently, and therefore most hallowed, the Bill of
Rights of 1689 and its heroes and martyrs: John Hampden, John Milton,
and Algernon Sidney (ironically, the same heroes and martyrs beloved
by John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and Benjamin Franklin) . . . . The
British Empire was supposed to satisfy itself with just enough power,
and just enough regulation, to make the interlocking parts of its economic
machinery work with well-oiled smoothness.

Those American colonists who had taken these professions of
freedom seriously felt betrayed. In the end, they rebelled not because
of excessive taxation—the was merely a convenient rallying cry—but
because they were concerned that the most sacred principles of British
freedom were at stake; that they were the custodians of the true British
Constitution which had been abandoned by a corrupt oligarchy in
London. I believe they were right. The government of Lord North,
in order to protect short-term economic interests, abandoned Pitt
the Elder’s concept of an empire of liberty based on mutual consent
and respect. It was a disastrous mistake. The underlying issue was
one of constitutional principle: the difﬁculty was the failure of the
British government to adhere to its own professed ideals of liberty,
coupled with the failure of both the American colonists and the
British government to agree to a constitutional relationship that
clearly deﬁned the rights of the colonial assemblies and the authority
of the Westminster Parliament. The American War of Independence,
therefore, can be seen as a legitimate rebellion rooted in the English
common law. The colonists were not trying to reject their treasured
British heritage, but rather to reafﬁrm and reclaim it from a foolish
King and a corrupt political cadre.
5

The American War of Independence can also be seen as a tragic
British civil war in that it divided social classes, towns, villages, and
families both in Britain and in the 13 colonies. At least one-third of
the colonists—including Benjamin Franklin’s son and John Jay’s
brother—remained loyal to the crown. In Britain, large numbers
of Puritans and other religious dissenters strongly supported the
American cause because of a shared religion, shared values, and
a heartfelt community of friendship. They were joined by English
republicans and other radicals whose grandparents had supported
Cromwell and the Parliamentary cause against the Stuart Kings: the
skilled craftsmen, shopkeepers, and owners of taverns and coffee
houses in London, in East Anglia, and in the industrial towns of
central England. Opposition to the war also included many elements
of the press, as well as members of the Whig opposition in the House
of Commons and Lords and many senior ofﬁcers in the British army
and Royal Navy who were especially reluctant to take up arms against
their kith and kin in America. This was not, therefore, the case of a
united American nation ﬁghting British imperialists determined to
subjugate it by force, but rather of one transatlantic “Anglosphere”
divided against itself.
Pillar I: Common Law.
The ﬁrst pillar of the special relationship is, of course, the shared
heritage that was and is our great common law tradition. The central
point here is that America’s Founding Fathers enthusiastically
embraced the profoundly British concept of a law-based state
shaped by centuries of British political philosophy, jurisprudence,
and practice dating back to the Magna Carta. As a result, our shared
conception of individual freedom, of a law-based state, and of
the pragmatic common law approach to justice rooted in custom,
experience, and precedent is now ﬁrmly embedded in the American
legal system. America’s founding documents—the Declaration
of Independence, the U.S. Constitution, and the Bill of Rights—
do not divide us. They unite us. As Winston Churchill once said,
“The Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution are
not only American documents. They follow on the Magna Carta
and the English Bill of Rights as the great title deeds in which the
6

liberties of the English-speaking peoples are founded.” As leading
colonial American historians have demonstrated, this was not mere
Churchillian romanticism, fuelled by several after-dinner brandies.
The political and legal structures created by the colonists were
deeply rooted in British constitutional history, political philosophy,
and jurisprudence
In its form and content, the Declaration of Independence, for
example, is a profoundly British document and part of a centuriesold British tradition. Pauline Maier has shown that, in both England
and Scotland, declarations were important political and legal
instruments. Politically, declarations were issued to explain and
justify the removal of a king. For the Founding Fathers, the most
important declaration was the English Declaration of Rights of 1689.
It ended the reign of King James II and began that of William and
Mary. For the Founding Fathers, the English Declaration became a key
source of inspiration: a document which set out certain fundamental
political and legal truths to inspire and shape the political and legal
structures of the new American republic, as well as to proclaim the
end of an old regime.
Jefferson used the English Declaration of Rights as his model
when writing the preamble of his constitution for Virginia, one of the
two texts we know he had with him in his lodgings in Philadelphia
that hot summer of 1776. The other was George Mason’s Declaration
of Rights for Virginia which was even more closely modeled on the
English Declaration of Rights. So Jefferson, the assiduous student
of British law and history, was acting as so many Britons had acted
before him: drawing up a declaration to explain and justify bringing
the reign of George III to an end in his American colonies.
And it is not just a matter of form, but of content. Jefferson relied
heavily on two of the leading thinkers of the 18th-century Scottish
Enlightenment—David Hume and Francis Hutcheson—for many of
his ideas. Hutcheson, for example, wrote that human rights included
the right of a people to oppose tyranny and the right of colonies
to secede if their mother country treated them unjustly. English
philosopher John Locke argued that sovereignty derived from the
people, who have a right to remove an unjust monarch. This argument
clearly shaped Jefferson’s thinking. Indeed, much of the language in
the opening paragraphs of the Declaration of Independence closely
7

resembles passages from Locke’s Two Treatises of Government.
As Dick Howard has written, the English Bill of Rights not only
“anticipates the American document of a century later, but also
some of the American bill’s speciﬁc provisions—for example, the
Eighth Amendment’s ban on excessive bail and ﬁnes and on cruel
and unusual punishment.”
That leads me to a central point as best expressed by the
distinguished colonial American historian Gordon Wood:
The English had worked out a respect for the law and a semblance of
popular self-government, however ﬂawed by modern standards, long
before the Americans. Whatever innovations Americans made to their
English heritage, and they were undeniably considerable, their ultimate
success in governing themselves and protecting individual freedom
owed more to their English heritage than in did to their constitutional
inventions in 1787. From decades of experience they had acquired an
instinctive knowledge of English liberty and the English Common Law,
and this inherited and inherent knowledge, this long experience with
English political culture, was what ultimately enabled them to succeed
as well as they did in establishing new governments.

Pillar II: Mutual Investment.
The second pillar of the Anglo-American relationship is the
extraordinary interpenetration of our two economies. Today, Britain
and America invest over $250 billion in each other’s economies,
more than any two other countries, and they lead in cross-border
mergers and acquisitions. This relationship did not begin yesterday.
For over 300 years, the prosperity of Britain and America has always
been closely linked. Indeed, the great paradox of the American
Revolution is that those rebelling against the Crown in the 1770s
were its wealthiest subjects, to a large degree the beneﬁciaries of
British investment and trade.
The foundation of the modern investment relationship can be
traced to Alexander Hamilton’s tenure as the ﬁrst U.S. Treasury
Secretary. The American War of Independence left ﬁnancial chaos
in its wake: the 13 states suffered Weimar-levels of inﬂation because
they had printed unsecured paper with reckless abandon. And it
took all of Alexander Hamilton’s ﬁnancial genius, his knowledge of
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British best practice, and British investment to bring order out of
chaos and lay the foundations for modern American capitalism. As
Treasury Secretary, Hamilton created the ﬁrst Bank of the United
States, modeled closely on the Bank of England. To achieve the
ﬁnancial stability necessary to attract the British investment that was
in turn essential to help pay off the American debt, Hamilton once
again turned to the British model of monetizing the national debt by
issuing long-term bonds that could be traded on the open market.
And as Hamilton studied the British ﬁnancial system in 1789, he also
borrowed William Pitt’s idea of the sinking fund—earmarking a
portion of annual tax revenues to pay off the national debt. This helped
tame rampant inﬂation resulting from the War of Independence and
restored investor conﬁdence. Building on the investor conﬁdence
established by Hamilton, British capital ﬁnanced the construction of
the American railroads—which knitted a continent into a country—
and also ﬁnanced much else of the American Industrial Revolution.
Pillar III: Diplomatic and Security Partnership.
The third and ﬁnal pillar is the unique diplomatic and security
partnership formed by the two countries. Since World War II, there
has been a unique collaboration in defense and national security
between Britain and the United States and in the closeness of our
consultation and action about most world crises.
FDR and Churchill invented this unique defense and intelligence
relationship, of course. They not only gave it its unique ﬂavor, but
also helped create the vast network of institutions and consultative
arrangements to sustain the partnership. It would be absurd to
suggest that a special relationship of this kind existed before 1941.
But the theme of confronting the common adversary was not new to
Anglo-American relations. It had existed since the 18th century as a
shared assumption of common interest even when bilateral relations
between Washington and London were strained. There are two
striking examples of this. The ﬁrst can be found in the foreign policy
of the Federalists in the 1780s and the 1790s; the second even more
striking example can be found in the foreign policy of Theodore
Roosevelt and Lord Salisbury when there was a Falklands in reverse.
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As John Lamberton Harper has argued, in the late 1780s and 1790s,
John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and George Washington created and
implemented a prudent, realistic foreign policy of strength through
peace. It was a foreign policy anchored in the belief that America’s best
interests lay in an alliance with Britain based on common interests.
Like their counterparts in the British government, Hamilton, Jay, and
Washington saw it as an irreducible interest of the United States, as
well as Britain, to prevent the domination of the European continent
by any single power. They saw British ﬁnancial and naval power as
America’s ﬁrst line of defense against French and Spanish ambitions
to control the Mississippi Valley, thereby threatening the territorial
integrity of the United States.
This policy found expression in Jay’s Treaty in 1794, which
represented the culmination of their earlier efforts to foster
reconciliation based on reciprocity and shared interests and a common
desire to heal the wounds of the Revolutionary War. Jay’s Treaty
not only repudiated the Franco-American alliance of 1778, but also
marked the birth of a common Anglo-American strategic outlook
and the hesitant beginnings of a mutual understanding. It also linked
American and British security policy because it recognized that the
Royal Navy was America’s ﬁrst line of defense against potential
aggressors like France and Spain.
This said, it must be admitted that the 19th century was a difﬁcult
period for Anglo-American relations. Despite the best efforts of John
Jay and Alexander Hamilton to heal the wounds of the Revolutionary
War, this tragic conﬂict left a bitter legacy of mistrust. The War of 1812,
another unnecessary war, made it worse. But in the decades before
the Civil War, Anglo-American relations improved because Britain
and the United States supported Latin American independence and
opposed French and Spanish attempts to reconquer their former
colonies.
The main source of friction arose out of the American Civil War
and Britain’s ambivalent response to it. While some British leaders,
including then Prime Minister Lord Palmerston, hoped that the Civil
War might lead to the breakup of the Union, the overwhelming
majority wanted to keep out of the war. The ambivalence of British
policy had deeper roots, however. On the one hand, the British
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anti-slavery movement (which had helped ﬁnance the American
“underground-railroad” enabling slaves to escape to the North) had
convinced almost all Britons that slavery must be abolished, and it
lobbied successfully against recognition of the Confederacy. On the
other, the powerful British textile industry needed continued access
to cheap raw cotton, and the bankers of the City of London had to
protect their loans to the big cotton plantation owners. Add to that the
pressure from the large British shipbuilders eager to accommodate
Confederate orders for warships, and one gets an idea of how
difﬁcult it was for the British government to formulate a consistent
and balanced policy that did not offend either side in the Civil War.
But the British policy of nonrecognition was compromised
by its decision to allow the Confederates to order warships from
British shipyards. One such ship, the Alabama, built in the Cammell
Laird shipyard on Merseyside, reached Confederate hands and
sank nearly 60 Union vessels in 2 years. Afterwards, the victorious
North was understandably angry that the British government
had allowed the building of the Alabama and two other warships.
What was important was not the dispute, but how it was resolved
through a Joint High Commission. The Commission, whose actions
personiﬁed the shared pragmatic Anglo-American common law
tradition, agreed on suitable compensation for the damage caused
by the Alabama and resolved the other outstanding grievances. Once
again, the common law heritage helped ensure a joint approach and
a successful resolution of a difﬁcult, divisive problem.
Throughout the later part of the 19th century, despite the
frictions caused by embittered Irish-Americans, Anglo-American
relations grew much closer. There were three reasons for this. First,
the passage of time and deft British diplomacy combined to soften
Britain’s image as the colonial oppressor and enemy of American
independence. Second, America’s remarkable economic growth
after the Civil War created new opportunities for British investors,
which they eagerly snapped up, thereby strengthening the AngloAmerican business relationship. Third, the arrival of steam-powered
transatlantic liners, combined with changes in British and American
social structure, facilitated closer social relationships between the
elites of both countries. America’s new Gilded Age millionaires
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wanted the social prestige of links to the British aristocracy, which
needed an infusion of American dollars to meet the ever-increasing
costs of maintaining their vast country mansions. Between 1895
and 1903, the daughters of more than 70 American millionaires
married prominent British aristocrats, many of them in key positions
in government. The great Anglo-American rapprochement did
indeed build on the these closer links, but it was driven primarily
by a common strategic outlook: both governments agreed on the
“Open Door” policy in China, and were deeply concerned about the
emergence of an aggressive militaristic Germany in Europe and in the
Paciﬁc. Both governments saw each other as key allies in containing
German power. U.S. Ambassador and later Secretary of State John
Hay spoke for both governments when he wrote, “There is in the
German mind something monstrous in the thought that a war should
take place anywhere and they not proﬁt by it.” Lord Salisbury saw
the Spanish-American War in 1898 as an excellent opportunity for a
show of solidarity with the United States. Just after the outbreak of
hostilities, Lord Salisbury’s government not only declared its political
support for the United States, but also gave the U.S. Navy the use of
British bases in the Caribbean. The Royal Navy also gave Admiral
Dewey every possible assistance in Hong Kong as he prepared to
attack the Spanish ﬂeet in the Philippines. It was truly a Falklands in
reverse. So as the 20th century began and America stepped forcefully
onto the world stage for the ﬁrst time, she did so with Britain’s full
diplomatic, intelligence, and military support. The impact on U.S.
leaders was profound. President Theodore Roosevelt (TR) wrote to
his closest British friend, Cecil Spring Rice, “I am greatly mistaken
if we ever slide back into the old conditions of bickering and angry
mistrust.” TR was right. We never have.
CONCLUSION
I hope I have provided a clue to unraveling the mystery of the
special relationship. Before 1941, there was, of course, bickering and
hostility, but underlying geopolitics and a common heritage continue
to be inescapable. Both countries were always wary of expansionism
on or from the European continent, so the implied partnership was
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always there. But it took the Nazi threat and the leadership of FDR
and Churchill to make it explicit. They succeeded in building so well
and so fast because the foundations were already there, strong and
deeply rooted. Then and now, we are indeed “bound by a tie we did
not forge and which we cannot break.” Or, as Margaret Thatcher
put it in an address to the Joint Houses of Congress on February 20,
1985,
Our two countries have a common heritage as well as a common language.
It is no mere ﬁgure of speech to say that many of your most enduring
traditions—representative government, Habeas Corpus, trial by jury, a
system of constitutional checks and balances—stem from our own small
islands. But they are as much your lawful inheritance as ours. You did
not borrow these traditions: you took them with you, because they were
already your own.
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SECTION I:
ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS ASPECTS
OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

CHAPTER 2
THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP — ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS
ASPECTS: AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE
Michael Calingaert
What constitutes a “special relationship”? And, particularly,
what is “special”? Is it “distinctive”? “Unusual” or “unique”? Does
it make a value judgment, connoting a relationship that is more
important than other bilateral relationships? If so, how does one
deﬁne or measure the scale of importance? Is it a relationship between
governments, between peoples, or both? Is it a relationship that is
distinguished by being privileged or preferential in some sense? If
so, how? Or is the United States’ relationship with every country
“special”—perhaps some simply more “special” than others?
These are questions that underlie the assessment one is asked to
make about the nature of a U.S.-UK relationship characterized as
being “special.” Viewed from the economic/business perspective,
the relationship is, in many respects, distinctive and, in some
respects, unique. On the other hand, many aspects of the relationship
ﬁt the pattern of U.S. relations with other countries of the developed
world.
A related issue is American and British attitudes toward the
existence of such a special relationship. To what extent does
promoting the existence of and drawing attention to this special
relationship promote national interests? What advantages are gained
from doing so? While any such relationship is necessarily complex,
and thus generalization can be misleading, the United Kingdom,
as the smaller of the two partners, must compete for U.S. attention
to enhance its inﬂuence over U.S. economic policies, particularly
foreign economic policy, and promote its trade and investment
objectives. Thus, there are clear advantages to the United Kingdom
in propagating the idea that a special relationship exists, which is
presumably why special relationship rhetoric is more prevalent
there than in the United States. Of course, it is also important for
the United States to obtain support for its foreign economic policies
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and to achieve its trade and investment goals. However, the United
Kingdom plays a less important role relatively for the United States
than the other way around. In any event, there is a downside for the
United States in touting a special relationship—for it implies that
other bilateral relationships are less “special.”
CONTEXT OF THE RELATIONSHIP
Two essential constituents distinguish economic interaction
between the United States and United Kingdom. In one respect, the
economic relationship is distinctive and important to both sides,
while in the other, it is less so.
The key of the U.S.-UK economic special relationship is the
shared belief in and practice of what is often called the “Anglo-Saxon
economic model” (while one can debate the appropriateness of this
term, the intended distinction is between it and the more regulated
form of capitalism prevailing in much of continental Europe). It refers
to a web of laws, practices, and attitudes that reﬂect acceptance of a
business culture and system that facilitate entrepreneurial activity
(and permits failure), encourages wealth accumulation, promotes
competition, and provides ﬂexibility in the use of labor and other
inputs.
The “model” contains many elements. One is a relatively reduced
role of government as a participant in and, especially, regulator of the
economy. Another is the preponderant role played by the stock and
bond markets as a source for investment capital—compared to the
Continent, where the banking system is more heavily involved—and,
related to that, the high percentage of shareholding by the general
public, which thus has a direct stake in the economy. A third is the
similarities of the two countries’ legal and accounting systems. Fourth
is the strength of the ﬁnancial services sector, consisting of a vast
array of market participants ranging from ﬁnancial intermediaries
and accountants to insurance and pension funds. And, ﬁnally, the
economies operate in a relatively transparent manner. This is perhaps
more so in the United States than the United Kingdom in regard to
the government and, increasingly, the private sector, as corporate
governance issues assume ever greater prominence.
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For the United States, these elements represent an essentially
continuous pattern of policy and practice, whereas in the United
Kingdom, they are the result of a signiﬁcant measure of policies
promoted by and adopted under the prime ministership of Margaret
Thatcher in the 1980s, and, after their success became apparent,
continued by the Labour government under Tony Blair. The net
result of the mutual embrace of this economic model is a strong
tendency to look at economic issues—domestic and international—
from a similar point of view.
However—and this is the second constituent—this similarity
of system and outlook is to some extent counterbalanced by UK
membership in the European Union (EU). The United Kingdom is
thus not a free agent in terms of economic policies and actions. EU
economic integration has progressed to a remarkable degree. The EU
single market, while clearly deﬁcient in many areas, is nonetheless
a reality over a wide range of economic activities. The EU has
competence in major areas, notably competition policy and trade
policy. Thus, the United Kingdom is but one of 25 member states
making an input to those policies. Similarly, the voluminous corpus
of EU law and regulation, the acquis communautaire, covers economic
subjects, and the United Kingdom, like all member states, is bound
by them. Thus, the freedom of action of the United Kingdom is, in
many respects, limited.
Nonetheless, there is an important exception; that is the British
“opt-out,” i.e., nonparticipation, in the EU’s Economic and Monetary
Union, whose central feature is the single currency. This sets the
United Kingdom apart—and enables it to play an independent
role—in a major area of economic activity, one where the U.S.-UK
bilateral relationship is unique, as will be described below. With that
exception, however, the economic counterpart of the United States is,
in large measure, the EU rather than the United Kingdom, or, indeed,
any of the other EU member states. Thus, the United States cannot
interact in the economic area with the United Kingdom in isolation
from the EU, which means dealing with the European Commission
and many or all of the member states.
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PRIVATE SECTOR RELATIONSHIP
Trade.
The simplest measure of bilateral economic interaction is trade—
a signiﬁcant, though not special, relationship. The United Kingdom
consistently has been an important trading partner of the United
States. In terms of trade in goods, the United Kingdom is currently
the fourth ranking overseas U.S. partner—not counting its contiguous
neighbors, Canada and Mexico—after Japan, China, and Germany.
It accounts for 3.6 percent of total U.S. goods trade, about the same
level as Korea, amounting to just over $80 billion per year.1 However,
the composition of U.S.-UK trade has changed dramatically from
goods to services, a trend that is likely to continue. In this sector, the
United Kingdom, which accounts for 12 percent of world trade in
services, ranks as the biggest U.S. trading partner.2
Regarding total trade ﬂows in the two directions, the United
Kingdom was the destination for 4.3 percent of U.S. exports in 2004,
while imports from the United Kingdom were a smaller share of the
total—3.1 percent. Interestingly, these shares are lower than those
achieved in recent years: export share peaked at 5.3-5.7 percent in
1997-2001, while imports fell within the 3.4-3.8 percent range during
the period 1991-2002.3
Investment.
Trade is, however, a much narrower indicator of economic
interaction than investment. Intracompany trade accounts for a
signiﬁcant share of total trade, and sales by foreign afﬁliates dwarf
trade volumes. In addition, of course, investment relations are deeper
and more lasting than trade.
Looked at in terms of both investment ﬂows and stock of
investment, the United Kingdom is the top destination for U.S. direct
investment. In 2004, over $23 billion was invested in the United
Kingdom, amounting to 10 percent of U.S. worldwide investment
and 28 percent of its investment in Western Europe. The total stock
of U.S. investment in the United Kingdom is almost $300 billion, a

20

ﬁgure approximately 30 percent greater than that in the next most
important destination, Canada.4 Over one million people in the United
Kingdom work for U.S.-owned companies. Small and medium-sized
U.S. enterprises participate very actively in this investment.5
By the same token, the United Kingdom predominates as a
destination for U.S. investment in the EU. Except for one “bad” year
(2001), the United Kingdom accounted for between 28 percent and
49 percent of annual U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) that ﬂowed
into the EU during the 10-year period from 1994 to 2003. Similarly,
when measuring the stock of U.S. FDI in the same period (without
excluding 2001), the United Kingdom has accounted for a range of
32-41 percent in the EU. Of possible signiﬁcance, both shares (the
United Kingdom as a destination of U.S. FDI in the EU and in the
world) peaked in the late 1990s; nevertheless, the United Kingdom
easily maintained its number one position. 6
The attractions of the United Kingdom as a destination for U.S.
investment are many—some tangible, others less so. A common
language and, to a somewhat lesser extent, common culture rank
high on the list. The business environment is clearly favorable: the
United Kingdom offers a well-developed infrastructure, receptivity
to inward investment (and more generally to “outsiders” doing
business in the United Kingdom), a political and legal system that
offers conﬁdence to investors that they will be equitably treated,
ease of entry (and departure), low taxes, a skilled and well-educated
workforce, labor ﬂexibility, a strong research and development
(R&D) sector, and, ﬁnally, an intangible but signiﬁcant factor of
comfort level. 7
In the early stages of the EU, the United Kingdom was viewed
by many U.S. companies as a gateway or staging area into what
began as a customs union and then developed into an increasingly
integrated economic area. However, over time the attraction of the
United Kingdom was reduced by rising costs, competition from
other destinations (notably Ireland, which featured low taxes, a
common language, and a plentiful and well-educated workforce),
and American ﬁrms’ increasing comfort with locating elsewhere
in the EU. Thus, there has been some increase in investment in the
rest of the EU. Reﬂecting the decline in manufacturing in the United
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Kingdom, the share of that sector in U.S. investment in the United
Kingdom has fallen from 39 percent to 15 percent. However, the
decline was offset by other attractive areas, with most of that money
moving into the ﬁnance, information technology, and property
sectors.8
One factor potentially affecting investment in the United Kingdom
is the British opt-out of the single currency, and its continued
reluctance to join. The “drying up” of inward investment predicted
by some when the Euro was introduced, without UK participation,
has not taken place. However, the further away British entry into the
Economic and Monetary Union seems, the more likely investment
in the United Kingdom—not only by U.S. ﬁrms—will be adversely
affected. That will be particularly so if the UK economy ceases to
outperform that of the Eurozone. Observers in the United Kingdom
report that Britain’s opt-out has not been a major factor in inward
investment decisions thus far, as most investors have assumed that
the United Kingdom will eventually join the eurozone. However,
ﬁrms that operate on small margins and are currency sensitive are
concerned about the situation.
Another potentially negative factor in U.S. investment decisions
is the further development of EU social legislation—regulating many
of the conditions of employment and the rights of workers—and its
extension to the United Kingdom. Although the United Kingdom
received an opt-out from this legislation, there are pressures within
the EU to terminate this exemption. Were the exemption to be
rescinded, the attractiveness of the United Kingdom as a destination
for U.S. investment would be diminished. Still, developments in these
two areas—the future of the single currency and social legislation—
may be affected by the crisis within the EU as a result of the French
and Dutch rejection of the draft EU Constitution.
On the other side of the ledger, the United Kingdom remains
a popular site for U.S. companies. An estimated 7,500 U.S. ﬁrms
have ofﬁces in the United Kingdom. Of these, 500 are corporate
headquarters, often of regional operations. It is estimated that onehalf of U.S. companies with corporate ofﬁces in Europe have located
those ofﬁces in the United Kingdom.9
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Tourism.
The United Kingdom is the most important U.S. partner in twoway tourism. Although U.S. residents travel more frequently to
Canada and Mexico, expenditures on travel and transportation are
highest for visits to the United Kingdom. In 2000, more than four
million Americans spent over $11 billion traveling to the United
Kingdom, compared with $7.5 billion (the second highest sum) in
Mexico. In the other direction, British visitors to the United States
number annually just under ﬁve million and spend almost $13
billion, ﬁgures that place it only slightly below Japan.10
Financial Market.
Here is perhaps where the “special economic relationship” is
most evident—indeed, the word “unique” is not out of place. The
historical ties between American and British capital date back to the
19th century, when British investment played an important role in the
economic development of the United States. Banking relationships
have a long history; many banks were well-established in the other’s
country in the period between the two world wars, if not before.
One can speak of a single ﬁnancial market, located in London and
New York. Each is a ﬁnancial powerhouse, and each is an undisputed
ﬁnancial center—London in Europe and New York in the United
States. The New York Stock Exchange is the biggest stock exchange
in the world, and it, together with New York-based Nasdaq, gives
the United States its preeminent position for stock trading. London
manages almost half of Europe’s institutional equity capital, and 70
percent of Eurobonds are traded in London. It is also the world’s
largest international insurance and foreign exchange market.11
American and British ﬁnancial institutions are major players in the
world, accustomed to working globally. The U.S. investment banking
community has acquired a preeminent position in London, while UK
commercial banks are very competitive and present globally. Of the
world’s top 15 “tier one capital” banks, over one-half are American
or British (four banks each).12 There are more American banks in
London than in New York (a reﬂection of the prevalence of U.S.
regional—not New York—banks that have international operations).
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These developments were facilitated by the similarity of economic
and legal systems and the role of stock and bond markets in the two
countries. It also has spurred the expansion of American-British ties
in other related sectors, notably insurance and law ﬁrms.
In one manifestation of this relationship, U.S. bank claims on and
liabilities to the United Kingdom are vast, second only to the Cayman
Islands. U.S. claims on the United Kingdom and Cayman Islands at
the end of 2004 were both about half a trillion dollars, with the next
country, the Bahamas, accounting for only about one-ﬁfth of that
amount. U.S. liabilities to the British were about $430 billion (for the
Cayman Islands, it was double that ﬁgure). The total U.S. banking
relationship (claims and liabilities) with the United Kingdom has
grown from the equivalent of 10 percent of world trade in 1978 to 19
percent in 2004.13
Defense Industry.
Although close relationships exist in a number of industrial sectors,
probably none is closer than in the defense industry. However, unlike
the other sectors, government policies and actions largely determine
the nature and extent of the relationship. Closely held and subject to
government control, U.S. defense technology sharing takes place at a
higher level with the United Kingdom than with virtually any other
country (Australia and Canada also vie for that position).
Trade in defense equipment is signiﬁcant, and it ﬂows in both
directions. American ﬁrms are routinely invited to bid on British
defense tenders, and they have registered many successes. The
United Kingdom is by far the largest overseas buyer of American
products. Major British purchases have included the Apache
helicopter, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), and
Airborne Stand-off Radar (ASTOR). Moreover, the United Kingdom
is the launch customer for the C-130J aircraft.
By the same token, UK companies are among the most active
participants in the “special security arrangement,” under which
U.S.-based subsidiaries of foreign companies can be certiﬁed to bid
as subcontractors on U.S. tenders. The most notable recent instance
was the U.S. Navy’s decision in early 2005 to accept the Lockheed-
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Martin-led bid for the new Presidential helicopter ﬂeet, which
includes a British component.
Signiﬁcant shares of the U.S. market are held by such British ﬁrms
as Rolls Royce, Martin Baker, and Smith Industries. However, the
leading British player is BAE, the ﬁfth largest supplier of hardware to
the U.S. military (and the largest foreign supplier). Like other British
ﬁrms, BAE has been looking to increase its business opportunities
in the United States. Its recent multibillion dollar purchases include
Lockheed-Martin’s electronic assets and United Defense Industries,
the latter ($3.5 billion) being the largest foreign takeover of an
American defense company. By any measure, BAE is a signiﬁcant
player in the U.S. defense industry sector, employing over 25,000 in
its U.S. operations.
A further example of close cooperation is the Joint Strike Fighter
project, in which the United Kingdom is a major partner. BAE is an
associate prime contractor, participating in the work and technology
on the new aircraft, which will be purchased by both governments.
The dispute that erupted in 2004 between the United States and
the EU over the possible lifting of the latter’s embargo on arms sales
to China placed the British defense industry in a delicate position.
While it did not want to forgo business opportunities in China, at
the same time it did not want to jeopardize existing and potential
business and the transfer of technology with the United States.
On balance, the latter consideration prevailed, and BAE, for one,
announced publicly it would not participate in trade with China.
The British government generally reﬂected industry’s position, at
ﬁrst going along with the French and German-led initiative to lift the
embargo, but backing away quickly when vociferous U.S. opposition
surfaced.
GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP
Multilateral.
The world’s multilateral economic agenda is vast, and so is the
range of multilateral institutions that deal with it. Both the U.S. and
UK governments interact on these many issues as they operate in a
multilateral context.
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In general, the two governments convey similar messages
on issues relating to the world economy—what policies national
governments should follow to enhance economic growth, operation
of the international monetary system, trade policy, operation of
the international ﬁnancial institutions, and the like—in the course
of what might be called normal international discourse, including
more speciﬁcally the G-7/G-8 and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). On the whole, the United
States and United Kingdom work together in those forums to
promote their mutual interests.
In some areas, however, there is a signiﬁcant difference in
policy. The most notable example is the environment, particularly in
attitudes toward the Kyoto Convention. The United Kingdom has
agreed with the consensus view within the EU—and indeed virtually
the rest of the world—and worked toward the adoption of the
Convention, while the United States has ﬁrmly refused to accede to
it. Nonetheless, the United Kingdom accepts that the United States
will not accede to Kyoto, and thus seeks to ﬁnd common ground in
other aspects of environmental policy.
On the other hand, the two governments have traditionally seen
eye-to-eye on trade, where they have been leaders in efforts to build
and maintain a liberal trading system, including the current work
on the Doha multilateral trading round. However, on trade, the
United Kingdom cannot carry out an independent policy because
competence for trade lies with the EU. Thus, the United Kingdom
remains one voice out of 25—albeit a strong and inﬂuential one—on
all trade issues. Nonetheless, that has not prevented U.S. and UK
negotiators on the Doha round from working closely together.
European Union.
The United States and EU have grappled with a host of trade
disputes over the years, while at the same time enjoying an
unprecedented and ﬂourishing economic relationship (a sometimesoverlooked, but critical, fact). Looking through the list of recent
issues, one ﬁnds some concordance of position, but also many
instances where the United States and the United Kingdom are on
opposite sides of the argument.
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• EU regulation of chemical substances: With similar industrial
interests and views on regulation (less is better than more),
the two governments have fought for an extensive wateringdown of the proposal of the European Commission for
registering, evaluating, and authorizing chemicals (REACH).
• U.S. foreign sales corporation: In the long struggle over U.S.
legislation, the United Kingdom played a constructive role in
the ultimately successful effort to keep the issue from getting
out of control, giving the United States leeway in terms of time
and modalities for settlement. Following the adoption of new
tax provisions in the United States, the British government
sought to prevent a return of the issue to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and the reimposition of sanctions by the
EU.
• EU banana regime: The United Kingdom historically protected
the banana exports of its former colonies in the Caribbean at
the expense of Latin American producers, and thus it was not
particularly sympathetic to U.S. efforts to prevent a restrictive
EU regime from replacing the various national regimes.
However, it believed the EU should comply with the WTO
ruling in favor of the United States, a view that was reinforced
by U.S. retaliation against imported cashmere sweaters.
• Biotechnology/genetically-modiﬁed organisms: In the long-running U.S.-EU battles over a number of issues in this area,
the United Kingdom generally has supported the U.S. view
that decisions should be based on scientiﬁc evidence, despite
strong opposition from the British public that is very “proenvironmentalist.”
• U.S. safeguard action against steel imports: Like the rest of the
EU, the United Kingdom, which exports signiﬁcant quantities
of specialty steel to the United States, sharply criticized
President Bush’s ﬁrst-term action (subsequently rescinded).
It pressed for, and received, exemptions from the increased
tariffs.
• Airbus subsidies: As a major participant in the Airbus
consortium, the United Kingdom has stoutly defended
Airbus against U.S. allegations of unfair subsidization and
27

criticized what it considers to be comparable subsidies by
the U.S. military to U.S. commercial aircraft manufacturers.
Nonetheless, it favors a negotiated settlement rather than
seeking recourse to the WTO.
• EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): Because of the nature
of its agriculture and its domestic agricultural policy, the
United Kingdom has been among the sharpest internal critics
of the CAP, thus lending support to the United States in its
long-standing efforts to reduce the distortions it has caused to
world agricultural trade. Prime Minister Blair made this clear
in the EU budgetary dispute in June 2005.
• Regulatory convergence: This is a major undertaking designed
to reduce the impediments arising from differences in
regulatory regimes in the United States and EU. While
American and British regulators generally share a similar
regulatory philosophy, some problems have arisen from
differences between the regulatory structures in the two
countries. The United Kingdom has been bothered by the
reluctance of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
to recognize decisions of British regulators and the problems
caused by regulation of insurance at the state, rather than
national, level. On the other side, U.S. regulators occasionally
have felt that the UK Financial Services Authority has not
adopted sufﬁciently tough positions in the EU, where it plays
an inﬂuential role.
Whether in agreement or not, there is intense, extensive, and
positive interaction between the two governments. U.S. government
ofﬁcials have found their British counterparts to be open and helpful.
The British are good sources of information on the inner workings of
the EU for their American colleagues. However, this occurs primarily
when the two governments are on the same side of an issue. Not
surprisingly, when they are not, the United Kingdom is considerably
less helpful.
Traditionally, there has been a tendency for some parts of the
U.S. government to assume that the United Kingdom is on its side
on issues under consideration at the EU, and that the British can, or
28

should, be counted on to promote U.S. views. As seen above, the ﬁrst
premise is by no means universally correct. While overall the British
outlook and objectives are in accord with those of the United States,
on many speciﬁc issues that simply is not the case. With regard to
the British role inside the EU, the United Kingdom is an active and
inﬂuential player in the EU deliberations. Suspect in the eyes of many
other members for Britain’s “outsider” status—i.e., opt-out of the
Euro and generally weak support for further integration and market
regulation—British ofﬁcials have to take care not to be perceived by
other member states as carrying water for the United States as they
pursue UK policy objectives.
Bilateral.
Signiﬁcant bilateral economic differences are rare. The major
exception is the civil aviation relationship. This relationship is
governed by a long-standing bilateral agreement, Bermuda II, which
speciﬁes the conditions under which American and British carriers
can operate between the two countries. It has long been a bone of
contention, with the United States chaﬁng under what it considers to
be unduly restrictive provisions, particularly as regards access of its
carriers to Heathrow Airport; and the United Kingdom complaining
about U.S. restrictions on foreign ownership of U.S. airlines and
the ban on foreign carriers ﬂying between points inside the United
States. The United Kingdom has stoutly resisted U.S. efforts to bring
the bilateral agreement more closely into accord with the series of
“open skies” regimes it has negotiated with almost all European
countries in recent years. However, after an unsuccessful 2-plus year
effort to renegotiate Bermuda II bilaterally, the issue will move from
the bilateral to the EU sphere. The European Court of Justice has
conﬁrmed that civil aviation agreements fall within the competence
of the EU, rather than the individual member states, and thus this
issue will be added to the U.S.-EU portfolio.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The U.S. economic and business relationship with the United
Kingdom is without any doubt among its most important. The
29

United Kingdom is a major economic partner, both in the public
and private spheres. In some respects the relationship is distinctive,
unique, and—yes—special.
Are there ways this relationship can be improved, i.e., rendered
more effective in meeting the two countries’ objectives? On the
business side, the answer is probably “not to any signiﬁcant extent.”
The framework within which businesses operate and business
decisions are made is ﬁrmly established, well-known, and not
notably in need of change. On the government-to-government side,
there is little apparent need for structural or institutional change.
The governments know each other well and communicate freely and
frequently.
The one area where improvement could be made is the quality
of government-to-government interaction. This has two aspects.
First, exchanges between American and British bureaucrats should
be expanded. A program similar to the existing exchange of U.S.
and British diplomats, under which Americans serve a tour in the
Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce and British do likewise at the
State Department, should be introduced for the UK Department of
Trade and Industry and the Treasury. In addition, British bureaucrats
visiting Washington should regularly add the U.S. Congress to their
schedule. Both sides can proﬁt from an improved understanding
of the other’s points of view and positions in the decisionmaking
process .
Second, the selection of the American ambassador to the United
Kingdom should be made on the basis of competence rather than
political indebtedness, as has almost invariably been the case.
Unless the function of the ambassador is deemed to be superﬂuous
to bilateral dialogue and interaction—certainly not the view of the
British government, which has invariably sent its most qualiﬁed
diplomat—it behooves the United States to send ambassadors with
the experience and skills to promote U.S. interests and enhance this
special relationship, whether it be a career or a noncareer person.
Indeed, at this time of heightened transatlantic misunderstanding, it
is all the more essential for the United States to ﬁeld an ambassador
who can articulate U.S. policy and seek to inﬂuence government
policy and public opinion abroad.
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Finally, in the EU context, it is essential that the remarkably
effective relationship between American and European trade
negotiators Robert Zoellick and Pascal Lamy be replicated by their
successors. The personalities of their successors, Peter Mandelson
and Robert Portman, give grounds for hope, but only time will tell
how effectively their relationship works as they grapple with a
range of difﬁcult issues, which will necessarily affect the bilateral
relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom.
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CHAPTER 3
ANGLO-AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS
RELATIONSHIPS: A BRITISH PERSPECTIVE
Ray Raymond
The great British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury is said to have
remarked to Her Majesty Queen Victoria, “Change, change, why do
we need more change? Aren’t things bad enough already?”
As one of the architects of the Anglo-American rapprochement
at the end of the 19th century, Lord Salisbury would be delighted by
the revitalization of the British economy and the strengthening of the
Anglo-American economic relationship over the past 25 years, and
especially over the last 8. They completely refute the conclusions
of the inﬂuential Wilson Center–Ditchley Foundation conferences
published in 1988 that Britain’s importance to the United States as an
economic partner was diminishing rapidly. Simply put, the WilsonDitchley analysis — understandable in the context of the times
— was that the United Kingdom (UK) was sinking into increasing
poverty because of its declining productivity and competitiveness.
In broader strategic terms, therefore, Britain was counting for less
and less, and its ability to function as an effective strategic partner
for the United States was almost at an end.
What a difference the consistent and rigorous application of
sound ﬁscal, micro, and macro economic and monetary policies
make. Today, in 2005, Britain is experiencing the longest period of
continuous economic growth and increased living standards seen
in the past half a century. As UK Chancellor Gordon Brown said in
his budget speech earlier this year, “Britain begins the 21st century
from a ﬁrm foundation of the lowest inﬂation for 30 years, the lowest
interest rates for 40 years, and the highest level of employment in
our history. Unlike the United States, the Eurozone, and Japan, the
British economy has grown uninterrupted every quarter over the
past 6 years.”
Despite the world economic downturn of 2001-02, Britain has
overtaken France as the world’s fourth largest economy and, if
current economic trends continue, some experts believe the UK
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could overtake Germany as the world’s third largest economy
by about 2012. Perhaps the most telling statistics are that British
unemployment is approximately half that in the Eurozone; that unlike
the United States, the UK actually gained jobs during the slowdown
of 2001-02; that the UK’s productivity per capita has overtaken Japan
and is poised to overtake Germany. Britain still lags far behind the
United States in productivity, but continues to learn from American
innovation, competition, and enterprise.
There are two main reasons for this dramatic transformation: the
ﬁrst is the supply-side reforms of the Thatcher years, supplemented
by those of Gordon Brown since 1997; the second is the new monetary
and ﬁscal framework introduced in 1997 which has helped create a
stronger, more ﬂexible, more enterprising Britain. UK monetary and
ﬁscal policy has responded successfully to the recent world economic
downturn and kept the British economy stable and growing. This
economically resurgent Britain is a more important economic partner
for the United States than at any time since the beginning of the 20th
century.
The Private Sector Relationship.
The ﬁrst key feature of the U.S.-UK economic special relationship
is the remarkable interpenetration of the two economies. Today, more
than half of the total earnings of U.S. overseas investors are accounted
for by Europe. And, within Europe, the UK is overwhelmingly the
most important single national market for corporate America. On
average, about 40 percent of all U.S. investment in Europe goes to
the UK. British ofﬁcials estimate that over 60 percent of American
companies doing business in the European Union (EU) have their
European headquarters in the UK. During the 1990s, U.S. investment
in the United Kingdom (at $175 billion) was nearly 50 percent larger
than the total invested by American ﬁrms in the whole Asia-Paciﬁc
region.
Of course, U.S. ﬁrms are investing very large sums in China,
India, and Brazil, but what is little noticed is that America’s stock
of assets in the UK alone is almost equal to the combined overseas
afﬁliate base of U.S. ﬁrms in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the
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Middle East. In an average year, total sales by U.S. ﬁrms in the UK
alone, at over $400 billion, are greater than aggregate U.S. sales in the
whole of Latin America and almost double those in Germany.
And what about jobs? Today, U.S. ﬁrms employ about 1.3
million workers in Britain. That is more than the entire U.S. afﬁliate
work force in all developing Asia and ﬁve times greater than those
working for American ﬁrms in China. Moreover, the British return
the compliment. Over 1.2 million Americans go to work each day in
British-owned companies in the United States. And just as the United
States is Britain’s largest investor, so the UK by far is America’s
largest foreign investor, with total foreign direct investment (FDI) of
over $280 billion.
If the investment relationship is special, the links between the
London and New York ﬁnancial markets are truly unique. The
historical relationship between British and American capital dates
back to the 18th century when British investment played an important
role in the economic development of the original 13 colonies and in
stabilizing U.S. public ﬁnances after the Revolutionary War. Later,
British investment bankers provided much of the capital that ﬁnanced
America’s phenomenal economic growth in the 19th century.
As Michael Calingaert writes in his contribution to this book, it is
now possible to “speak of a single ﬁnancial market located in London
and New York. Each is a ﬁnancial powerhouse,” and all the evidence
is that they will continue to dominate global ﬁnancial markets for the
rest of 21st century. Together, London and New York account for
just over 50 percent of global foreign exchange dealing, 92 percent of
foreign equity trading, and 28 percent of cross-border bank lending.
London is the world leader in fund management, New York a close
second. New York is the global leader in mergers and acquisitions,
London second. Their shared dominance is underpinned by the
shared Anglo-American legal systems that govern such a large
portion of international mergers and acquisitions and public stock
offerings. Their shared dominance is reinforced by the UK-U.S.-led
surge in international mergers and acquisitions throughout the 1990s
and by the UK-led move to privatization of publicly-owned services
and utilities.
Above all, the London-New York link has been reinforced
by globalization and, ironically, the introduction of the Euro.
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Globalization has done three things to reinforce the unique New
York-London partnership. The ﬁrst is that it has encouraged the
major players — Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, HSBC
— to have operations in both cities. The second is that globalization
has compelled the big American investment houses to increase their
operations in London because it is the best way to win more business
in global markets. The third way globalization has reinforced the New
York-London dominance is that it gives investors and issuers of stock
what they both want: access to the widest range of global securities
and investment products and a worldwide pool of global investors.
The introduction of the Euro has also strengthened the New YorkLondon link because it has encouraged more U.S. investment houses
to see London as their base for European mergers and acquisitions
work and to increase their presence there accordingly.
The Anglo-American Model.
The second special feature of Anglo-American economic relations
is the remarkable breadth of agreement between contemporary
U.S. administrations (Democrat or Republican) and contemporary
British governments (Conservative or New Labour) over so many
fundamental areas of economic policy. This level of agreement
is the product of more than 20 years of convergence in thinking
about economic policy and in results achieved. Britain has shaped
U.S. thinking on deregulation, privatization of public services, and
enterprise zones. The United States taught Britain the importance of
ﬂexible labor markets, welfare reform, and having an independent
central bank responsible for monetary policy. Overall, the AngloAmerican “model” aims to reduce the role of government as a
regulator of economic activity and to change it from a provider
to an enabler of services; to create ﬂexible labor markets and
entrepreneurship, promote competition, and encourage wealth
accumulation through ownership of property and stocks, thereby
creating an “ownership society.” There are areas where we differ —
the ﬁnancing of health care being the most obvious. But what unites
us is far more powerful than what divides us. In my judgment, what
the Anglo-American model boils down to is: (1) the abandonment of
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the old-style socialist or Great Society welfare state in favor of free
market capitalism, and (2) the belief that government should be an
enabling force empowering, encouraging, and equipping its citizens
to meet the challenges of globalization. Lest there be any doubt,
compare the essence of President George W. Bush’s compassionate
conservatism with that of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Third Way.
Here is Myron Magnet, the intellectual architect of compassionate
conservatism on the welfare state: President Bush’s campaign for
Social Security reform “is part of the large and coherent worldview
that has evolved out of compassionate conservatism. What has made
America exceptional is limitless opportunity for everyone, at all
levels — the chance to ﬁnd a job, to advance up the ladder as you
prove yourself, and to prosper. A giant welfare state hampers the job
creation that makes all this opportunity possible. Bush is determined
to keep the dynamism vibrant and to encourage and empower the
poor to take part in it, rather than suggest that they are unequal to
the task.” And here is Tony Blair on the same topic: “The challenge
of modern employment is about extending welfare to work, making
work pay, and investing in the skills individuals need. In a more
insecure and demanding labor market, it recognises that people will
change jobs more often, and believes government has a vital role
in equipping individuals to prosper.” Unless I am badly mistaken,
the President and the Prime Minister would agree with the recent
comments of the White House Director of Strategic Initiatives:
“Government’s default position should not be to view citizens as
wards of the state, but rather as responsible and independent, selfsufﬁcient and upright.”
And it is no accident that the two major economies which have
performed best over the last decade are the two that have put this
philosophy into practice: Britain and the United States. And because
Britain and the United States have created this model, the two
governments generally approach most domestic and international
economic policy issues from a shared perspective.
In his chapter, Michael Calingaert suggests that, apart from civil
aviation, there are very few differences between the two governments.
This is true, but understates the closeness and intensity of the policy
collaboration between London and Washington today in all the key
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multilateral forums, including the EU. The UK and United States
not only share a common business model, but also a belief that they
must lead the process of labor, capital, and product reform in Europe
so that they can create a more open market across the Atlantic which
will beneﬁt the EU as well as the United States. The total annual twoway ﬂow of foreign direct investment of goods and services between
the United States and the EU is over $2.5 trillion, but it could be even
higher.
The British and U.S. treasuries believe that if the United States
and EU break down more of the remaining transatlantic barriers and
create a more open market across the Atlantic, then this could bring
about $350 billion in beneﬁts for both the United States and the EU.
How to get there? Faster removal of industrial tariffs and nontariff
barriers, liberalization in services, labor market reforms, common
accounting standards, and closer regulatory cooperation to prevent
domestic regulators from putting up barriers to trade and causing
needless conﬂicts.
Not surprisingly, elements of this reform agenda are key priorities
for the British Presidency of the EU, including initiatives to reassess
and, if necessary, roll back unnecessary regulation now damaging
competitiveness; and strengthening systems used to monitor whether
the beneﬁts of proposed regulations outweigh the costs, etc. That
Britain will be able to achieve any of these much needed reforms is
highly questionable.
Britain, the United States, and the EU.
Unfortunately, the similarity of outlook, policy, and system
between the United States and the United Kingdom is offset by
British membership of the EU. This limits Britain’s freedom of action
especially in trade and competition policy, where, for better or worse,
competence has been ceded to Brussels. As Michael Calingaert
points out, the UK has had to absorb the entire corpus of EU law
and regulation into its domestic law which, in my judgment, has
often worked against the UK government’s own efforts to embrace
the challenges of globalization, forcing British Ministers and ofﬁcials
to spend enormous amounts of valuable time ﬁghting the EU’s
damaging directives. The prolonged showdown over Britain’s wise
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opt-out from the absurdly restrictive EU working time directive is just
one example. Calingaert is right in pointing out that today in large
measure, the U.S. economic counterpart is now the EU rather than
the UK or, indeed, any of the 24 other EU member states. Whether
that will continue to be the case remains to be seen. As the recent
U.S. National Intelligence Council Report on the World in 2020 has
correctly argued, continuing economic sclerosis in the Eurozone
“could lead to the splintering or, at worst, the disintegration of the
EU.”
The crisis of conﬁdence and direction which the EU now faces
after the rejection of the EU Constitution by French and Dutch
voters and the collapse of the its June 2005 Budget summit are about
much more than economics. The crisis was brought on by profound
anger over the EU’s democratic deﬁcit: the failure of European
governments to consult their electorates about key decisions,
combined with the lack of democratic accountability in the EU’s
own decisionmaking. It is a crisis brought about also by the failure
of the European economic model to deliver jobs and prosperity, by
enlargement, by the reemergence of nationalism, and by the rejection
of the more integrationist vision of Europe’s future. It is now clear
that there exists a yawning chasm between the integrationist vision
of European bureaucratic and political elites and the legitimate
aspirations of their citizens to retain their national identity.
Above all, however, the truth is that globalization has thrown
a harsh light on the failure of the Eurozone. Or, as Myron Magnet
has rightly put it, “The failure of the European model . . . is one
of the signal facts of our era. In Europe, the idea that capitalism
creates a permanently jobless class has become a self-fulﬁlling
prophecy, as strict regulation and the high taxes needed to pay
lavish welfare and unemployment beneﬁts have resulted in half the
U.S. rate of job creation, twice the rate of unemployment, and much
less opportunity.” The Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) agrees with Magnet, warning European
leaders this summer that without labor market and welfare reform,
the Eurozone is doomed to terminal economic decline.
The conclusion is clear: The Anglo-American model offers the
only credible way forward, and its European critics should be
honest enough to recognize that it is not the Dickensian bogeyman
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they like to say it is. For example, both Britain and the United States
have increased national public spending on primary and secondary
education and on health care. Both countries have also implemented
welfare reform and reduced child poverty. As Blair argued in his
masterful speech to the European Parliament on June 23, 2005,
Europe can either huddle together under the bed covers hoping
globalization will go away, or it can confront its challenges head on.
But will it?
The evidence is not encouraging. Like the German voters of
North Rhine Westphalia in May 2005, the voters of France and the
Netherlands a month later emphatically rejected the structural reforms
necessary to increase productivity and enhance competitiveness.
Financial Times columnist Quentin Peel is surely right when he argues
that “the prospects for embracing difﬁcult economic reforms may be
as moribund as those for ratifying the constitutional treaty.”
Worse, the political inﬂuence of Britain, the one European power
willing to ﬁght for structural reform, has been seriously weakened
by recent developments. In 2004, British inﬂuence appeared to be
increasing. The defeat of the Franco-German-backed candidate for
President of the European Commission, the election of the British–
backed Barosso and his pro-growth, pro-reform agenda (much of
which was shaped by British thinking), and the continuing economic
failure of the Eurozone, suggested that the UK might be able to change
the European agenda. This hope was reinforced because enlargement
changed the correlation of forces within the EU by giving Britain
new allies who wanted more open, ﬂexible economies.
In April 2005, because of this background, I was far too optimistic
in my presentation to the second of the two conferences on which this
book is based. I thought that economic realism would prevail within
the EU, but I was wrong. As I write in early July 2005, the EU is in
utter disarray, and the prospects for real reform are more remote than
ever. The regional election results in North Rhine Westphalia alluded
to above showed that German voters deeply opposed even the initial
steps towards labor market reform proposed by Chancellor Gerhard
Schroeder. The referendum results in France and the Netherlands
showed that the revolt against labor market reform was not conﬁned
to Germany. The EU crisis has been made worse by the failure of the
recent Brussels summit, for which most Europeans blame Blair. The
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Prime Minister’s ﬁrm and justiﬁed insistence that any reduction in
the British rebate must be linked to broader reform of the EU budget
and the Common Agricultural Policy alienated even his closest allies
in East-Central Europe. They were understandably upset because
they needed a budget deal to release funds to help rebuild their
economies. Most of them remain supportive of his reform agenda,
but relations need to be repaired. Even when they are, however, the
Prime Minister faces a much more difﬁcult obstacle: weakened and
defensive French and German governments. As Peel astutely put
it: “Far from clearing the way for British leadership, such FrancoGerman weakness is more likely to guarantee gridlock.” In other
words, getting an EU-wide commitment to structural reform is
further away than ever.
Conclusion.
In his speech to the European Parliament on June 24, 2005, Blair
was right to warn that Europe faced “failure on a grand strategic
scale” if it tried to hold back the forces of globalization and block
the economic reforms necessary to save it from terminal economic
decline. I believe that that moment of failure is already at hand:
The core of the Eurozone is already many miles down the road to
terminal decline, and neither its voters nor its elected leaders appear
to have the political will to embrace the painful reforms necessary
to reverse it. The result — as the U.S. National Intelligence Council
predicts — will be the splintering and possible disintegration of the
EU.
So where does that leave the special relationship? The short
answer is that it becomes more special and more vital than ever. The
interpenetration of our two dynamic economies is deeper than ever.
The vast ﬂows of investment between our two countries grow ever
greater, and the London-New York dominance of world ﬁnancial
markets seems assured for the foreseeable future. Britain and the
United States have never been more important economic partners
for each other. Together they need to look beyond Europe to meet
the challenge from the two sunrise economies of the 21st century:
China and India. In addition to investing more in each other, this is
where the United States and UK should be investing their ﬁnancial
and diplomatic resources.
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CHAPTER 4
THE ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS DIMENSION:
PANEL CHAIRMAN’S SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Erik R. Peterson
Look back 60 years, to the end of the Second World War, and imagine that
it had marked too the end of the alliance between Europe and America.
We would not have the great institutions which that alliance forged in
the aftermath of war—the UN, NATO, the World Bank, the IMF. Without
America’s support, Europe’s reconstruction would have been longer and
more arduous; its democracies today far less ﬁrmly entrenched; and the
unique enterprise of the European Union might never have got past
the planning stage. The Cold War might not have been won—it might
even have been lost, in Europe at least. The great wave of economic
liberalization and political freedom which has so enriched billions of
lives might have been no more than a ripple.

The words above were spoken on May 18, 2005, at my
organization, the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), by UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, as part of a speech he
entitled “A Partnership for Wider Freedom.” Three months earlier,
U.S. President George W. Bush had described the importance of
U.S.-European relations this way: “Our strong friendship is essential
to peace and prosperity across the globe—and no temporary debate,
no passing disagreement of governments, no power on earth will
ever divide us.”1
Both these statements emphasize the signiﬁcance of cooperation
between Europe and the United States in a range of events that helped
shape the world around us today, and by their nature and context
imply that such cooperation is equally necessary if we are to confront
effectively challenges that lie in the future. And by their respective
contexts, they both clearly imply that the role of the United Kingdom
(UK) in bridging Europe and America is as important today as it was
60 years ago.
This is the basis for the “special relationship” writ large, the
relationship that bundles critical U.S. and UK political, security,
economic, ﬁnancial, and other interests across the Atlantic. It is also
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the basis for the relationship described by U.S. Undersecretary of
State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns soon after he assumed his
most recent portfolio at the State Department: “As a career diplomat,
I am convinced that our ability to succeed on this daunting agenda is
directly related to our ability to work closely and productively with
Europe. That is why it is ﬁtting to start my tenure here in Europe—
our indispensable partner—and speciﬁcally, in the United Kingdom,
our most trusted and indispensable ally.”2
In looking forward, the operative question is whether in a
highly complex future environment, the United States and the UK
can continue to give effect to these kinds of sweeping declaratory
statements. The key uncertainty is whether the two countries will
be able to maintain what has been “special” about their relations—
whether the UK will be able to maintain its identity as both a member
of the European Union (EU) and a close partner of the United States,
and whether the United States will continue to regard the UK at once
“part of” and yet “separate and distinct from” the rest of Europe. In
the end, the challenge is to create the basis of a continued “special
relationship” that will enable leaders to trumpet the beneﬁts of
cooperation, as Secretary Straw did last May, 60 years in the future.
How well we succeed will depend on our capacity to “build a better
and safer world through a renewed and reinvigorated alliance for
freedom between Europe and the United States,” as Secretary Straw
observed in his speech at CSIS.
There can be little doubt that economic and commercial relations
are at the core of the current “special relationship.” The two
countries have long been bound by signiﬁcant and longstanding
trade, investment, and business ties. And for good reason. First
and most obvious, they speak the same language. But the depth of
the relationship goes well beyond the common vocabulary of the
English language. Owing to the shared grammar of the “Anglo-Saxon
economic model” and commonly-held beliefs and practices when it
comes to corporate culture, the level of effective interaction at both
the government and private business levels has been pronounced.
Then there is the “tense” of U.S.-UK relations—past, present, and
future. The legacy of the special relationship itself is a foundation for
the perpetuation of the “special ties” that exist. That both sides are
building on a well-established pattern of cooperation shows that the
relationship beneﬁts from its own historical momentum.
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As impressive as they are, the empirical data on trade, investment,
and commercial cooperation only partially reﬂect the depth of the
relationship. Overall U.S.-EU economic relations are unparalleled. In
aggregate terms, the economic and commercial linkages between the
United States and Europe total some $2.5 trillion. More importantly,
the economies are inextricably linked at one level after the other—
through cross-investment, employment, trade of goods and services,
trade in services, capital ﬂows, and so on. Furthermore, cooperation
between the two largest economic entities on the planet3 is a
precondition for progress in dealing with the range of issues outside
their direct relations, stretching from progress in trade liberalization
through dealing with third-party states—in particular, the rapid
emergence of China as a global economic force—to the Doha
Development Round of the World Trade Organization and then to
the various G-8 agendas. These agendas include, most recently, such
important items as economic development in Africa and the spread
of weapons of mass destruction.4 Obviously, these dimensions of
transatlantic relations are often overshadowed by more immediate
political and security challenges, but the capacity of the two sides
to work together on broader economic and economic development
issues is essential to progress in a number of areas.5
Within this context of overall U.S.-European economic,
commercial, and ﬁnancial ties, the bilateral relationship between
the United States and the UK stands out. Despite the asymmetry
that characterizes the size of their respective economies (the UK
economy in 2004 was roughly 15 percent of its U.S. counterpart),
the two countries are important trading partners. The United States
was the UK’s largest export partner in 2005, accounting for some 15
percent of UK exports. In imports, the United States was the UK’s
second largest partner at 9.2 percent (behind only Germany).6 For
the United States, the UK is the sixth largest overseas partner in
trade in goods. In trade in services, the UK is now competing with
the Caribbean ﬁnancial centers as the largest U.S. trading partner.
In two-way tourism, also, the UK is Washington’s most important
partner. In 2004, the UK accounted for 4.3 percent of total U.S.
exports, while imports from the UK that year were 3.1 percent of
total U.S. imports.
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More signiﬁcant is the level of cross-investment. The UK is the
top destination for U.S. investment, accounting in 2004 for 10 percent
of total U.S. worldwide investment and 28 percent of its investment
in Europe. The total stock of U.S. investment in the UK, nearly $300
billion, is about 30 percent greater than the second most important
destination for U.S. investors—Canada. Thanks to U.S. investment,
1.3 million UK workers go to work each morning; on the other side of
the Atlantic, a few hours later, 1.2 Americans go to work generated
by investment from the UK.
These levels of interaction in trade and investment are
representative samples of a much fuller set of economic and business
relations that bind the two countries. Two other areas help deﬁne the
wider set of relations. The ﬁrst—the area in which the rubric “special
relationship” is perhaps most defensible—is in ﬁnancial markets, in
which both countries are world powers. Is it a surprise, then, that
there are more U.S.-owned banks in London than in New York?
The second is in defense industry cooperation—the by-product of
the strong bilateral and multilateral defense ties between the two
countries. This cooperation extends from trade in defense equipment
to technology sharing.
In addition, there is the element of economic dynamism. Pause
to consider the background of a Europe that has been anemic
economically over recent years, with an environment of relatively
high unemployment and pervasive workforce rigidities, all in the
context of political and social welfare systems that have failed to
demonstrate a capacity to adapt to future challenges (such as their
aging population and associated ﬁnancially challenged welfare and
retirement systems). Compared with all of this, the UK is truly a
bright spot. As Dr. Ray Raymond noted during our deliberations, the
UK economy has grown steadily over the past 6 years—pushing it in
front of France as the world’s fourth largest economy and positioning
it to overtake Germany as the third largest, possibly by the year 2012.
That economic dynamism, coupled with the similarities between the
economic and business systems, suggests that the UK is already a
“strategic” partner of the United States and poised to become an
even more signiﬁcant partner in the future.
The contrast between this economic performance and other EU
countries is striking. Over the past 2 years, for example, growth in
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France has slowed from 2.1 percent to 1.9 percent, and unemployment
has risen from 9.0 percent to 10.2 percent; in the Netherlands, the
unemployment rate last April was at its highest level in 9 years,
while the growth rate has fallen from 1.4 to 1.0 percent.7 These two
countries—two states which rejected by popular referendum the
EU constitution this spring—are symptomatic of many other of
the EU member states with respect to less than favorable economic
prospects. They make the economic dynamism in the UK all the
more noteworthy.
For these reasons—a shared “language,” a common outlook
based on the Anglo-Saxon model, vibrant bilateral trade and
investment ties, and economic vitality—there is a solid case that the
special relationship carries over to the economic and commercial
sphere. To suggest, however, that these elements will allow for the
perpetuation of the distinctive nature of the long-term relationship
may be premature. As Winston Churchill observed, “It is a mistake
to try to look too far ahead. The chain of destiny can only be grasped
one link at a time.“
How Special?
In the light of the foregoing areas of established cooperation,
then, what are the factors that should temper our optimism about the
future of the special relationship? The ﬁrst and most obvious element
is London’s membership in the EU. That the UK has committed itself
to the integration implied by the EU process suggests a number of
constraints on how “special” bilateral relations with the United
States can be. Despite the fact that the UK and the United States
share a number of priorities with respect to international economic
and ﬁnancial policies, ultimately London is bound by its relationship
with the EU and the process by which the EU member states seek to
effect higher levels of economic and ﬁnancial integration, inter alia.
Because the United States and the EU sometimes have conﬂicting
interests and positions, this by deﬁnition suggests the possibility
that London and Washington may ﬁnd themselves on the opposite
sides of disputes.
As Michael Calingaert described it during our deliberations, by
virtue of its EU membership, the UK is “not a free agent in terms of
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economic policies and actions.” The fact is that the UK has conferred
competences to Brussels in a number of areas—not least of which
are trade and competition policy. It follows that from the standpoint
of Washington, Brussels—and not London or the other EU memberstate capitals—must be the focus in these broader economic and
business interactions.
True, the UK can play an even more signiﬁcant role in shaping
developments within the EU and therefore in U.S.-EU relations.
London has played a positive role over the years in many of the
trade issues that have surfaced between Washington and Brussels
including, for example, chemical substances, the action on the Foreign
Sales Corporation, biotech and genetically-modiﬁed organisms, and
steel imports. Still, a number of bilateral problems persist—including
frictions over civil aviation. Another consideration is that London’s
capacity to inﬂuence the course of EU decisionmaking is in itself
limited.
The second element overshadowing the special relationship is
the ongoing shift in the global economy. The United States must
necessarily determine how its relations with the UK compare with
the sets of relations that Washington has with other economic
powers. As other countries—in particular, Brazil, Russia, India, and
China (the “BRIC” countries)—continue to expand rapidly and in
the process shift production and consumption patterns and the very
balance of the global economy, the United States must also pursue
and balance a number of newly “special” relations as it seeks to
achieve its broader economic and commercial goals.
There are looming demographic issues, especially in continental
Europe, which suggest potential structural constraints in longerterm economic growth. Aging populations in many of the European
countries will bring to the surface long-postponed adjustments in
retirement and health beneﬁts. Among other things, increasing
expenditures on pension and medical care could crowd out public
spending on everything from infrastructure to the military. My
CSIS colleague, Richard Jackson, has estimated that public pension
and health care beneﬁts for the G-7 countries will rise from 5.8
percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1960 to 21.7 percent in
2030, leaving little room for other areas of public spending.8 A key
uncertainty, therefore, is whether Europe’s freedom of maneuver
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will become increasingly limited—with the obvious implications
that such a reduction suggests for alliance politics between Europe
and Washington. That, it turn, has ominous overtones for the future
of U.S.-UK relations as well.
Developments on the U.S. side of the Atlantic could also serve
to constrain the extent to which relations are authentically special.
Adrian Kendry highlighted during our discussions the concern in
Europe—and the UK—that the outlook for relations is contingent on
broader economic and ﬁnancial trends in the United States. Not least
of these concerns are the “twin deﬁcits” in the United States (the
Federal budget as well as trade) and the capacity of the United States
to maintain economic dynamism in the face of potential dislocations
generated by these imbalances.
Beyond that, there is the potential that widening political positions
between the United States and Europe—on the current military
operation in Iraq, for example—could spill over into the economic
and commercial realms. A number of such issues—ranging from
differences on the Middle East to international frameworks such as
the Kyoto Protocol—could manifest themselves in a gradual erosion
of traditional U.S.-Europe trade and ﬁnancial ties. This would have
an obvious impact on U.S.-UK relations.
Moving Forward.
When these important links between Washington and London
and potential future divisions are weighed together, what
recommendations materialize? I would point to four.
• The ﬁrst is to acknowledge that the relationship, even if
tempered by uncertainties about the future and qualiﬁcations
about current directions, is genuinely special, and that
perpetuation of this special relationship, as Secretary Straw
argued, could indeed be instrumental to achieving a better
and safer world. After all, leaders in Washington and London
have a very signiﬁcant common agenda with respect to
economic, trade, investment, and commercial issues.
• Second, despite the shifts in world economic powers and the
diverse nature of U.S. interests around the world, the UK does
indeed represent an important set of bilateral relations with
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the United States. It is also a key player inside the EU. As such,
furthering the special relationship implies the possibility that
London could “bridge” issues between the United States and
Europe—including trade liberalization, the pursuit of jointly
determined interests with third-party states, etc.
• Third, in order to effect such an authentically special
relationship, the two sides must redouble efforts to strengthen
structural consultations and communication. Although
this applies to communication across the board, it is no less
important to making progress in a constellation of bilateral
economic and commercial issues. In that regard, both sides
would be well-served were it possible to emulate the “ZoellickLamy” model (based on the prior interaction between then
U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick and then EU Trade
Commissioner Pascal Lamy)—at both the bilateral level as
well as in U.S.-EU relations.
• Finally, it is in the interest of both sides to deﬁne a more nearly
strategic agenda in the economic and commercial realm and
then seek to implement that agenda in the respective national
contexts. This implies challenging both sides to engage in a
frank assessment of common interests and obstacles, and then
to work together to achieve commonly deﬁned objectives.
In the ﬁnal analysis, the U.S.-UK special relationship transcends
the fact that we have a common language and a common outlook.
The relationship is special for many more reasons, not least of which
is that leaders on both sides have a long-standing commitment to
work together on the many international challenges—economic and
otherwise—that they confront.
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SECTION II:
POLITICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS
OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

CHAPTER 5
THE ANXIETY OF SOVEREIGNTY:
BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Douglas E. Edlin
INTRODUCTION
The United States and Britain disagree about several legal
issues with a political dimension, or political issues with a legal
dimension, ranging from landmines to climate change.1 But unlike
disagreements over the Ottawa Convention and the Kyoto Protocol,
given both nations’ shared cultural, historical, and constitutional
commitments to the rule of law and judicial independence as a means
of securing fundamental values and governmental accountability,
the disagreement between Britain and the United States over the
International Criminal Court (ICC) seems especially unexpected. As
I will explain in this chapter, though, the nations’ divergent positions
toward the ICC perhaps are not as surprising as they ﬁrst appear.
Given the current international political and military mobilization
against agents of terrorism around the world, the presence of an
international criminal tribunal provides a legal mechanism for
prosecuting those who commit terrorist acts (as well as, perhaps,
those who might resort to untoward methods while pursuing
otherwise legitimate military operations on foreign soil). This chapter
examines the development of the ICC, outlines the positions of and
disagreements between Britain and the United States concerning it,
and analyzes the speciﬁc objections to the ICC raised by the United
States. In this discussion, I will argue that the contrasting positions
of Britain and the United States toward the ICC can be understood
in terms of each nation’s differently conﬁgured perception of its
own sovereign power. For various reasons, it seems that Britain’s
sovereignty is tested most acutely by its relationship with the
European Union (EU),2 while the United States feels its sovereignty
is encroached upon primarily by its relationship with the United
Nations (UN).3
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THE ORIGINS AND JURISDICTION
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The ICC traces its antecedents back, ultimately, to the Nuremberg
Trials.4 British leaders had grave doubts about the efﬁcacy of
an international tribunal; the ofﬁcial British position toward the
punishment of identiﬁed war criminals from 1943 until the end of
the war was summary execution.5 Nevertheless, Nuremberg and
the aftermath of World War II generated international awareness of
and momentum for the creation of an international legal tribunal
responsible for the prosecution and punishment of those responsible
for war crimes.6 After Nuremberg, and in light of persistent
questions about the legal legitimacy of those proceedings,7 the UN
General Assembly appointed a body of experts to organize and
codify international legal principles. In particular, this International
Law Commission (ILC) was asked to draft a statute instituting an
international criminal court along with an international criminal code,
the so-called “Nuremberg Principles,” which would be enforced by
the international criminal tribunal.8
These efforts culminated in the ILC’s draft statute for the creation
of an international criminal court in 1994. Two years later, the ILC
completed its draft international criminal code. As background to
the ILC’s work, international pressure was building for the creation
of tribunals to try individuals in connection with the human rights
atrocities in the former Yugoslavia. In 1994 the UN Security Council
passed a resolution to create a second ad hoc tribunal as a result of
the genocidal activities in Rwanda.9
Building on the ILC’s draft statute and referencing the two ad
hoc tribunals as prototypes, the UN General Assembly issued
resolutions that led to the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, which met
in Rome beginning on June 15, 1998. On July 17, the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court was signed by 120 states, with
21 abstentions and over the objections of seven states, including the
United States.10 The ICC was formally created upon the ratiﬁcation
of the Rome Statute by 60 states and entered into force on July 1,
2002.
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Four crimes may be prosecuted before the ICC: genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and aggression.11 These crimes are
understood to possess an intrinsic international dimension as a
result of their scope and extraordinary inhumanity, which raise a
concern for all nations. The jurisdictional limitation of the ICC to
these four crimes is tied to its historical predecessor at Nuremberg,
because all four of these crimes also were prosecuted in some form at
the Nuremberg Trials.12 Also, like Nuremberg, the ICC was created
to provide a forum for prosecution of leaders and organizers most
responsible for these crimes, not lower-level functionaries.13 Indeed,
the Rome Statute speciﬁcally rejects ofﬁcial capacity as a bar to
prosecution and highlights the potential criminal responsibility
of commanders and other superiors.14 At the same time, the ICC
hearkens back to Nuremberg by expressly precluding exculpation
for core crimes through the defense that those responsible were “just
following orders.”15 Finally, the ICC contains explicit provisions
that preclude the legal and theoretical challenges raised concerning
the legitimacy of Nuremberg. By speciﬁc, separate articles, the ICC
incorporates the principles of nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine
lege, and a prohibition against ex post facto criminalization.16
The ICC is most sharply distinguished from its predecessor
tribunals by its jurisdictional mandate. Unlike the Nuremberg
tribunal and the Yugoslav and Rwandan ad hoc tribunals,17 the
ICC’s jurisdiction is consensual and complementary. In other words,
the states that consented to the jurisdiction of the ICC also consented
to permit prosecutions in a supranational court of crimes committed
on their soil or by their citizens. However, the ICC’s jurisdiction
only complements or supplements the authority of a state’s national
courts. The ICC assumes jurisdiction over trials for the four core
crimes when, and only when, the national judiciary of the state in
question is unwilling or unable to proceed.18
BRITISH AND AMERICAN POSITIONS REGARDING THE ICC
Britain’s support was pivotal to the creation of the ICC, beginning
with the formative discussions in 1997 of the Preparatory Committee
on the Creation of an International Criminal Court (PrepCom). At the
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December 1997 PrepCom meeting, Britain agreed to withdraw the
demand that ICC proceedings would depend upon prior Security
Council approval. This “dramatic shift” altered the course of the
negotiations and was a departure from the American position,19
although the issue of prior referral by suitable authority would return
and remain contentious in Rome.20 In addition, in contrast to other
Security Council members, Britain joined the so-called “like-minded
group” (LMG) of smaller and mid-level states that wished the ICC
to be a strong, inﬂuential court.21 Britain signed the Rome Statute on
November 30, 1998, and ratiﬁed the Statute on October 4, 2001.22
As the varying and contradictory U.S. formal postures indicate,
American attitudes toward the ICC have been decidedly ambivalent.
This ambivalence is further demonstrated by the U.S. decision to vote
against the Rome Statute when it was initially adopted in Rome on
July 17, 1998. The United States then chose to sign the Rome Statute
on the ﬁnal day it remained open for signature, December 31, 2000.
The United States then reversed its position again and “unsigned”
the Rome Statute on May 6, 2002.23
The United States followed its repudiation of the ICC with the
enactment by Congress of the American Servicemembers’ Protection
Act (ASPA), which ensures (so far as U.S. domestic law and policy
are concerned) that no American soldier or government ofﬁcial
will be subject to ICC jurisdiction.24 In fact, Section 7423 of ASPA
speciﬁcally precludes any American court, state entity, or agency
from supporting or assisting the ICC, and prevents any agent of
the ICC from conducting any investigative activity on American
territory.25 Where American and allied forces conduct joint operations
in which an American is under the command of a state party national,
ASPA authorizes the President to attempt to reduce the risk of
American exposure to ICC jurisdiction.26 As a preemptive tactic, the
United States has entered into bilateral agreements with dozens of
nations in an effort to guarantee that these nations will never refer
any American for prosecution before the ICC and has conditioned
American participation in multinational military operations upon
international immunization from ICC prosecution.27
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U.S. OBJECTIONS TO THE ICC
American reluctance to join the ICC might seem peculiar, given
that the ICC was originally an American idea.28 The ICC has been
accepted by the other allied nations and Security Council members
that formed the Nuremberg tribunal (Britain, France, and Russia),
every NATO nation (except Turkey), and Mexico. Nevertheless,
the ICC was perceived by certain inﬂuential government ofﬁcials
as a “threat to American sovereignty and international freedom of
action.”29 This perceived threat related, at least according to these
ofﬁcials, to the prospect of the ICC restricting the United States
(regardless of whether the United States subjected itself to ICC
jurisdiction) from pursuing certain forceful responses to acts of
aggression out of fear of prosecution before the ICC. As these ofﬁcials
put it, “The last thing America’s leaders need is an additional reason
not to respond when our nation’s interests are threatened.”30
American objections to the ICC all stem, in one form or another,
from perceived threats to United States sovereignty.31 At hearings
on the ICC held one week after the Rome Conference, Senator Rod
Grams stated to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “the
United States will not cede its sovereignty to an institution which
claims to have the power to override the U.S. legal system and
pass judgment on our foreign policy actions,” and Senator Larry
Craig claimed that the ICC represented “a fundamental threat to
American sovereignty.”32 Such rhetoric demands, but sometimes
overwhelms, careful examination of the concerns the ICC raises for
the United States. In an effort to clarify and analyze these concerns,
I will organize America’s objections to the ICC into six distinct
but overlapping categories: institutional, constitutional, doctrinal,
security, prosecution, and symbolic.
Institutional Objections.
Institutionally, the ICC is viewed by some as supplanting the UN
Security Council. According to the UN Charter, the Security Council
has “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security . . .” and provides the Council with power to “determine
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the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
agression and . . . [to] decide what measures shall be taken. . . .”33 The
ICC, at least arguably, frustrates the UN Charter by usurping this
role from the Security Council and by depriving the United States
of its veto of Security Council measures. Accordingly, the United
States (and others) sought prior review by the Security Council as a
precondition for ICC proceedings. Absent a prior Security Council
imprimatur, action by the ICC strikes some as displacing the role of
the Security Council and nullifying the effect of the UN Charter.34 Of
course, the response to this point is that the requirement of Security
Council permission prior to ICC action effectively would negate any
authority the ICC could have as an independent tribunal, particularly
where an investigation or prosecution of a Security Council member
or its allies was deemed necessary.
Constitutional Objections.
The ICC does not offer criminal procedures and protections that
coincide completely with those offered under the U.S. Constitution.
Most obviously, the ICC trial of an American need not (and would
not) take place in “the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed.”35 Moreover, the ICC has no jury trial provision36
and does not protect against unreasonable searches and seizures,
although it does acknowledge a modiﬁed form of exclusionary rule
for improperly obtained evidence.37 Despite the presence of many
familiar, fundamental constitutional protections afforded to criminal
defendants under the U.S. Constitution and traditional American
criminal procedure—such as Miranda warnings, presumption of
innocence, notice of charges, assistance of counsel, prompt and public
trial, modiﬁed confrontation and compulsory process, privilege
against self-incrimination, and double jeopardy38—the ICC does
not protect Americans to the same degree that the U.S. Constitution
does.
Another constitutional objection to the ICC concerns the legal
source of its judicial authority. If we imagine that the U.S. Senate
ratiﬁed the Rome Statute, it might seem that the ICC is just another
court, which Congress has chosen to accept through its Article II
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advice and consent power39 rather than to create through its Article
III power.40 The problem is that Article III of the Constitution vests
U.S. judicial power “in one supreme Court” and grants Congress the
power to ordain and establish “inferior Courts.” Joining the Rome
Statute would give the ICC jurisdiction over American citizens for
acts committed on American soil. Given the theoretical possibility
that the ICC could prosecute an American for a crime committed in
the United States and that the ICC’s decision could not be reviewed
by the U.S. Supreme Court, the ICC would be exercising U.S.
judicial authority in a manner not contemplated or tolerated by the
Constitution.41 Under these circumstances, the ICC genuinely could
not be considered an “inferior court” and the ICC’s recognition as
a judicial authority over American citizens by the U.S. government
would seem to conﬂict with the constitutional mandate that there
be “one Supreme Court.” Granting the ICC judicial authority
over American nationals in a manner consistent with the U.S.
Constitution would seem to require a constitutional amendment
rather than a treaty. The need for a constitutional amendment prior
to American acceptance of the ICC underscores the advantage (or
the disadvantage) of having a written constitution.
Doctrinal Objections.
A central U.S. concern involves the ICC provision granting it
jurisdiction over nationals of nonparty states who are accused of
crimes committed on the territory of party states.42 According to
settled and fundamental doctrines of international law, a treaty
is binding only upon the parties that sign and ratify it (unless the
treaty codiﬁes general customary international law principles).43 The
subjection of nonparties to ICC jurisdiction seems to conﬂict with
this fundamental doctrine.44
There are three related responses to this objection. First, American
resistance to the existence of the ICC or to American participation in
the ICC could not prevent Americans from being tried by a foreign
tribunal if, for example, members of the American military carrying
out operations on foreign soil were accused of one of the crimes within
the jurisdiction of the ICC (i.e., genocide, crimes against humanity,
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war crimes, or aggression). On the contrary, American military
personnel who found themselves in this situation would, according
to principles of international law, be subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts of the state in which the operations were conducted.45 Second,
and related to the previous point, the ICC’s jurisdictional mandate
simply incorporates the traditional jurisdictional foundations
of nationality and territoriality. In other words, Article 12 of the
Rome Statute merely allows the ICC to do what national judiciaries
commonly do, viz., exercise jurisdiction over their own nationals for
crimes committed outside state borders and exercise jurisdiction over
nationals from other states who commit crimes within the subject
state’s territory. Third, the United States has ratiﬁed several treaties
that require prosecution by state parties of any individual suspected
of deﬁned criminal activity, even if the accused’s home country has
not ratiﬁed the treaty. These treaties apparently conﬂict with the
notion that a treaty cannot authorize jurisdiction over nonparties.
Certainly this notion has not prevented the United States from
executing these treaties.46 Such inconsistency raises doubts about the
gravity of American objections to the ICC grounded on its purported
violation of fundamental principles of international law.
Security Objections.
In a manner related to ICC jurisdiction over nonparties, the
United States argued in Rome and subsequently maintained that this
unprecedented extension of international jurisdiction could restrict
signiﬁcantly military operations necessary to preserve American
national security or to restore or maintain peace in politically volatile
regions. For example, the United States maintains a wide-ranging
commitment to employ its forces in peacekeeping missions around
the world. This, it is argued, raises a not unlikely possibility:
American servicemen on duty in the 1990-91 Persian Gulf conﬂict or in
the operations in Somalia would be subject to frivolous charges raised in
the [International Criminal] Court by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein or
Somali leader General Aidid solely to deﬂect international criticism from
their own egregious behavior. Then, in order to avoid the possibility of
“malicious prosecution” of this nature, the U.S. reduces its commitment
to participate in crucial international peacekeeping missions, thereby
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increasing the risk of global instability and war. In particular, this
jurisdictional element has led to the United States seeking and securing
immunization from ICC prosecution prior to committing troops for
international peacekeeping missions.47

These concerns are raised not only by politicians and others who
oppose any form of international inﬂuence on U.S. policymaking.
The concern about the threat of malicious prosecutions inhibiting U.S.
participation in international peacekeeping missions is considered
signiﬁcant even by Ambassador David Scheffer, who headed the
American delegation at the Rome conference.48
Prosecution Objections.
A concern closely related to the previous discussion addresses
the possibility that the ICC might be used to pursue political agendas
rather than war criminals. The United States sees itself as a likely
target for politically-motivated prosecutions before the ICC and
therefore is reluctant to support the creation of a tribunal that might
be manipulated pursuant to such political motivations. Additionally,
America objects to the authority of the ICC prosecutor to initiate
an investigation even in the absence of any state party or Security
Council complaint or referral.49 For many U.S. military members, this
is the insurmountable obstacle to America signing the Rome Statute
or complying with the ICC. As Lieutenant Colonel William Lietzau
puts it:
Because the jurisdictional regime does not adequately protect U.S. troops
and commanders from politically motivated prosecutions, the United
States cannot sign the treaty . . . . [T]he Rome negotiators settled on a
regime that fell short of U.S. objectives to maintain certain jurisdictional
control over its own forces. . . . Referrals initiating such [ICC] jurisdiction
can derive from any of three sources: the UN Security Council, a state
party to the Statute, or the prosecutor acting in his or her independent
capacity. The U.S. military has been much criticized for its stance on this
critical aspect of the ICC Statute, but what the critics sometimes fail to
recognize are the unique and vital national security responsibilities of the
U.S. armed forces and the consequences of their front-line role in carrying
out the nation’s national security strategy. . . . [N]o other state regularly
has nearly 200,000 troops outside its borders, either forward deployed or
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engaged in one of several operations designed to preserve international
peace and security. . . . Soldiers deployed far from home need to do their
jobs without exposure to politicized proceedings.50

However, other American military personnel, such as Major General
William Nash (Retired), point out that few foreign nations have
accepted American assertions of exemption from ICC jurisdiction.
So in the event that an ICC investigation or prosecution required
compliance by foreign states or actors, American opposition to the
ICC is unlikely to have much effect.51 Moreover, the military might
have an interest in supporting the ICC, because American forces
serving overseas are at the greatest risk of becoming victims of
war crimes. So it could be in the interest of the military to see war
crimes investigated, prosecuted, and punished as extensively and
vigorously as possible.52
Symbolic Objections.
The ﬁnal, and in some ways the most fundamental, U.S. objection
to the ICC is captured by the imagined spectacle of an American
president or high-ranking military or political ofﬁcial standing trial
before a non-American tribunal. The ICC does not recognize claims
of ofﬁcial immunity,53 and it is unclear whether the ICC would
honor a national grant of amnesty that shielded individuals from
ICC prosecution. Accordingly, the concern about the spectacle and
its symbolic and practical effects on American position, prestige, and
power is not merely hypothetical. Its very possibility is intolerable to
the sensibilities of many Americans. Of course, the response to this
objection is that the prospective national embarrassment of a leader
being prosecuted before the ICC would itself be a salutary deterrent
effect of the tribunal’s existence. This is hardly a basis for American
objections to the ICC.
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY IN A GLOBAL COMMUNITY
One plausible explanation for the disparate British and U.S.
reactions toward the ICC might be found in their reactions to
the perceived sovereignty threats posed by the EU and the UN,
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respectively. Britain has, after some constitutional indigestion,
accepted the supremacy of EU law in two judicially relevant ways.
First, Britain accepts—as all EU members ultimately must—the
supranational jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Given that British
citizens and the British government may appear as parties before
the ECJ and the ECHR, and that the decisions of those courts are
binding upon Britain’s national judiciary, Britain has acknowledged
the judicial authority over its citizens of courts outside its borders.
Second, EU law is directly enforceable by the national courts of
Britain. British courts therefore apply external legal doctrine that has
been incorporated into British law through, for example, the Human
Rights Act of 1998.54 As a result of these two factors, by virture of
which Britain has made its (sometimes uneasy) peace with its presence
within the EU, it likely does not view the ICC as a radical challenge
to the authority or autonomy of its governmental structure.
Unlike Britain and the EU, inﬂuential elements of the U.S.
government continue to view the UN with measured circumspection.
The United States tends to be most supportive of UN action when that
action has no direct repercussions on U.S. foreign policy. Moreover,
Americans tend to view their courts and their law as entirely
sufﬁcient for the expression and maintenance of legal doctrine and
government accountability. Indeed, Supreme Court justices still
have serious reservations about citing, to say nothing of following,
decisions of foreign courts such as the ECHR.55
In other words, there is a constitutional dimension to sovereignty
itself, which some would say American subjection to the ICC
would contravene. The unwritten British constitution is generally
understood to grant Parliament the unfettered authority to bind
Britain and its subjects to supranational jurisdiction as a condition of
its constitutional authority. As with the EU, the power of Parliament
to submit Britain to the ICC is a demonstration of Parliament’s
constitutional sovereignty. Unlike the case of the British Parliament,
however, the very act of subjecting an American citizen to ICC
jurisdiction might be a violation of America’s constitutional authority
in the absence of a constitutional amendment. Without amending
the Constitution, some Americans would claim that deference
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to the ICC is tantamount to the abandonment of republican selfgovernment.56 According to this view, the mere existence of the ICC
(should the United States ever join it) would constitute a challenge to
American constitutional democracy, because for the ﬁrst time in U.S.
history, an institution outside the U.S. government would have “the
ultimate authority to judge the policies adopted and implemented
by the elected ofﬁcials of the United States—the core attribute of
sovereignty and the sine qua non of democratic self-government.”57
Nevertheless, it seems entirely plausible that American republican
government permits Congress to commit the United States, on
behalf of the people, to an international or supranational institution
with genuine inﬂuence over U.S. policy. There is nothing inherently
undemocratic about giving governmental representatives the
authority to bind their constituencies in ways that the constituents
ﬁnd surprising or objectionable. To borrow a phrase from the
British context, so long as this congressional authority is not viewed
as “self-embracing,” there is no threat to American sovereignty
or democracy, because not all delegations of sovereignty are
derogations of sovereignty. Indeed, some would say it is the essence
of constitutional democracy that the majority’s representatives may
take certain actions to preserve and promote constitutional values,
fundamental rights, and the rule of law, despite the majority’s
disapproval.58
Notwithstanding these differing perceptions of their place in
the international community, the Anglo-American commitment to
the rule of law both within and beyond national borders offers a
meaningful incentive to support an international court of criminal
justice. In the end, as Gary Bass explains, “[A] war crimes tribunal
is an extension of the rule of law from the domestic sphere to the
international sphere. . . . [T]he serious pursuit of international
justice rests on principled legalist beliefs held by only a few liberal
governments.”59
Britain and the United States are two of these few liberal
governments. Britain’s preference for summary execution of war
criminals rather than legalism after World War II was the sole
aberration in the commitment of liberal states to legalism when
confronting war crimes.60 The rejection of the ICC by the United States
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is now, arguably, the second. The Anglo-American commitment
to the rule of law and the historical contribution of both nations
to the development of due process and norms of justice enforced
by an independent judiciary has, in the past, anchored a shared
commitment to legalism in the pursuit of international justice.61
Britain and America have supported international war crimes
tribunals largely out of a belief in the fundamental fairness of their
own tradition of constitutional protection of criminal defendants
and the intrinsic value of their principles and process as a means of
achieving justice domestically and internationally.62 At Nuremberg,
the United States had to persuade (or remind) Britain that trials alone
were the only means of achieving justice for war crimes consistent
with Anglo-American legalism.63 Perhaps Britain needs to return the
favor with respect to the ICC. Though, to be fair, the United States
strongly supports an international court of criminal justice (but not
one that would try Americans without American consent).
Inasmuch as Anglo-American dedication to international norms
of justice enforced by international tribunals derives, at least in part,
from the recognition and reinforcement of domestic rule of law
values in those international norms and tribunals, it is reasonable
to see Anglo-American legalism itself as a manifestation of national
sovereignty. After all, “sovereignty does not arise in a vacuum, but
is constituted by the recognition of the international community,
which makes its recognition conditional on certain standards. . . .”64
Just as American democracy theoretically is predicated upon a
relinquishment of a measure of liberty in exchange for security and
individual autonomy in a larger social context, so too can support for
the ICC be viewed as the relinquishment of a measure of sovereignty
in exchange for security and international respect in a global context.
Put differently, supporting the ICC does not just mean sacriﬁcing
sovereignty, it also enhances sovereignty.65
To be sure, this view of sovereignty depends upon a particular
view of the nature of political power. Power, in this view, is more
than the ability of one state to bend other states to its will through
coercion; it is also the ability of one state to persuade other states
that their interests align. In other words, soft power can, in certain
circumstances, be more effective than hard power.66 If the United
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States will achieve more, including the achievement of more of its
own political goals, in a world that respects American leadership,
then its ongoing opposition to the ICC may engender a very real loss
of American inﬂuence and, ultimately, of American sovereignty and
security.67 The international perception that U.S. opposition to the
ICC tarnishes the long-standing American commitment to the rule
of law inside and outside its borders could limit America’s ability
to inﬂuence international affairs and thus ultimately detract from
America’s sovereignty.68
CONCLUSION
U.S. rejection of the ICC has angered U.S. allies, increased
resentment toward the United States around the world, raised
doubts about American commitments to the preservation of the rule
of law nationally and internationally, and seemingly distanced the
United States from the nation otherwise most closely associated with
American values of legalism and support of norms and institutions
of international justice. All of these factors inevitably lead one to
wonder whether the current U.S. position toward the ICC is prudent
politically. Some commentators suggest that a less unilateral position
toward the ICC would serve American interests for four reasons:
(1) the practical risk of prosecution of American citizens before the
ICC is extremely remote;69 (2) American negotiating inﬂuence would
not be weakened in contexts such as the Security Council, where
U.S. rejection of the ICC, among other things, led to international
reluctance to support American military intervention in Iraq;70 (3) the
current U.S. policy has ﬂoundered because of the backlash against
bilateral agreements immunizing Americans against future referral
for ICC prosecution, the refusal of most signiﬁcant powers to sign
them, and the U.S. inability to alter the fundamental structure of the
ICC or to inﬂuence policy relative to the ICC now that the United
States is no longer a party to the Rome Statute;71 and (4) the apparent
inconsistency between America’s commitment to rule of law values
and its unwillingness to comply with the ICC as an institution
dedicated to the preservation of human rights through international
legal norms has eroded America’s political and moral capital as a
leader in international affairs.72
68

Our friends inﬂuence our decisions even, or especially, when
we disagree with them. Just as Britain’s acceptance of the Ottawa
Convention inﬂuenced America’s decision not to employ landmines
during joint military operations in Afghanistan after September 11,
2001,73 so too can Britain’s decision to join the ICC inﬂuence American
actions during joint military operations. To the extent that the very
existence of the ICC promotes a “culture of accountability,”74 the
ICC may exert an inﬂuence over American policy even if Americans
are never subject to ICC jurisdiction. Of course, this inﬂuence on
American policy will strike those Americans who oppose the ICC
as validation of their initial concerns, and this inﬂuence will strike
American supporters of the ICC as mitigation of their misgivings over
U.S. withdrawal from the ICC. In the end, the ICC raises the question
of whether constitutionalism is a domestic or a universal concept.75
In other words, the ICC tests the Anglo-American commitment to
the rule of law, in part by asking what law will rule. Britain and the
United States share a cultural, historical, theoretical, and doctrinal
commitment to the rule of law, and this commitment has grounded
Anglo-American support for international war crimes tribunals in
the past. But Britain seems more willing than the United States to
accept that, at least where the ICC is concerned, the law that will
rule Britain and its leaders and citizens can sometimes be made by
an institution beyond its borders, while the United States remains
committed to the rule of law solely as deﬁned and limited by U.S.
law.
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CHAPTER 6
STRANDED BETWEEN TWO RECEDING SHORELINES?
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
AFTER THE MAY 5, 2005, ELECTIONS
Mark Gilbert
In the days immediately before Britain’s general election on
May 5, 2005, one revealing insight into the politics of the “special
relationship” between Britain and the United States was provided by
typing the phrases “Tony Blair Special Relationship” and “Michael
Howard Special Relationship” into Google. In the former case, the
inquirer obtained thousands of hits and was able to access dozens
of articles and think-tank commentaries on the importance of the
Anglo-American partnership for world affairs. In the second case,
the inquirer was presented mostly with a long list of speeches by
Conservative leader Howard on the sanctity of marriage.
This anecdote reveals the difﬁculty Michael Howard has
encountered in formulating a policy toward the United States that
differs in any signiﬁcant way from the prime minister’s. Mr. Blair
has been one of a handful of British leaders who have inﬂuenced
American policy successfully and, as a result, heightened British
standing in Washington and the world in general. Ernest Bevin
pulled this trick off; so, more unctuously, did Harold Macmillan.
Anthony Eden disastrously failed; Harold Wilson exasperated
Lyndon B. Johnson by jetting into Washington for an impromptu
summit every time his poll ratings were slipping; Edward Heath,
though he maintained a formal veneer of good relations with the
Nixon White House, distrusted and disliked U.S. policy and did his
best to encourage the emergence of a common European Community
foreign policy in opposition to that of the United States.
In part, the success or failure of the special relationship reﬂects
personal chemistry between leaders. Bevin was esteemed and perhaps
even slightly feared by his American counterparts. Macmillan and
Kennedy, despite the age difference, do seem to have developed a
mutual personal respect, as did George Bush senior and John Major.
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Thatcher and Reagan, at any rate in public, were a mutual admiration
society. George W. Bush and Tony Blair, with their shared concern
for religious values and worries about moral decadence, seem to
have established an authentic friendship that seemed improbable in
light of Mr. Blair’s even closer friendship with President Clinton.1
But it seems clear that circumstances are more important than
personal chemistry. The British statesmen who enjoyed the most
inﬂuence in Washington were those in power at moments when the
United States needed military, moral, or political support. Berlin
could not have been saved during the early Cold War, the North
Atlantic Treaty could not have been negotiated, and South Korea
could not have been preserved without the giant ﬁgure of Ernest
Bevin and the less great, but underestimated ﬁgure of Clement Attlee.
Thatcher’s hostility to communism and her outspoken championing
of free-market values were extremely useful to the United States in
the early years of the Reagan presidency. Tony Blair, meanwhile, has
given a gloss of respectability to the U.S.-led Iraq war and made it
appear less of an exercise in high-tech gunboat diplomacy.
Not surprisingly, the special relationship has been at its worst
when Britain was perceived in Washington to have let the Americans
down. Eden, whether from imperial hubris, lack of comprehension of
the American position, or sheer irritability, hopelessly antagonized
the United States, which was determined not to take sides in a
conﬂict between colonialism and third world nationalism, by his
policy towards Egypt in October-November 1956.2 Wilson could
have gotten away with reducing British commitments “East of Suez,”
or with failing to commit troops in Vietnam, or with devaluing the
pound; but his failure to live up to expectations on all three counts
lost him Lyndon Johnson’s goodwill.3
A warm special relationship therefore depends upon: (1) the U.S.
need for British support for its immediate foreign policy goals, and (2)
British policy being coherent with broader American objectives. This
may sound banal, but I think the point is worth emphasizing, since
the special relationship is suffused with so much sub-Churchillian
rhetoric about cultural unities and our great common history. While
it is no doubt true, to quote John Major, that “there is a unique rapport
between Britain and the United States,” the undoubted cultural
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closeness of Britain and the United States has not guaranteed idyllic
relations in the past, and does not guarantee that the two countries
will remain on good terms in the near future. The two countries’
interests, as Major himself admitted, can diverge.4
It is also worth remembering that the cultural similarities between
the two nations can easily be taken for granted. Nations change over
time. Although the United States unquestionably continues to be
a very attractive society for many British citizens, and large parts
of the British establishment certainly retain a deep respect for U.S.
institutions, generosity, and military know-how, it is also true that
this admiration is in many ways a remembrance of things passing.
U.S. soft power reserves will be exhausted eventually, even in
Britain, if she continues her present trend towards vociferous moral
conservatism and unabashed hyper-patriotism. A society as deeply
secular as Britain (weekly church attendance is well under 10 percent
of the adult population, and the number of professing Christians
is, by American standards, derisory) is not a natural partner for an
American polity throbbing with moral majority rhetoric and action.
On Sundays, most Britons wash their cars, trudge glumly around
shopping malls, or worship do-it-yourself sofas at IKEA.
Will the United States Need Britain?
So the ﬁrst question is: Will the United States continue to need
British support? The obvious answer is “yes.” Any regular reader
of the quality press, or even The Times, could quickly reel off a list
of reasons: (a) The United States needs British support in Iraq to
help maintain order and to ease the transition to democracy; (b) The
United States needs Britain to act, in Tony Blair’s somewhat clichéd
metaphor, as a “bridge” between the two banks of the Atlantic; (c)
the two countries cooperate over intelligence matters; (d) Britain is
a useful veto-wielding ally in the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC). In short, Britain is needed by the United States in order to
make superpowerdom a little less lonely.
These are all good reasons for thinking that the United States will
continue to need Britain. Whether she will continue to need Britain
quite so intensely is another matter. This surely depends largely
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upon events. If North Korea implodes, Japan, South Korea, and
China will become the focus of American diplomacy; and Junichiro
Koizumi, or his successor, will eclipse Tony Blair in importance. The
same is true if a crisis should blow up between China and Taiwan.
If tensions grow between Ukraine and Russia, Germany and Poland
would weigh at least as heavily on American scales as Britain, and
probably more. One can multiply the examples. The point is that since
September 11, 2001, circumstances have conspired to place Britain
at the heart of U.S. concerns (and Britain’s leaders certainly have
exploited the situation with skill). But this need not be a permanent
state of affairs.
Will British Policy Remain Coherent
with that of the United States?
This is the more interesting and problematic question. Several
factors might easily affect British policy toward the United States,
the recent British general election for one. As expected, the Labour
Party won a third successive electoral victory on May 5, 2005, but its
majority was slashed by almost 100 seats. Mr. Blair can now count
on a majority of just 67 seats in the House of Commons. For most
third-term governments, a victory of this kind would be regarded
as a considerable success. But as most commentators immediately
recognized, in Blair’s case a majority of these dimensions has to be
considered a personal defeat for the Prime Minister.
The reason is that, in terms of votes, Labour’s performance was
decidedly unimpressive. Labour lost votes to the Conservatives and
barely came out ahead of them in the popular vote (35 vs. 32 percent).
Overall, New Labour won just 9.6 million votes—hardly more
than a ﬁfth of Britain’s adult population. The two main Opposition
parties—the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats—together
took 15 million votes. It is fair to say that the lopsidedness of the
British “winner-takes-all” electoral system rarely has been so vividly
demonstrated.
Moreover, Labour’s unimpressive results were achieved against
dismal opposition. The Conservative Party’s populist positions on
a number of sensitive questions such as Europe, immigration, and
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crime, while appealing to a hard core of working class supporters,
unnerved middle class centrists and obstructed the party’s return to
the center ground in which British elections are won or lost. Michael
Howard rightly fell on his sword when the mediocre nature of the
Conservative Party’s electoral improvement became clear. Liberal
Democrat leader Charles Kennedy could boast a gain of 11 new
Ministers of Parliament (MPs) as compared to 2001 and a total of
almost six million votes (22 percent), but Mr. Kennedy failed to
impress as a leader during the electoral campaign and must now be
regretting that he did not invade the political center more vigorously.
The Liberal Democrats picked up many voters from Labour’s left,
but did not modernize their traditional tax and spend policies to
attract moderate Conservatives. It is hard to escape the conclusion
that a centrist Tory with charisma—admittedly a rare beast—could
and would have put Mr. Blair’s majority at risk. But the truth of the
witticism that Mr. Blair remains the only centrist Tory politician in
Britain was conﬁrmed by the election campaign.
What will be the likely consequences of Mr. Blair’s muted victory
for the relationship with the United States? Mr. Blair is the most
pro-American Labour leader imaginable, and after a “defeat” of this
kind he may not hold the ofﬁce of prime minister for a full 5 years.
His likely successor, Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown,
is certainly an admirer of many aspects of the American economy
and political system, but he is also more closely associated with the
Labour grassroots than Mr. Blair. Many ordinary Labour members
have been angered by the closeness of Blair’s ties with President
Bush. A third of the Labour Party’s parliamentary contingent voted
against the campaign in Iraq. Anybody who wants to know what
ordinary Labour supporters (and many backbenchers) think about
the United States need only read the Guardian or the New Statesman.
These two newspapers at times have been hysterically anti-American
since September 11, with the tone of their criticism going far beyond
what even a highly negative evaluation of U.S. foreign policy might
justify.5 After the May election, if only because the Blairite MPs from
southern England have borne the brunt of the electoral losses, the
likelihood is that the mood of the Labour Party will be less amenable
to unconditional support for U.S. foreign policy. Mr. Brown
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probably will not put his leadership chances in jeopardy by publicly
contradicting this mood. He has waited too long to be leader.
Much of the public disaffection with Blair is linked to the
continuing Iraq crisis and the widespread perception that the Prime
Minister had misled parliament and the public about Iraq’s weapons
of mass destruction during the run-up to the second Gulf War. These
issues were also a decisive factor in Labour’s poor performance in the
recent election. The most striking individual victory in the election
was secured by “Gorgeous George” Galloway, a pro-Iraqi ex-Labour
MP, who formed the anti-war “Respect” party and campaigned in
the London constituency of Bethnal Green and Bow, which has a
large Muslim population. Mr. Galloway, who has been implicated
in the United Nations (UN) “oil for food” scandal, but who strongly
denies any wrongdoing, won a shattering victory against the Labour
candidate. In his victory speech, he dedicated his votes to the people
of Iraq and warned Mr. Blair that “all the people you have killed
and all the loss of life have come back to haunt you, and the best
thing the Labour party can do is sack you tomorrow morning.” Reg
Keys, the father of a military policeman killed in Iraq, campaigned
personally against Mr. Blair in his County Durham constituency and
obtained 4,252 votes—hardly a negligible ﬁgure for an individual
citizen without party support and organization.
Indeed, there are already strong signs that the Labour Party’s
left is drawing lines in the sand that Mr. Blair will cross at his peril.
Shortly before the election, former Foreign Secretary and Iraq war
rebel Robin Cook contributed a signiﬁcant article to the Guardian
entitled “Why American Neocons Are Out for Koﬁ Annan’s Blood.”
Cook’s theme in this article was that the U.S. right is leading the
attack on the UN Secretary General precisely because Mr. Annan is
a reformer who wishes to see improved global governance. More
generally, Cook asserted:
The world is confronted with a choice between two competing models
of global governance. The direction signposted by Koﬁ Annan is to a
regenerated UN with new authority for its collective decisions. However,
collective decisionmaking is only possible if there is broad equivalence
among those taking part. And there is the rub. The neocons who run
the U.S. administration want supremacy, not equality, for America and
hanker after an alternative model of global governance in which the
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world is put to right not by the tedious process of building international
consensus, but by the straightforward exercise of U.S. puissance.6

The woolly-mindedness of this passage doubtless will raise hackles
in some U.S. circles. There is not “broad equivalence” among the
major nation-states of the world today—some nations are plainly
more equal than others. Robin Cook is, in substance, asking the
United States to pretend it is Canada for the sake of international
“governance”—whatever this buzzword actually means.
Presumably, this will not happen. But it is certainly true that Mr.
Cook speaks for many, perhaps most, Labour backbenchers when he
expresses such views, and that these backbenchers, many of whom
feel betrayed by Mr. Blair’s foreign policy since 2001, will vote, if
necessary, against the government. It is clear that British support for
further U.S. intervention anywhere in the world will be conditional
upon there having been blatant breaches of international law. As
Gerald Dorfman perceptively has argued, “Britain will be more
hesitant and sceptical about embracing American initiatives and
about committing its military to war.”7 Iraq has exhausted British
enthusiasm for military conﬂicts undertaken at U.S. behest and on
the basis of chancy photographs.
Mr. Blair’s foreign policy priorities in any case may not be as
accommodating to the United States as most people think. As Blair
powerfully argued at the Davos World Economic summit on January
26, 2005, Britain’s priorities during the meeting of G-8 (consisting of
France, the United States, Britain, Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada,
and Russia) and European Union (EU) presidencies would be global
warming and world poverty.8 Perhaps sensing that Blair would trim
his coat to suit his cloth, the Guardian urged Blair to give salience in
his foreign policy to issues such as poverty and development, AIDS,
and Third World debt, and to “use his clout to ensure Washington
sticks ﬁrmly to the road map to Israeli-Palestinian peace.”9 While
such objectives are not necessarily contrary to U.S. priorities—as
the Gleneagles accord in early July 2005 showed—they do suggest
that Blair is not concentrating single-mindedly either on the war on
terror or on the special relationship. Blair’s leadership on this score
already has paid dividends in Europe, where British adherence to the
Nordic countries’ long-term pressure for a greater aid commitment
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has led to the EU states making, on May 24, 2005, a powerful pledge
to spend a substantially increased portion of gross domestic product
(GDP) on aid to the Third World and Africa in particular. In Europe,
this commitment was interpreted widely as an alternative foreign
policy to that preferred by George W. Bush.
In the same Davos speech, Blair went out of his way to stress
that “interdependence is the governing characteristic of modern
international politics” and that “international engagement” of
the major power groups was essential. Blair’s political antenna is
probably the most sophisticated of any contemporary political leader.
He is well aware that U.S. unilateralism has outlived its welcome
with British public opinion. Concentrating his efforts on building
coalitions willing to deal with some major international problems
is a strategy that has obvious appeal for a man, like Mr. Blair, who
sincerely loves to do good, but who also likes to do well. The strategy
has obvious personal beneﬁts for the British Prime Minister. The
kudos he receives from the left in both Europe and the United States
will compensate for any chilliness that might ensue in his relations
with Washington.
Another factor that might cause the new Labour government to
cool towards the Atlantic relationship is the strength of its ties with the
EU. Given the high proﬁle of the Labour government’s Atlantic policy,
it is easy to forget that Blair and Foreign Secretary Jack Straw have
followed a very active European policy. Despite the Iraq diversion,
Blair has largely continued, with no little success, John Major’s policy
of placing Britain at the “heart of Europe.” Essentially, this campaign
involves combating the federalist aspirations evoked in Europe in the
1990s by Jacques Delors and, later, Joschka Fischer, while presenting
an alternative vision of an enlarged economic confederation of 20plus states that respects the central decisionmaking role and political
rights of the member states.
Who can dispute the success of British diplomacy in this regard?
Contrary to the beliefs of the ﬂakier British Conservatives and
Euroskeptics, the current EU—with its various national opt-outs, its
(still incomplete) single market, its (failing) competitiveness agenda,
its strictly limited budgetary resources (Britain, the Netherlands,
and Germany want to restrict the budget to 1 percent of Gross Union
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Product; it currently may not be more than 1.27 percent), and its
sturdily intergovernmental approach to decisionmaking on major
questions—is to a signiﬁcant extent a British creation. Anybody who
has studied the history of European integration since the 1986 Single
European Act will know this.
Moreover, Britain played an active role in promoting EU
enlargement to embrace the new democracies of Central and Eastern
Europe and played a decisive part in ensuring that relatively few
concessions were made to supranationalist principles in the EU
Constitution that was signed in Rome at the end of October 2004—an
outcome that was far from certain when the constitutional process
began in March 2001. The ﬁnal version of the Constitution has Britain’s
sticky ﬁngerprints all over it. All the main policy areas will continue
to be decided by unanimity; the role of the European Council is
strengthened; matters decided by qualiﬁed majority voting will pass
only with a very high degree of consensus, despite the inﬂux of new
members; the Union’s competences have been rigidly ﬁxed; national
parliaments will possess a de facto veto over controversial legislation;
and amending the Constitution will be extremely difﬁcult.10 It is not
an accident that one of the main reasons given by French opponents
of the Constitution during the electoral campaign prior to France’s
dramatic rejection of the new Constitution on May 27, 2005, was that
the document is much too “Anglo-Saxon” in character.
With success comes responsibility. Britain would lose all credibility
within the EU, and its diplomatic achievement would accordingly
be threatened, were she to take America’s side consistently in all
the disputes currently upsetting relations between the EU and the
United States. London, and Mr. Blair personally, cannot allow critics
across the Channel to cast doubt on Britain’s European credentials
by depicting the Prime Minister as America’s poodle.
But, unfortunately, there are plenty of grounds for U.S.-EU
disagreement. Despite President Bush’s recent charm offensive,
which included his heartfelt appeal for a “new era of transatlantic
unity” in a speech in Brussels in February 2005, arms to China, vital
trade questions such as the Boeing/Airbus row, the ongoing conﬂict
in Iraq, and the Iran nuclear question all divide the United States
from most of the important EU states. If Britain is a “bridge” over
the Atlantic, she risks ﬁnding herself stranded between two rapidly
receding shorelines. If she is constrained to build bridges towards
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one bank or the other, it is possible that she may not choose the
traditional route towards the United States.
The question is complicated by the fact that the EU is likely to
prove a tricky diplomatic arena during the lifetime of the current
Labour government. The next 5 years seem likely to be the most
problematic period in European integration since the near-breakdown
of the European Community in the early 1980s. The French and
Dutch referendums in May-June 2005 have thrown the EU into total
confusion; there is bound to be a concerted attempt to make Britain
surrender its supposedly permanent rebate on its contribution to the
EU budget. Furthermore, protectionist sentiment may grow in the
EU, leaving neo-liberal Britain with no choice but to ﬁght a series of
hard battles from within the EU.
This turbulent situation is both a threat and an opportunity for
Britain. Mr. Blair may use the crisis in the EU to wrench leadership
of the Union from the hands of France and Germany and shift the
EU towards the liberalization agenda he clearly prefers. On the other
hand, it is quite possible that Britain will be made a scapegoat for the
Union’s present travails. In the latter case, the special relationship
with the United States may come to seem a safe haven from the
growing chaos of European entanglements. Macmillan’s famous
admonition that we should never forget “events, dear boy, events”
still holds good.
American Perspectives.
From an American perspective, therefore, the state of the special
relationship is bound to be a delicate one over the next few years.
British political and public opinion will warm only to a more
multilateralist United States that eschews the “robust brand of
internationalism” practiced in recent years.11 Britain will also have
a Prime Minister who will raise issues that Americans may want to
sweep under the carpet. Britain will also certainly be embroiled—this
is the right word—in the internal politics of an EU whose purpose is
increasingly contested and whose chief policy orientations are under
threat.
From the American perspective, therefore, the central future
political question of the special relationship, assuming the United
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States continues to regard the Atlantic link as a cornerstone of its
policy, lies in understanding that Britain is less different than she
often seems from the rest of the big EU states. Britain, while far more
pro-American than almost any other European country, nevertheless
shares some of Europe’s disquiet at current U.S. foreign policy and
is alarmed by many of the same global trends as her European
neighbors. Moreover, the paradox of Britain’s strongly “eurosceptical” public mood is that the United Kingdom (UK) is arguably
the most Brussels-obsessed country in the whole of the EU (British
public and political opinion rightly dedicate enormous attention to
what is happening in Brussels).
Britain is also not Berlusconi’s Italy. She won’t necessarily jump
if the United States barks. Consider, for example, the following
assertion (which I note from a 2002 article by a neoconservative author
but which reﬂects a still-relevant strain of U.S. policy thinking): “[I]f
Washington insists on Britain reshaping (or scuppering) European
military plans, desisting from further European integration, and
renewing its transatlantic focus, London will comply.” This assertion
greatly misunderstands the complexity of the special relationship
today.12 Nowadays an old-fashioned “command and obey” approach
to marriage often leads to one spouse slamming the door on her way
to her lawyer. The special relationship, like any other relationship,
could fray at the edges if the United States becomes domineering
and insists that Britain drop her friends.
If this statement is true, and if the considerations I outlined
earlier about the U.S. need for the special relationship are also true,
the U.S. task thereupon becomes that of helping the UK to remain in
the U.S. camp. How can this be done? Continuing to accord Tony
Blair a special status among international leaders will do no harm.
Making the right noises (and writing some of the right checks) on
global poverty, global warming, and the Palestinian question will
positively do good. Avoiding unilateral strikes against rogue states
is essential. Publicly acknowledging that the U.S. society contains
blemishes and imperfections and that recent U.S. foreign policy has
not been a triumphal chapter in the struggle to promote democracy
would do most good of all, but expecting self-criticism from a
hegemon is probably a forlorn hope. After all, the British political
élite were prone to the same kinds of rhetorical excess before the sun
set on the British empire.
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U.S. policy towards Europe also will inﬂuence the future of the
special relationship. There appears to be a growing perception in
Washington policy circles—a perception encouraged by many
prominent EU boosters—that the EU is a major threat to American
hegemony in the West.13 Some voices therefore have been urging that
the EU should be humbled before it challenges the U.S. leadership
role. Suggestions for dissolving the EU’s power range from the crude
to the sophisticated. An example of the latter has been advanced by
John C. Hulsman, in a series of very well-researched and stimulating
Heritage Foundation lectures and position papers (and in his chapter
in this book).14 Hulsman contends that the United States should
“cherry-pick” the more Atlanticist member states of the EU, with
Britain obviously being the chief prize, to form a Global Free Trade
Association (GFTA) parallel to the EU.
This idea, which, if put into practice, would undermine one of the
EU’s most solid historical achievements—its ability to act as a bloc in
trade talks—has obvious similarities with Britain’s 1957 proposal for
a European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and suffers from exactly
the same defects. Like EFTA, it gives its main proponent (the United
States) far too many economic beneﬁts in exchange for far too little
loss in sovereignty. After the experience of European integration,
where free trade measures within the Community have been locked
in by a series of treaties that have direct legal effect upon the citizens
of the member states, few EU members, Britain included, would be
enthused about joining an organization whose trade bargains would
depend entirely upon the whim of the majority in Congress for their
durability. The great advantage of the EU is that free trade within
the Community is backed by law. Moreover, just as EFTA was seen
as an attempt to dissolve the European Economic Community (EEC)
like a “lump of sugar in a cup of hot tea,” so GFTA would inevitably
be interpreted as a scheme to dismantle the EU. A possible result
of this, especially in the light of the anti-globalization rhetoric so
dominant during the French referendum, might be the formation of
an anti-American and protection-inclined bloc of states within the
EU. This would be in neither U.S. nor British interests.
The GFTA plan may be a useful “Plan B” for the United States
if the EU plunges back into the futile bickering over budgets and
institutions that characterized the EC in the early 1980s. John
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Hulsman is right to stress that there is a widening cleavage between
the EU’s dinosaurs (France is an obvious example, but Italy is an
even more striking case) and its more liberal-minded members (the
ﬂat-taxers of Central Europe and the Baltic, Ireland, Britain, but also
modernized and competitive social democratic states like Denmark,
Finland, and the Netherlands). Contrary to the mythology of the
European movement, which has always assumed that progress to
full political union was inevitable in the long march of history, this
cleavage might easily have substantial political consequences in the
next 5 to 10 years, and defections cannot be ruled out.
A better U.S. response, however, surely would be to intensify
the “charm offensive” launched by President Bush and Secretary
of State Condoleeza Rice, by encouraging more high-level political
dialogue between the United States and the European nations. Jaw
jaw is better than war war. There are already multiple forums for
transatlantic cooperation, notably the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council and the G-8, and it may be that further such institutions need
to be developed. Why should there not, for instance, be a formal and
regular Atlantic Economic Council, attended not only by government
ofﬁcials but by Congressmen and members of the European and
national Parliaments which would be empowered to hold hearings,
debate, and make recommendations to the national governments
about trade questions, currency issues, and other pertinent matters?
No sovereignty would be lost on either side, but both the U.S. trade
administrator and the European Commissioner for trade would
be forced to justify their positions in open debate. Progress might
possibly accelerate as a result. At any rate, an understanding of
why progress must be slow or nonexistent might be more widely
diffused, and the relationship between the EU and the United States
might seem less confrontational.
Future political developments within Western Europe might
make such transatlantic engagement a more promising strategy than
it may currently appear. A Christian Democrat Germany, led by
Angela Merkel, surely will prove to be more Atlanticist than the SPDGreen administration. At a minimum, a Merkel-led Germany will
be unlikely deliberately to whip up anti-Americanism for electoral
purposes. A post-Berlusconi Italy, governed by the center-left, while
it will be less instinctively pro-American than the current government
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has been, will inevitably be open to persuasion and will not want
to appear anti-American. France and Spain, if the United States
could swallow its understandable annoyance with Jacques Chirac
and José Luis Zapatero, might prove surprisingly responsive. Most
important of all, Britain would welcome a re-launched Atlanticism
as an opportunity to exercise leadership within Europe and to fulﬁl
her bridging role.
What this chapter has sought to underline, in short, is that in
its European policy, the United States must not put Britain in the
position where she has no choice but to break with Europe or break
with the United States. Such a policy would be stupid diplomatically
and might not have the intended results.
It is worth remarking in conclusion that the current conjuncture
offers enormous opportunities for statesmanship. As a very
thoughtful book by MIT political scientist Richard Samuels recently
has argued, the ability of leaders to “stretch constraints” is the
deﬁnition of statesmanship. Leaders of stature are those who see
opportunities for constructive initiatives when less gifted politicians
see themselves as being hemmed in by the circumstances of their
time.15 The current state of transatlantic relations is one such
opportunity. As John Lewis Gaddis has argued, Washington needs
to re-learn the art of “speaking more softly” and to remember that
“it is never a good idea to insult potential allies, however outrageous
their behaviour may have been.”16 If the United States can engage
with Europe, institutionally and intellectually, she will lose little
and may gain much. Certainly she will strengthen the relationship
with Britain, which, as I have been suggesting, is shakier than many
Americans think. Antagonism between the United States and Europe
will leave Britain, to repeat the metaphor used once already in this
chapter, “stranded between receding shorelines.” Such a situation
would be a crisis for Britain, but it would be a grave problem for the
United States as well.
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CHAPTER 7
POLITICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP: PANEL CHAIRMAN’S SUMMARY
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Andrew Apostolou
The German statesman Bismarck reportedly once prophesied
that the most important fact of the oncoming 20th century would
be that Britain and America spoke the same language. Subsequent
German leaders would discover that Bismarck was accurate in his
prediction as to the weighty consequences of the bond between the
two countries. Yet, at the time of the attributed comment, the late
19th century, British-American relations were socially friendly but
politically somewhat cooler. Lord Randolph Churchill, Maurice
Crawford MacMillan, and Joseph Chamberlain married American
heiresses, and offspring from the ﬁrst two unions became British
prime ministers. However, in 1890, the same year that the American
Naval ofﬁcer, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, published The Inﬂuence
of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, he also drew up a “Contingency
Plan of Operations in Case of War with Great Britain.”1 In 1902, British
prime minister Lord Salisbury wrote concerning growing U.S. naval
strength: “It is very sad, but I am afraid America is bound to forge
ahead and nothing can restore the equality between us.”2
So much, then, for the mawkish nostalgia and high-ﬂown rhetoric
about our common history that tends to bubble to the surface when
the “special relationship” is discussed. With useful sobriety and
illuminating detail, Professor Douglas Edlin of Dickinson College
and Professor Mark Gilbert of the University of Trento in Italy remind
us in their chapters on the legal and political aspects of the special
relationship of the practicalities of the British-American alliance.
Beneath the grandiose speeches celebrating that relationship, and
the recent shrill denunciations of it, there are hard legal and political
questions that we must confront. Edlin and Gilbert have done just
that.
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Edlin on the ICC.
One of the most troubling issues in recent years has been divergent
transatlantic attitudes regarding international law. Not only have
there been questions raised about the legality, or otherwise, of the
Iraq war, but U.S. tactics in the war against terrorism also have come
under scrutiny. In Chapter 5, Edlin provides a detailed analysis
of an issue that predated both of these controversies, but that also
overshadows them: the U.S. government’s decision not to join the
International Criminal Court (ICC). The purpose of the ICC is to
prosecute four types of major war crime—genocide, crimes against
humanity, crimes in war, and aggression—if national courts are
unwilling or unable to do so. So hostile is the United States to the
ICC that it has adopted legislation that protects its ofﬁcials and
servicemen from potential ICC jurisdiction, no matter how unlikely
that is. By contrast, Great Britain has both signed and ratiﬁed the
Rome Statute (the ICC’s charter) and was an important player in
crafting it.
Edlin’s accessible and carefully structured analysis avoids
the obvious positions—the ﬁrst being the “everybody-does-it”
defense, suggesting that all nations adapt international law to their
convenience; and the second being the anti-U.S. reﬂex of invoking an
imagined international legal system as a justiﬁcation for attempting
to tie the United States in juridical knots. Instead, Edlin outlines the
four key aspects of the ICC that the United States ﬁnds objectionable
and considers whether these arguments are well-founded. Not
surprisingly, many U.S. objections ultimately stem from concerns
over sovereignty.
First, the ICC is criticized for unfair procedures that are at
odds with the American constitution and that allow the ICC, an
unaccountable body, to sit in judgment over the United States. Edlin
observes that some of these claims do not stand up to scrutiny, and
that ICC procedures do not differ much from the congressionallyenacted Universal Code of Military Justice applicable to the U.S.
armed forces. War crimes prosecutions and domestic criminal
prosecutions are very different and, indeed, are supposed to be.
Second, the ICC is accused of attempting to bind nonparties,
which is objectionable under the usual international legal practice
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that treaties apply only to those who have signed and ratiﬁed them.
However, in the past the United States has acceded to treaties that
have similar reach.
Third, some critics worry that the ICC may engage in frivolous,
politicized prosecutions of Americans. In fact, the ICC can take a
case only if national courts either will not or cannot do so. However,
the ICC can, in essence, earmark a case for future prosecution if it
suspects that national proceedings are a means of protecting persons
from legal jeopardy.
Fourth, the ICC is opposed on the grounds that it is unaccountable.
The United States wanted the ICC to be required to seek permission
from the United Nations (UN) Security Council to proceed with a
case. Great Britain, which initially took a similar stance, was willing
to forgo this requirement. Making the ICC independent of the UN
Security Council is, in fact, problematic—witness the way the UN
General Assembly sidelined the Council by referring the Israeli
security barrier case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). At
the same time, however, separating the ICC from the Council gives
the Court an aura of independence. Indeed, the British-American
legal tradition is the key champion of this principle of judicial
independence.
American opposition to the ICC has potentially great ramiﬁcations.
The U.S. commitment to the rule of law appears, Edlin argues, to
have been weakened by the American stance on the ICC, a stance
that limits U.S. inﬂuence. There are, in addition, implications for
future military operations. British and American forces ﬁght and
operate side-by-side in a number of different theaters, which makes
mutually-agreed legal standards and rules of engagement critical.
For example, British forces apply the Geneva Conventions in their
counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, while U.S. forces do
not.
During the discussion of Professor Edlin’s paper, it became clear
that no U.S. administration was likely to have gained congressional
support for the ICC. This generated various questions. Could the
U.S. government have dealt with the ICC issue more shrewdly?
Could the United States have dodged both ratifying the ICC statute
and the resulting opprobrium? As one participant asked, was there
not a better alternative to just saying “no”? Could the United States
95

have responded more constructively? The merits or demerits of
the ICC notwithstanding, the diplomacy involved has not been
impressive. President William Clinton’s administration signed the
Rome Statute on the very last day of the signing period, December
31, 2000. President Clinton thereby acceded to a treaty that he knew
the incoming Bush administration opposed and that, even had the
presidential election result in 2000 been different, stood little chance
of being ratiﬁed by the U.S. Senate. President George W. Bush then
“unsigned” the Rome Statute on May 6, 2002. Both decisions made
little political sense. For his part, President Bush renounced the treaty
and ignited controversy, making the United States an easy target for
criticism, when all he had to do was to allow the Rome statute to be
shelved, or rejected, by the Senate.
The disagreement over the ICC has also had practical
consequences, such as for the people of Darfur in western Sudan.
Both sides of the argument have been able to manipulate the ICC
controversy in a way enabling them to evade acting in the Darfur
crisis. Neither the United States nor the critics of the its attitude
toward international law in the European Union (EU) have any
desire to take concrete measures to end the mass killings in Darfur.
The United States correctly has declared Darfur to be genocide, even
while it cooperates against terrorism with a Sudanese government
that is largely responsible for that genocide and that was previously
responsible for the terrorism. Invoking the word “genocide” but not
taking action, or demanding that the UN act, is posturing. Many in
the EU (Sweden is an exception)3 shrink from calling the mass killings
in Darfur genocide because such a ﬁnding by the UN would oblige
international action, action that would either threaten their national
interests or expose their lack of capabilities. Instead, they are content
with the ﬁndings of a UN panel that carefully danced around this
issue and that recommended referring the atrocities in Darfur to the
ICC.4 That way, they also strike an attitude which implies that they
care about the Darfur crisis, while reminding the world that they
back the ICC and the United States does not.
Fundamentally, however, there is also a clash of legal traditions
at work here. Thomas Buergenthal, an American justice on the ICJ,
has described this difference compellingly:
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For much of our history, we have been able to look for protection to
American courts and political institutions rather than to international
human rights law and institutions when our human rights appeared to
be threatened. This explains, I believe, why we tend not to appreciate
why people in other countries often attach such great importance to
international judicial and quasi-judicial human rights institutions and to
human rights treaties.5

Gilbert on British Politics and the Special Relationship.
Professor Mark Gilbert’s Chapter 6, prepared before the British
general election and the EU crisis that followed the French and Dutch
rejections of the new EU constitution, has held up extremely well to
these changing events—requiring only small editorial updates for
his contribution to this volume. Gilbert brushed aside what he called
the “sub-Churchillian rhetoric about cultural unities and our great
common history,” and instead analyzed the circumstances under
which the special relationship had ﬂourished. With a keen judgment
of personalities, he described how personal relations between the
president of the United States and the prime minister of Great Britain
have played a role in bilateral relations. But three other factors, he
argued, were even more critical: ﬁrst, that the United States needs
Great Britain to support its foreign policy; second, that British policy
is coherently consistent with that of the United States; and, third,
that the UK must not be perceived by Washington as letting the
United States down. The special relationship is at its worst when
this third condition is not fulﬁlled. Gilbert nonetheless concluded by
arguing that leadership does matter, and that good leaders stretch
constraints, refusing to allow themselves to be locked in by them.
In Gilbert’s judgment, Tony Blair has been weakened by the
result of the British elections. However, context matters. The terrorist
attacks in London on July 7, 2005, and Blair’s strong leadership
in their aftermath, have caused some to wonder whether he will,
as he has promised, step down by the time of the next general
election.6 It is hard to imagine any other British politician having
the necessary skills and vision to rally the country in time of crisis
and war. Furthermore, the EU crisis that began with the French
rejection of the EU constitution in May 2005 has delivered a severe
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blow to the notion of the EU either as a rival pole of attraction for
Britain’s primary loyalties or as a rival power to the United States
in global affairs. Fears of the EU as a potential rival to the United
States generally are exaggerated in any event. It is interesting to note
that the U.S. government, in a policy review in early 2005, chose to
retain its long-standing support of EU integration because, as the
State Department successfully argued (in the face of Department of
Defense [DoD] skepticism), the anti-Americanism represented by
Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder would end when they left
ofﬁce, and their likely successors would probably take a more proU.S. stance. As one conference participant wisely observed, while
the United States rates poorly in opinion polls in the EU, so does the
EU itself.
Gilbert called the current crisis in the EU “a threat and an
opportunity for Britain.” The silly posturing over “freedom fries”
(vice French fries) has masked the deep sense of disappointment in
Chirac felt by the UK government.7 Blair was willing to accept some
stress to the close defense ties between the United States and Great
Britain by agreeing to Chirac’s demands at St. Malo, France, in 1998
that the EU enhance its defense and security identity. The subsequent
belief in London that Chirac ambushed the United States and Britain
at the UN over Iraq and actively sought to engineer Tony Blair’s
political downfall engendered antipathy that extends well beyond
the culinary. While Blair publicly bemoaned the French and Dutch
rejection of the EU constitution (a document that Gilbert astutely
argues had represented a victory for British diplomacy), few doubt
Blair’s satisfaction in seeing Chirac take the bullet for him.
In the light of recent EU developments, Blair looks downright
strong, especially when the damage inﬂicted by the French and
Dutch rejection of the EU constitution on both Chirac and Schroeder
is given due weight.8 Indeed, commentators who have been busily
interring the special relationship and its most eloquent advocate,
the British prime minister, have now found that he is the last man
standing in EU politics.
The British-American special relationship does face some serious
problems, however, especially with some sections of British public
opinion. Three explanations bear particular mention. First, the
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inequality in the relationship is bound to rankle from time to time in
Britain. That the special relationship has endured as long as it has and
survived repeated predictions of imminent demise is remarkable.
The world is not replete with examples of former great powers that
accept a demotion to junior partner status as the price of salvation.
The British are the reliable allies of the Americans. There is great
admiration throughout the United States for Great Britain’s staunch
loyalty and contribution to the war against Islamist terrorism and
in Iraq, in obvious contrast to the behavior of other EU states. In
fact, one of the few items of agreement between George W. Bush and
John Kerry during the presidential election foreign policy debate
on September 30, 2004, was their respect for Tony Blair.9 On the
other hand, Blair’s image in the United States as a reliable ally and a
“stand-up kind of guy” who demonstrates “backbone and courage
and strong leadership” (President George W. Bush’s words),10 has
been the source of much of the bilious criticism by the British press
that the Prime Minister is “Bush’s poodle.”11
There has been a shift in British public opinion against the United
States, but it is not as dramatic as the British news media would
have us believe. According to the most recent poll from the Pew
Research Center, 55 percent of British respondents have a favorable
view of the United States (admittedly, a sharp drop from 83 percent
in 1999/2000).12 Interestingly, those with low incomes view the
United States more favorably than those with high incomes (57.6
percent of low income Britons say that the United States is mostly
a positive factor in the world, compared to 37.1 percent of those
with high incomes).13 The British news media’s exaggeration of antiAmericanism thus stems from the simple fact that those who work in
newspapers and television generally are not from Britain’s poorest
classes.
The second factor is, as Gilbert indicates, that British conservatism
is in crisis. The pro-American consensus of British political life,
summed up by the British politicians named in Gilbert’s chapter,
has stretched from the socialist left to conservative right. The
extreme left and the extreme right, meanwhile, have always been
anti-American and will not change. What has changed, however, is
that the British right and center-right have become anti-American.
Britain’s Conservatives must now rank as one of the most xenophobic
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political movements in western Europe: They are anti-EU, anti-U.S.,
anti-immigrant, and, on occasion, anti-Irish. It is unclear who there
is left for British Conservatives to hate.
Conservative anti-Americanism has resulted in American
Republicans distancing themselves from the British Conservatives.
Instead of being embarrassed about this, British Conservatives are
so pleased that George W. Bush closed the door of the White House
in then-Tory leader Michael Howard’s face that they leaked the story
to the British press.14
Third, the Labour Party’s mismanagement of the Iraq issue has
damaged the special relationship. Note that the problem is not the
Iraq war in and of itself. Rather, the difﬁculty lies in the way that
the government has handled criticisms of the war. Britain has been
involved in other, less justiﬁed military operations without creating
the same level of public controversy. The problem with Iraq is that
Labour has simply ceded the issue to the antiwar movement and
refused to debate it.
How much this failure cost Blair during the May 2005 general
election is unclear. The conventional wisdom is that Iraq explains the
loss of Labour seats during the general election.15 However, a closer
look at the results indicates that the Iraq effect was localized, and
that there was no national trend during the elections. Labour held its
two most vulnerable seats (Dumfries & Galloway and Dorset South)
as well as Margaret Thatcher’s old seat (Finchley & Golders Green).
Yet Labour lost far safer seats such as Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale,
and Tweeddale (their 80th most vulnerable seat and number 96
on the Conservatives’ target list). They also lost Hornsey & Wood
Green, a seat that the BBC considered so safe that it was not even
listed as a target. Indeed, the Liberal Democrats, who ran an antiwar
and anti-U.S. platform, were probably surprised to win Hornsey &
Wood Green as it was only number 77 on their target list.16 Local
factors, such as tactical voting and an appeal to ethnic and religious
prejudice, helped to hand the previously safe Labour seat of Bethnal
Green & Bow to George Galloway, a former Labour Member of
Parliament (MP) and apologist for Saddam Hussein.17
Of course, for all the talk of Labour being somehow damaged
by the May 2005 general election, it is worth bearing in mind that
Blair won a third consecutive term, a feat achieved before only by
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Margaret Thatcher. Moreover, the size of Blair’s three parliamentary
majorities exceeds those achieved by Margaret Thatcher. Far from
being a threat, the Conservatives won fewer seats in the 2005 elections
than Labour did at its low point in the 1983 elections. For all the
talk of Blair’s leadership being threatened, it was the Conservative
leader, Michael Howard, who resigned after the election. Blair has
now put four Conservative leaders out of a job—not bad for a man
whom the British media have repeatedly written off.
Conclusion and Recommendations.
What, then, should be done to inject new life and direction into
the special relationship? Five policies need to be pursued.
First, the British government has to make the argument to its
citizens that the special relationship serves Britain’s distinct national
interests. Many Britons do not like the idea of doing favors for
foreigners, whether through EU subsidies or helping the United States
feel less lonely as a superpower. Situating the special relationship
within the context of EU-U.S. relations may win plaudits from policy
wonks and editorial writers, but it is meaningless to the practicalminded British electorate. Instead, what the government should be
explaining is that the special relationship gives Britain unprecedented
leverage and access with the United States and, as importantly, in
the EU and elsewhere. The reason why British Foreign Secretary Jack
Straw was welcome in Iran in the months immediately following
September 11, 2001, was that both Iran and the United States knew
that he would be an honest intermediary. Both sides knew where
they stood with this middleman. Such services could not have been
rendered by France or Germany, given the French pursuit of its
commercial interests with Iran and German contacts with Iranian
intelligence.
For Britain, there is no need to make an exclusive choice between
the EU and the United States. The dichotomy is false, since the EU
is not a coherent bloc. What is often meant by the EU is nothing
more than the Franco-German axis that claims to be the core of the
EU. Were Britain to reduce its ties with the United States, there
could well be important economic consequences and a humiliating
reduction in British inﬂuence in the EU. The UK would be reduced
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to a third-rung power, a subsidiary of this Franco-German axis. On
the other hand, were Britain to turn away from the EU, as Britain’s
Conservatives advocate, the damage to the British economy, and to
Britain’s inﬂuence on the continent, would be immense.
We need to understand that the problem for so many foreign, and
in particular continental European, critics of the special relationship,
is not its existence but its membership. Many EU states want to
emulate Britain’s close relations with the United States. Indeed, we
can rest assured that if tomorrow Britain were to renounce the special
relationship, the president of France would board the ﬁrst ﬂight to
Washington, and hasten to the White House to press his claim to ﬁll
the spot vacated by Britain.
Second, the U.S.-British special relationship needs to demonstrate
leadership across the spectrum of policy issues, not just security. If the
special relationship is to matter, it must demonstrate leadership on
precisely the economic and environmental issues which supposedly
are its greatest weakness. A clear theme during the special relationship
conference was the general failure of leadership on economic issues,
with special reference to the complacent U.S. attitude toward its
ﬁscal deﬁcit and the unwillingness of the continental EU to pursue
structural reform. The superﬁcial thought in the EU regarding its
economic future was neatly illustrated during the debate in France
over the EU constitution. Chirac called neo-liberalism the new
communism, and the only area of agreement during the referendum
campaign was that both sides were hostile to the United States.
Blair challenged the continental critics of economic liberalism
with his speech to the European Parliament on June 23, 2005, in which
he pressed the EU for reform. The prime minister pointedly asked,
“What type of social model is it that has 20 million unemployed in
Europe.”18 It is an indication of how the continental EU is rethinking
its approach to economic policy in the wake of the Franco-Dutch
rejection of the EU constitution that the response to Blair’s speech
was so positive.19 But Blair cannot defend free market economics on
his own. George Bush must join him by demonstrating seriousness
on the deﬁcit. The President also needs to be more responsive to
Blair’s call for a global campaign of economic assistance to Africa.
The United States and the UK must also avoid easy solutions to
complex economic and political problems exempliﬁed by such long102

standing proposals as a Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA) or
the more recent call for a Global Free Trade Area (GAFTA). These
schemes, to a degree, are designed to satisfy conservative ideology
and its fetish for sovereignty (our sovereignty, nobody else’s). To
create such free trade arrangements would require destroying the
EU single market, which conservatives dislike because it involves
pooling sovereignty. Closing down the EU single market would,
however, be too high a price for any British government to pay.
Britain also needs to lead the EU debate about the development of
genuine security capabilities that complement rather than compete
with the United States. At present, the EU is in the unfortunate
position of being dependent upon Washington for its global security
needs and unable to meaningfully contribute to its own defense. The
result of this dependency is a climate of strategic irresponsibility in
the EU. Again, Blair put it well on the eve of the Iraq war:
I would never commit British troops to a war I thought was wrong or
unnecessary. But the price of inﬂuence is that we do not leave the U.S.
to face the tricky issues alone. By tricky, I mean the ones which people
wish weren’t there, don’t want to deal with, and, if I can put it a little
pejoratively, know the U.S. should confront, but want the luxury of
criticising them for it.20

The luxury of criticism stems from the lack of capabilities of many
EU states and their inability to come up with policy alternatives to
U.S. proposals. The Franco-German position on Iraq boiled down
to opposing the war in order to make the United States pay a high
diplomatic price for changing a status quo that they had previously
criticized. There was no expectation in either Paris or Berlin that
diplomacy could resolve the issue of Iraqi noncompliance with UN
Security Council resolutions, and both capitals accepted that war
was inevitable. Their change of position was nothing more than
posturing, without offering serious policy alternatives. As Jamie
Rubin, the Clinton-era State Department spokesman, has observed,
“After spending 1995 to 2000 criticizing Iraq sanctions, the Germans
and French fell in love with containment.”21
Third, the British government needs to privatize the state-owned
news media. There is no need in a modern democracy for a stateowned broadcaster such as the BBC. The only reason why the BBC still
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exists is that the government controls its ﬁnances and so is able, from
time to time, to prevent the BBC from broadcasting programs that it
objects to. Margaret Thatcher engaged in this form of censorship on
more than one occasion. Blair, meanwhile, has often found that this
unrepresentative, state-ﬁnanced media outlet has taken upon itself
the mantle of the opposition to his government. He has tolerated
this because he knows that during elections the left-leaning BBC will
punish the Conservatives.
Such short-term political beneﬁts have generated a longer-term
political cost—consistent BBC bias against the United States and, in
particular, the war against terrorism and the war in Iraq. The BBC
has been particularly active in propagating the notion that the British
and American governments misled their electorates to justify the
war in Iraq—an extremely serious allegation that has been knocked
down by repeated inquiries. The case for war has been twisted into a
preemptive strike and a hunt for weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
stocks in Iraq, when the motion put before the House of Commons
on March 18, 2003, repeatedly mentioned Iraqi breaches of UN
Security Council Resolutions and was legally based upon repeated
Iraqi violations of the March 1991 Gulf War ceaseﬁre.22 The truly
guilty party in distorting the case for the Iraq war was the BBC, as
demonstrated by the Hutton inquiry which resulted in the resignation
of the two top ofﬁcials at the BBC, its chairman, Gavyn Davies, and
its Director General, Greg Dyke. The journalist involved, Andrew
Gilligan, also resigned and later joined a right-wing magazine that
is edited by a Conservative MP, The Spectator. In a similar fashion,
the BBC’s astonishing response to the July 7, 2005, terrorist attacks
in London illustrated just how unaccountable the organization had
become. For hours the BBC stuck to the initial report that there had
been an electrical “power surge” on the lines powering the London
Underground railway. Once events ﬁnally forced the BBC to report
that there had been a series of terrorist attacks, the corporation then
struggled with calling such an attack on London “terrorism.” Stories
that initially used the words “terrorist” were subsequently edited to
delete the word.23
Of course, the BBC’s opinions are representative of a swathe of
the educated class in London and the southeast, but they are not the
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opinions of the country, and they do not deserve to be funded by
a form of regressive taxation. The unrepresentative nature of these
views is encapsulated in the standard term used about the BBC and
similar self-styled opinion formers—the “chattering classes.”
Fourth, the United States must clarify its attitude towards
international law and, in particular, torture. The perception that
the United States wants international law à la carte is extremely
damaging both to U.S. inﬂuence and to the legitimacy of the war
against terrorism. Allegations, in some cases well-founded, of
torture of detainees need to be fully addressed. Above all, the U.S.
government needs to distance itself from those on the left and the
right who are willing to countenance torture,24 and instead articulate
a principled opposition to torture because it is morally wrong and
damaging to any serious prosecution of the war against terrorism.25
None of this means that the United States should bow to the new
pseudo-legalism of human rights groups. The human rights industry
consistently holds the United States and its allies to higher standards
than the rest of the world and seeks to confound efforts by democracies
to defend themselves against aggression and terrorism.26
One argument put forward during the special relationship
conference and mentioned by Philip Stephens in the sessions in both
the United States and the UK bears some similarity to the unrealistic
arguments of members of the human rights community. Stephens
argued that no British prime minister could go to war again in support
of the United States without UN backing. If Stephens had conﬁned
himself to saying that another Iraq-style venture was not politically
feasible under present circumstances, then his judgment would have
been correct. But his claim was broader and worrisome, implying as it
did that a somehow chastened Britain could not risk taking assertive
action abroad without the sanction of some ideal “international
community.” Such a standard would unfairly tie Britain’s hands and
its ability to defend itself. We cannot foresee future contingencies,
and the right to use force in self-defense is a right recognized, not
granted, by article 51 of the UN charter. It is interesting to note that
when John Kerry suggested that any contemplated U.S. preemptive
action should pass a “global test” of convincing the rest of the world
of its justiﬁcation,27 he was pounced on by critics.28 What Stephens is
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proposing resembles the right-wing caricature of Kerry’s comments,
a surrender of British sovereignty to the UN Security Council.
Fifth, Washington and London should continue to lead the battle
against Islamist terrorism and Ba’athism, but they must do a better
job of explaining that these wars are not elective. They must also
present a more convincing case for a long-term political, military,
and economic commitment to Iraq. To leave early, allowing Iraq’s
nascent democracy to fail, would be to betray the Iraqis yet again
and to nullify the value of either Britain or the United States as an
ally.
The war against Islamist extremism requires a careful melding
of political and security measures. The battle for public opinion is
an important aspect of the battle against the jihadists. Too often,
however, Britain and the United States have deﬁned the war in
negative, defensive terms, for example, that it is not a war against
Islam.29 Constantly on the back foot, they have failed to deﬁne what
they are ﬁghting for. Bush’s inaugural address and State of the
Union speech in 2005 were sweeping renunciations of the realpolitik
practiced by his father.30 While Bush may think he is a conservative,
his foreign policy is consistent with Blair’s vision of an ethical
foreign policy and of a global community. In his willingness to shake
up the existing world order, Bush’s policy carries strong echoes of
the British left’s long-standing hostility to dictatorships and states
that imprison unwilling populations. Blair’s speech following the
London bombings, which echoed his comments to the Labour Party
conference in 2004,31 began to address this deﬁcit by pointing out
that there can be no compromise or policy changes that will assuage
the jihadists.32
Still, more needs to be done.33 A world without terrorism should
be our goal, but even for a world that often does not feel threatened by
terrorism there needs to be more to offer. The promises of democracy
without development and of globalization without global economic
justice are not particularly appetizing. By contrast, Britain and the
United States should pledge that more open societies will beneﬁt
from more open trade relations, and that there will be tangible
economic beneﬁts to societies that curb terrorism and extremism.
Articulating a vision of how the world can look after the defeat of
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Islamist terrorism and Ba’athism will not convince all the skeptics,
but it will force them to come up with their own alternatives.
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SECTION III:
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

CHAPTER 8
A CONSERVATIVE VISION
FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD EUROPE
John C. Hulsman and Nile Gardiner
The United Kingdom (UK) is likely to remain America’s
paramount ally for the foreseeable future. That is why it is in America’s
fundamental national interest to assist Britain to continue playing
this pivotal role. Washington’s management of its relationship with
the European Union (EU) will be a key determinant of the UK’s
ability to maintain its inﬂuence and options as a global and regional
actor.
Since joining the then European Community in 1973, Britain
has had an uneasy and sometimes tumultuous relationship with its
European partners. During this period, the EU has evolved from a
largely economic grouping of nation-states into an inward-looking
political entity, with ever-greater political centralization. The British
have found their national sovereignty gradually eroded by EU laws
and regulations.
Despite efforts by British Prime Minister Tony Blair to play a
leading role in Europe, the British public has grown increasingly
disillusioned with EU membership in the past few years. In a recent
Institute of Commercial Management (ICM) poll commissioned by
the New Frontiers Foundation, 59 percent of Britons agreed with the
suggestion that the UK “should take back powers from the EU and
develop a new global trade and defense alliance with America, some
in Europe, and other countries across the world.” Just 30 percent of
respondents said that Britain “should join the Euro and Constitution
and aim for a political union in Europe.”
The UK’s future direction in Europe will directly impact the
United States. Economically, it is hard to imagine how two countries
could be closer. Between 1995 and 2003, 64 percent of total U.S.
direct investment in the EU went to the UK, while 62 percent of EU
investment in the United States originated in Britain. The United
States and the UK easily remain the largest foreign direct investors
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in each other’s economies. These extraordinarily close ﬁnancial ties
between the world’s largest and fourth largest economies would
alone make the UK a primary U.S. national security interest.
Militarily, along with France and the United States, the UK is one
of only three North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) powers
capable of sustaining a global military presence in terms of both
transport capacity and logistics. It is unfortunate that Britain is
embarking on major cuts in its armed forces as part of a modernization
program. While supposedly improving Britain’s niche in military
capabilities, the cuts are likely to leave the British military severely
overstretched.
Nevertheless, these three powers are the only Atlantic allies
that can participate in the entire military spectrum, from highend, technologically intricate major warﬁghting through low-end
peacekeeping. It is also helpful that both France and the UK are the
only European countries with a genuine geopolitical grasp of military
realities (partly due to their colonial histories) and a political tolerance
for casualties. This state of affairs is not expected to change—it is
highly unlikely that any other NATO power will obtain a signiﬁcant
global reach in the medium term.
Perhaps the single greatest asset accruing to the United States
from its relationship with Britain, however, is the UK’s proven
political slant toward America. The two countries have a unique,
long-standing tradition of working intimately with one another, as
demonstrated in World Wars I and II, the Cold War, Afghanistan,
Iraq, and the ﬁght against al-Qaeda. This ingrained afﬁnity—the
product of a common cultural heritage, a common commitment to
free markets and free elections, and common geopolitical views—is
without parallel in the world. It explains why the UK is currently so
vital to U.S. coalition-building and is likely to remain so.
But this relationship obscures fairy tales America has told itself
about the EU. For the past half-century, the policymaking elite
in Washington has come to similarly positive conclusions about
America’s relations with Europe at large: every effort at closer
European integration is to be welcomed, if tepidly. The assumption
has been that a uniﬁed Europe would inevitably prove more profree market, more pro-Atlanticist, and more pro-American. Today,
however, following the transatlantic rift over the Iraq war and the
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public diplomacy calamity that has ensued for the United States,
such simplistic analysis is starkly at odds with the schism at the heart
of the post–Cold War transatlantic relationship.
The United States should stop merely reacting to fundamental
changes in Europe, voicing platitudes from the sidelines, and adopt
a more proactive approach. Washington should develop a series
of strategic, diplomatic, and analytical principles, with political,
economic, and military dimensions, to guide its policies toward
NATO and the EU and its plans for reviving the transatlantic
relationship. In formulating these principles, the United States
should follow the conservative precepts of the great 18th century
British statesman, Edmund Burke, who insisted on seeing the world
as it is, not as some might hope it to be.
The ﬁrst principle should be recognition of the continuing
strategic centrality of Europe. Whatever the global issue—be it the
war on al-Qaeda, the Doha trade round, Iran’s efforts to develop
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the Arab-Israeli conﬂict, or
the future of Iraq—the United States simply cannot act effectively
without the support of at least some European powers. The
United States remains ﬁrst among equals, but the world is neither
genuinely unipolar nor multipolar, which makes it vital for America
to continue to court allies. For the foreseeable future, there will be
only one place to ﬁnd those allies—Europe. It is the sole area of the
world where political, diplomatic, military, and economic power
can be generated in sufﬁcient strength to support American policies
effectively. The cluster of international powers in Europe—led by
the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Poland—
has no parallel.
The leading European nations, however, rarely agree on most
of today’s key issues of foreign and security policy. As a result, the
United States must engage European states on an issue-by-issue,
case-by-case basis to gain the greatest number of allies for the largest
number of missions, thus maximizing its diplomatic effectiveness.
The second principle that should drive American policy toward
Europe centers on the importance of national choice and sovereignty.
American interests are best served when European states act
ﬂexibly according to their separate interests, rather than collectively
according to some utopian ideal. Although the day may be far off, an
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EU implementing a genuinely supranational common foreign and
security policy could clearly hamstring American efforts to form
political, military, or economic coalitions with individual member
countries.
To illustrate the point, one need only look at the EU common
commercial policy, under which the European Commission conducts
international negotiations on behalf of the EU. Since the member
states have not reached a consensus on the very principle of free trade,
the EU formulates trade policy on the basis of the lowest common
denominator. It can proceed only as fast as its most protectionist
member allows. This adherence to supranationalism keeps largely
free-trading nations with more open economies—such as the UK,
Ireland, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, and Estonia—
from following their sovereign interests and developing closer and
mutually beneﬁcial trading ties with the United States.
This one-size-ﬁts-all approach does not comport well with the
political realities of the continent today. European countries have
politically diverse opinions on all aspects of international life: free
trade, NATO, relations with the United States, and how to organize
their own economies. Ireland, for example, is a strong free-trading
country, has extensive ties to the United States, and favors a large
degree of economic liberalization. France, by contrast, is more
protectionist, more statist in organizing its economy, and more
competitive in its attitude toward America. Germany falls between
the two on free trade and relations with the United States, but favors
some liberalization of its economy to retain its corporatist model.
Strategically, Ireland is neutral, France is inherently hostile to NATO,
while Germany is more pro-NATO than France but prefers UN
involvement in crises over that of the alliance. Such real European
diversity ought to be reﬂected in each state’s control over its foreign
and security policy. A more centralized Europe simply does not
reﬂect the political reality on the ground.
Third, the United States must follow Burke’s advice and see
Europe as it is, not as some Europeans might wish it. Europe
collectively is far weaker than its federalist adherents proclaim.
Simply put, it is considerably less than the sum of its parts. In the
wake of the Iraq war, the EU looks economically sclerotic, militarily
weak, and politically disunited.
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Economically, the Franco-German-Italian core of the Eurozone
has structurally high unemployment. Staggeringly, according to the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
between 1970 and 2000 the 12 countries now in the Euro area did
not create any net private sector jobs. The demographic problems
created by Europe’s falling birthrate and aging population—linked
to its over-generous social safety net—make the preservation of
its way of life highly dubious in the medium-term without radical
reform. Unless Europe as a whole deals with this massive problem,
it will be consigned to the status of an elderly theme park.
Militarily, the collective picture is also grim. Despite a market
that is slightly larger than that of the United States, European defense
spending is two-thirds that of the United States and ﬁelds only 20
percent of the ﬁghting strength that American can deploy. Even the
current level of spending and capability is in peril. In the words of
leading American defense expert Richard Perle, Europe’s armed
forces have already “atrophied to the point of virtual irrelevance.”
Politically, Europeans remain deeply divided on seminal issues
of war and peace, as demonstrated by the fundamental differences
between Britain and France and Germany over Iraq. The basic
reason is that national interests still dominate foreign policy-making
at the most critical moments, even for states ostensibly committed
to common foreign and security policies. For the European powers,
Iraq has never been primarily about Iraq. It is about the attitudes
of Europeans toward post-Cold War American power and their
jockeying for position within common European institutions.
One camp, championed by France, is distrustful of American
power and strives to create a centralized EU as a rival pole of
power to America. The other camp, led by Britain and including
the Scandinavian, Baltic, and Central and Eastern European states,
seeks to engage American power and favors a more decentralized
Union. This very disparate political, economic, and military picture
of Europe explains why the EU constitution—the latest attempt to
impose greater central control over the European process—has been
rejected by the voters in both France and the Netherlands. There
is no doubt that the framers of the European project started with
over-lofty goals, to the extent of making false comparisons with the
drafting of the U.S. Constitution in Philadelphia in 1787.
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According to the Laeken Declaration of December 2001, which
launched the process of replacing the Union’s existing treaties, the
new European document was supposed to clarify the division of
competencies among the EU institutions, the member states, and the
people, making the Union more efﬁcient and open. The institutions
were to be brought closer to Europe’s citizens in an effort to lessen
the Union’s “democratic deﬁcit.” This was to be a two-way process,
with some powers returned to the member states and the people and
some new competencies bestowed on Brussels. These high hopes
bear little resemblance to the ﬁnished product. In fact, the document
was riven with contradictions, many of which were to be worked out
over time by the European Court of Justice, with “ever-closer union”
as its mandate. This scheme can readily be seen as an effort at further
centralization through the back door, a result wholly out of line with
the notion of a diverse Europe. Tellingly, the constitution did little to
provide citizens with a sense of control over the process of European
government or the evolution of the Union.
These egregious ﬂaws explain why the constitutional referendum
was soundly defeated by French and Dutch citizens. Indeed, these
voters did other European governments a favor by killing the
treaty before they were forced to confront ratiﬁcation. American
policymakers must now accept that the EU drive toward ever-closer
union has at last decisively sputtered, and that engaging Europeans
at the state level generally will be far more effective than engaging
the EU itself.
Given these broad principles, the United States should advance
the following policies toward Europe. First, Washington should favor
a multispeed Europe, with each state having greater choice about
its level of integration. It now seems possible that France will make
the case for the creation of a more integrated, confederal European
core dominated by France and Germany, with Italy, Belgium, and
Luxembourg as probable members. The United States should accept
this possible initiative since it will contribute to the development
of a genuinely multispeed Europe. But the French cannot be the
only ones to redeﬁne their role. There must be at least two speeds
to a reconstituted EU: the inner core, a group of states that wish to
remain roughly as integrated as they are now, and an outer core that
wants looser ties with Brussels. This latter group ought to regain the
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right to join trading blocs with non-EU countries. This will require
a trade opt-out, just as a new confederal opt-in will be necessary for
the inner core.
Such a reconstituted process must be negotiated all at once, so
that the newly deﬁned inner core, led by France as described above,
cannot stop other states from also altering their relationship with the
EU. If such a policy is adopted, individual European states will be
free to decide their own destinies.
Second, the United States must launch a massive public diplomacy
campaign in Europe if it is to retain the ability to engage European
countries as allies. There is little doubt that the conﬂicts over the war
in Iraq and its aftermath have been a diplomatic disaster of the ﬁrst
magnitude for Washington. While many European governments
still support U.S. policy in Iraq, the general public remains extremely
hostile to American foreign policy. The recently published Gallup
transatlantic Trends 2004 poll of opinion in nine major EU countries
found that 58 percent of European respondents believed that strong
U.S. leadership in the world was “undesirable.”
If Europe is the most likely place for America to ﬁnd allies well
into the new century, it must become the main focus of U.S. global
efforts at public diplomacy. Fostering goodwill toward America will
make a greater practical difference in Europe than anywhere else in
the world. It may take a generation to rejuvenate the transatlantic
alliance, and America must not underestimate the scale of the problem
if this new strategy is to work. But unless public diplomacy is used
effectively, America may have no European allies in the future.
Third, the United States should help establish a Global Free
Trade Alliance (GFTA), opening the door to genuine free trade with
qualiﬁed European nations in the outer core. A GFTA would be an
economic coalition of the willing, determined to liberalize trade
among its members, augmenting already existing bilateral, regional,
and multilateral free trade negotiations. It would not be a treaty but
a legislative initiative, offering free trade between the United States
and other nations with a demonstrable commitment to free trade
and investment, minimal regulation, and property rights. Congress
would offer GFTA members access to the U.S. market, with no
tariffs, quotas, or other trade barriers, on the single condition that
they offer the same access to the United States and other members of
the group.
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The GFTA would associate the United States and genuine freetrading European nations with other dynamic economies around the
world, such as Australia, Hong Kong, New Zealand, and Singapore.
The GFTA would have no standing secretariat, and institutional
cooperation would be limited to formal meetings of the member
countries’ trade ministers, staffs, and technical experts. Further
decisions on trading initiatives—such as codifying uniform standards
on subsidies and capital ﬂows—would be made on a consensual
basis to further minimize barriers within the alliance.
A GFTA could change the way people and countries think about
free trade. Further global trade liberalization would no longer
require wrangling over “concessions.” Instead, free trade would be
seen for what it is, a policy that gives countries a massive economic
advantage. As the beneﬁts of the alliance become apparent, the
GFTA would serve as a practical advertisement for global free
trade. Such an organization would be extremely attractive to the
outer European core, who are tired of the overly statist strictures of
protectionist Brussels. And Britain would be America’s natural ally
in the sponsorship of this initiative.
Fourth, the United States should continue to press for NATO
reform, particularly through increased use of the Combined Joint
Task Force (CJTF) mechanism, endorsed by NATO governments in
April 1999. Until recently, the alliance could take on a mission only
if all its members agreed to do so. Under CJTF procedures, NATO
member states do not have to participate actively in a mission if they
do not feel their vital interests are at stake, but their absence does
not stop other members from going ahead. As Iraq illustrates, there
are almost always some allies who will go along with any speciﬁc
American policy initiative.
The new modus operandi would work both ways. Sometimes the
United States would act together with those allies that wanted to join
it; sometimes European countries would act without the United States.
In fact, the ﬁrst de facto use of the new procedure involved European
efforts to head off civil conﬂict in Macedonia. The United States wisely
noted that Macedonia was, to put it mildly, not a primary national
interest. For Italy, however, with the Adriatic as its Rio Grande,
upheaval in Macedonia would have had serious consequences,
destabilizing a nearby region and causing an unwanted ﬂow of
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refugees. By allowing a group of European states to use common
NATO facilities—such as logistics, lift, and intelligence capabilities,
most of which were American in origin—while refraining from
putting U.S. boots on the ground, Washington followed a sensible
middle course that averted a crisis in the alliance.
Beyond the sacrosanct Article V commitment, which holds that
an attack on one alliance member is an assault on all, the future of
NATO consists of just these sorts of “coalitions of the willing” acting
out of area. Such operations are likely to become the norm in an era
of a politically fragmented Europe. The United States should call for
full NATO consultation on almost every major politico-military issue
of the day. If full NATO support is not forthcoming, Washington
should doggedly pursue the diplomatic dance, rather than treating
such a rebuff as the end of the process, as many strict multilateralists
would counsel.
If action by a subset of the alliance proved impossible, owing to a
general blocking of such an initiative, the United States should form
a coalition of willing countries around the globe outside NATO.
After exhausting these options. America should be prepared to act
alone if fundamental national interests are at stake.
Fifth, the United States must continue to encourage European
members of NATO to modernize the alliance by developing
a rapid reaction force—quickly deployable, highly lethal, and
expeditionary—so as not to erode the sharing of risks that is so vital
to the continued functioning of the organization.
The present unequal division of labor between the United States
and its European allies—with the United States ﬁghting the wars
and the Europeans keeping the peace—sets an awful precedent for
the future of the alliance. France and Britain apart, Europe’s paltry
military spending means that the continent’s only hope of making
a viable contribution to allied security is to modernize and pool
resources, in an effort to play niche roles in an overall American-led
defense strategy.
There is also a vast and growing technological discrepancy, with
the United States spending nearly four times more than its European
allies on defense research and development. Barely 10 percent of
Western Europe’s 5,000 attack aircraft, for example, are capable of
precision bombing, and Europe has almost no independent “lift”
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capacity to transport an army at will. If the United States continues to
be the “mercenary” of the alliance while the Europeans are the “social
workers,” this functional disparity will lead to constant differences
in political views and imperil the viability of the alliance.
Sixth, the United States should continue to realign and update its
European base structure to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
President George W. Bush has called for the removal of up to 70,000
U.S. troops from Europe and Asia over 10 years, in a sweeping
reorganization that would better prepare the armed forces to handle
post–September 11, 2001, crises. Two armored divisions would
return to the United States from Germany and be replaced by one
light-armored brigade. The plan calls for more troops to be deployed
farther south and east in Europe, nearer the arc of instability (the
Caucasus, Iraq, Iran, the Middle East, and North Africa), where
future crises are most likely to originate.
This redeployment is more consistent with the realities of today’s
threats and will help to remedy NATO’s current inability to deploy
troops quickly. By making more American troops ready for rapid
deployment, the United States will help to revitalize the alliance and
increase its relevance to today’s problems.
The restructuring will also increase America’s geostrategic
ﬂexibility. The United States currently is too dependent on a few vital
NATO countries. Developing a presence in other European nations
will spread the strategic risk and decrease America’s dependence
on any one NATO ally. Turkey, for example, will no longer be one
of the few critical pressure points in mounting a military campaign
in the Middle East, as it was during preparations for the war in
Iraq. American bases in Bulgaria and Romania would shift some of
the burden away from this hard-pressed ally, allowing Ankara to
emphasize military action as regional in nature, not solely as a makeor-break U.S.-Turkish matter.
It is also important to emphasize that any removal of American
forces from Germany is not a reaction to Berlin’s opposition to the
war in Iraq. It is imperative to reafﬁrm that Washington values its
traditional European alliances, especially with Germany, and that
the restructuring efforts will beneﬁt all of Europe by adjusting
NATO’s force structure to reﬂect the fact that the world has entered
a different era.
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Conclusion.
Only by grounding American policy prescriptions in a new view
of Europe will it prove possible to escape from the reactive nature of
current American efforts to deal with the bewildering continent. By
following Burke’s adage, it becomes clear that “Europe” is less than
its admirers claim and more than its detractors admit. European
countries remain the foundation of all coalitions that America can
assemble well into the future, with the UK playing a critical role.
It is also true that the United States simply cannot act effectively
in the world without at least some European allies, whatever the
issue. Furthermore, Europe is not the monolith bloc to which EU
integrationists aspire. On the contrary, it shows amazing diversity,
whether the issues are economic, military, or political. Europe
is ultimately a hodgepodge, and this perfectly suits American
interests.
Simply put, America will be able to engage European governments
most successfully in a Europe in which national sovereignty remains
paramount in foreign and security policy, and in which states
act ﬂexibly rather than collectively. This ﬂexibility, whether in
international institutions or in ad hoc coalitions of the willing, is the
future of the transatlantic relationship, for it ﬁts the objective realities
of the state of the continent. Such a Europe is worth conserving.
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CHAPTER 9
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE FOREIGN POLICY:
THE BRITISH PERSPECTIVE
Nicholas Childs
A foreign policy guide to the special relationship is in some
ways simple for anyone in Britain: Acknowledge its existence and
inevitability, based on an amalgam of cultural, linguistic, economic,
and emotional ties unmatched by any other partner of the United
States. These factors encourage both Washington and London to
cooperate on almost all the big questions. As the world’s dominant
power, America will have “special relations” with many countries:
Russia, China, and Israel. But not like this one. That is why,
fundamentally, it is impossible to see Britain joining any camp that
views the United States as a strategic rival rather than a strategic
collaborator. And that is why, even when there is a falling out
between Washington and London, it is still different from the way it
would be with any other countries.
But also accept that at times this can be a difﬁcult, unrewarding,
and unforgiving affair between two sovereign nations of vastly
different weight, with different national interests. In the military and
strategic jargon of our time, it is very “asymmetric.” But it was almost
ever thus. I recall the uneasy smile on the face of President George
W. Bush when the then visiting North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) Secretary-General Lord Robertson paused by a bust of
Winston Churchill in the White House (surely the fact that it is there
at all speaks volumes) and recalled the great Prime Minister’s wry
observation—which surely captures the essence of the issue—that
the Americans can always be relied upon to do the right thing, once
they have exhausted all other possibilities. Fundamentally, the
Americans and the British agree on what is right and important. But,
as the Cunard Company claimed when its great Anglo-American
ambassadors, the liners Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth, used to
surge across the ocean creating their own transatlantic bridge:
“Getting there is half the fun.”
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There is no getting away from the fact that the United States is
the most powerful nation in the world by a huge margin. So it can be
tough on friend and foe alike if it chooses. But within limits. While
America may never have been so strong, and while globalization
and the information revolution may mean that the planet has never
seemed so small, it is also true that the international community has
never been so unwieldy and willful, the levers of diplomacy so weak,
and the costs of exerting real inﬂuence apparently so high. For these
reasons, Washington must as a ﬁrst resort invariably seek friends
and allies. Then too, there is in Britain, in Whitehall, in the British
news media, and sometimes among the population as well, a wish
to be loved and appreciated. But, especially when the relationship is
as lopsided as this one, there has got to be something in it for both
sides.
Of course, history is full of tensions and frictions in the relationship.
The irony in this relationship is that, most often, it has been most
inﬂuential when it has been most controversial. Think how difﬁcult
it was for President Franklin Roosevelt to extend a hand to Britain
in the aftermath of the fall of France, and before Pearl Harbor? The
heydays of the Thatcher-Reagan double-act were also some of the
stormiest in terms of transatlantic tensions during the Cold War,
with difﬁcult and controversial choices for the British government,
in particular, to make. These were the years of the cruise missile and
Pershing ballistic missile deployments, Britain’s active support for
the U.S. bombing of Libya, the Reagan-Weinberger arms build-up,
and the Reagan fulminations against “the evil empire” of the Soviet
Union. We can look back on each of these periods with a measure of
historical perspective. We know the signiﬁcance of the outcome: the
successful partnership in World War II and the beginning of the end
of the Cold War. In the current situation, however, we do not have
the luxury of critical distance, and Washington and London must
manage their relationship in the highly toxic environment existent
since the invasion of Iraq. Clearly, the occupation and reconstruction
of Iraq has cost much more in terms of lives and treasure than had
been expected, at least by those who were making the political
decisions. The insurgency is far from defeated. What will emerge
from the political ﬂuidity created in the region as a whole is very
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uncertain. It could all look very different from the vantage point of
2015, but we cannot tell yet.
The other immediate challenge is that the traditional mainstays
of the special relationship have been military power and intelligence
collaboration, currencies in which Britain has still had a relatively
signiﬁcant amount in the bank, and ones that carried particular
value during the Cold War. But they are precisely the ones whose
value and credibility have been most called into question as a result
of Iraq.
On the military front, the close cooperation between the Pentagon
and the Ministry of Defence in the run-up to war with Iraq was clear
from my vantage point as the BBC correspondent at the Pentagon.
U.S. defense ofﬁcials always made it clear that if they had to do the
major combat operation on their own, they could. And, indeed, we
learned from Robert Woodward’s book, Plan of Attack, that that option
was explicitly offered to Tony Blair because of his domestic political
difﬁculties.1 That is not to diminish the respect in which the British
military is clearly held in the Pentagon. Without the British joining
in at that stage, an already complex and ﬁnely-judged military plan
would probably have been complicated still further, with even more
serious consequences for the post-conﬂict phase.
But 2 years after the invasion, as much as it is a symbol of the U.S.UK military alliance, Iraq is a reminder of the limits of conventional
military power and a lesson, even for the United States, that military
power is not a limitless resource. The Americans have just under
140,000 personnel in Iraq, and will probably have a signiﬁcant
fraction of that number there for several years.
Britain, for its part, has around 8,000 personnel still committed in
its sector of Iraq. And the bottom line is that, whatever they say, both
militaries are highly circumscribed in what they can and cannot now
contemplate in terms of additional commitments, with the inevitable
policy consequences. The Ministry of Defence has been more open in
acknowledging that the British armed forces will not be in a position
to replicate Operation IRAQI FREEDOM for several years. The
recently departed Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Richard Myers, candidly acknowledged that the strains of Iraq mean
that dealing with another major contingency would take more time
and cost more in terms of casualties than would otherwise be the
case.
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Equally, the jewel in the crown of the special relationship has
always been and remains the intelligence link. And yet, in the wake
of the fallout from Iraq and the debacle over the weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) issue, that link is surely the most tarnished
element of all, at least for now. Intelligence is an area where, it is
to be hoped, both countries are genuinely looking to learn lessons
from the recent past, and have been re-evaluating the quality of the
product they have been receiving recently, how it is used, and what
it all means for their liaison.
Of course, the response always is that the intelligence successes
inevitably must remain secret. But the recent presidential commission
on U.S. intelligence capabilities regarding WMD concluded with
respect to Iraq that “the harm done to American credibility by our
all too public intelligence failings . . . will take years to undo.”2 The
same presidential commission concluded that the United States still
knows “disturbingly little” about the weapons programs and even
less about the intentions of many of its most dangerous adversaries—
which, by implication, include both Iran and North Korea. Such a
situation clearly has considerable policy implications.3
It may take years for the intelligence communities in America
and Britain to regain their morale—condemned as they seem to be to
years of perpetual radical “reforms”—and to restore their credibility
with elements of the policymaking establishments in both countries.
On the other hand, it is clear that they need to change, having not
adapted sufﬁciently to what is admittedly a more challenging security
environment, and having been notoriously resistant in the past to
external pressures for reform. In any event, it seems inevitable that
the revelations they offer will be viewed in a rather different light in
the future from the way they were previously.
It has often been remarked that the bar of proof that the United
States will have to clear in the arena of international public opinion
for any future intervention will be even higher now as a result of the
experience of Iraq, making the construction of any future coalitions
for action, willing or grudging, even more problematic. The question
has also been raised as to whether a British prime minister, even the
current one, could ever again sign up to a U.S.-led adventure like
Iraq and take Britain to war in any similar circumstances. But the
question is surely moot, since it must be equally inconceivable that
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any American president, even this American president, would be
able to take HIS country to war again in the same set of circumstances
as those of Iraq. Still, it must have raised a few eyebrows that the ﬁrst
published response by the new U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza
Rice, to the presidential commission’s conclusions on intelligence
was that “there are no guarantees where intelligence is concerned,”
and that “while we may never know the exact nature of any of these
[clandestine weapons] programs, we also have to be very careful not
to underreact” to closed societies seeking WMD.
If the military and intelligence pillars of the special relationship are
circumscribed for the time being, what of the broader foreign policy
front? The great good fortune for this relationship has been that, in
the mainstream struggle of the Cold War, the two countries were
the founding fathers of the Western alliance and shared a common
ideal. The good fortune for Britain in the post-Cold War world has
been that the main cockpits of concern have been in regions where it
retains both real and direct inﬂuence and interest—in Europe itself,
notably the Balkans, and in the Middle East, notably Iraq.
More generally on the world stage, Washington and London have
been far less in step. In the early post-World War II world, President
Dwight Eisenhower’s cool attitude to empire and colonialism was
as problematic for Britain as it was for France, culminating for both
imperial powers in the ﬁasco of Suez. But it felt so much more hurtful
for London than for Paris. In the 1960s and 1970s there were the
strains over Vietnam. Even the golden age of the Reagan-Thatcher
years had their moments of crisis. In the prime minister’s darkest
hour, the Falklands crisis, Washington equivocated because the
State Department feared what open support for Britain would do
to U.S. interests in South America. The other oft-cited humiliation
for London was the 1983 U.S. invasion of the Commonwealth
country of Grenada. But the slight that surely must have been for
Margaret Thatcher potentially the much more far-reaching was
Ronald Reagan’s summit with Mikhail Gorbachov in the Icelandic
capital, Reykjavik, in October 1986, when the two men came close to
a sweeping nuclear disarmament pact without so much as a passing
thought for the British Prime Minister.
In the post-Reagan era, the ultimate diplomatist President, George
H. W. Bush, gave Whitehall great cause for concern. His calculation
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of U.S. national interest and the likely international agenda prompted
him early in his presidency to favor Germany over Britain. That sent
shockwaves down the corridors of power in London. But more sober
voices urged patience, counselled caution, and predicted that, when
the chips were really down, the Americans would remember who
their most trusted and valuable friends were.
So it proved to be. Vindication came in August 1990 when Iraq
marched into Kuwait. The glue that kept the relationship solid over the
next decade was none other than the former Iraqi president, Saddam
Hussein. From the Kuwait invasion unfolded Operation DESERT
STORM, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), the
no-ﬂy zones, containment (and the erosion of it), and ﬁnally—in
the aftermath of September 11, 2001 (9/11)—Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM. Now, of course, Iraq has morphed into the anvil on
which the relationship has been most battered.
Without Iraq, things begin to look shaky on the foreign policy
front. On some of the Bush administration’s key agenda items,
like North Korea, Taiwan, and the rise of China, Britain may have
a view but hardly any inﬂuence. On those issues, Washington’s
key partners and friends will surely be Seoul, Tokyo, and perhaps
even Delhi. Equally, Tony Blair may be the most Atlanticist prime
minister imaginable, but, absent Iraq, he espouses a liberal and moral
international agenda on poverty, debt relief, and climate change that
hardly sets the Bush White House on ﬁre.
So what is the diplomatic way forward for Britain in this unusual
state of affairs? Tony Blair is clearly in the twilight of his premiership.
His reduced parliamentary majority, and the fact that the locus of
power is edging towards his assumed successor, Gordon Brown,
give him less room for maneuver. Moreover, he has the image of
“damaged goods” over Iraq, even if the charges that he was simply
George Bush’s “poodle” are wide of the mark.
Part of the Prime Minister’s calculation over Iraq, for sure, was a
desire to preserve the relationship and to be seen to be at America’s
side in its hour of greatest need. But Tony Blair was not a reluctant
follower in the argument of the threat of proliferation and WMD.
His public statements in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 were in
some ways in advance of those emerging from Washington at the
time. He also went further in publicly broaching a moral case for
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removing Saddam Hussein than did the Bush administration. And,
with hindsight, he probably wishes he had pressed that case further
still.
Equally, the concessions he extracted from Washington—in
shaping its response to 9/11, on the U.S. demarche to the United
Nations (UN) over Iraq, and over Middle East diplomacy—are not to
be dismissed, especially given how otherwise deaf and impervious
to the arguments of outsiders this particular U.S. administration
generally is.
Part of the problem for Britain’s international standing is its guilt
by association with a viliﬁed United States—so different from the
times when everyone envied the closeness of the Thatcher-Reagan
partnership, for example. Sorting out the temporary from the lasting
elements of all that will be no small task.
On the other hand, events may be conspiring to offer some new
hope. Events in Iraq shattered the Blair vision—not a new or original
vision, but clearly passionately felt—of Britain as the indispensable
bridge between the United States and Europe. British attitudes
toward Europe are part of its enduring, post-imperial identity crisis.
But, ironically, there may now be a window of opportunity to rebuild
that concept, and the possibility that Britain can exert real inﬂuence
in Washington even when the two do not see eye-to-eye through the
vehicle of the European Union (EU).
Tony Blair may now look relatively weak domestically, but in
comparison to most of his European counterparts, he is in a position
of enviable strength. And, while the rows over the EU constitutional
treaty and the budget may have provoked some serious political
enmity between Britain and other key EU member states, they also
offer the opportunity for Britain to press a reform agenda that would
create a stronger but ﬂexible Europe in which the British worldview
could still hold sway. Above all, the EU also does not want to be seen
as hobbled by internal debate, and it is more anxious than ever to be
seen as an effective and constructive player on the world stage.
The happy coincidence is that America’s and the EU’s travails
have also prompted even the most Euro-sceptical in the Bush
administration to take a more benevolent view across the Atlantic.
The EU constitutional debacle probably has banished the neo-con
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specter of a monolithic strategic rival. At the same time, the prospect
of Europe retreating into a period of introspective soul-searching is
actually sounding alarm bells in the administration at a time when
its own traditional instruments of global power projection are hugely
circumscribed by Iraq. It would clearly be beneﬁcial to engage with
partners like the EU. All these considerations produced perhaps
the most harmonious atmosphere in years for a U.S.-EU meeting in
Washington in the wake of the catastrophic EU summit in Brussels
in June.
But if there is to be transatlantic engagement on British terms, it
must also guide the agenda toward areas where it and Europe have
common interests and real inﬂuence with Washington. That might
be difﬁcult, given how much Tony Blair has invested in his agenda
for the economic development of Africa. But the issues are obvious:
Iran, of course, for the time being at least; weapons proliferation
in general; democratic prospects in Russia; and the challenge of an
emerging China.
Apart from the EU pillar, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) pillar also cannot be neglected. Britain must more actively
press for further reform in the Atlantic Alliance. NATO is to a
remarkable extent pursuing a Pentagon/Rumsfeld agenda in terms
of modernizing its military capabilities, but it is doing so reluctantly
and half-heartedly, especially in terms of how much Europe’s NATO
members are prepared to devote to defense spending. Moreover,
there has hardly been the beginning of a debate on how NATO can
organize itself for the future in order to use what capabilities it has.
Nor has there been much substantive discussion about when to use
these capabilities. Answers to these questions will determine NATO’s
continuing relevance. The technicalities of military capabilities are
important, but more important is creating a new concept of operations
for the Alliance.
Obviously, Britain itself cannot rest on its laurels as far as its
own military capabilities are concerned. The current government
has received many plaudits for the way it has transformed the
British military through its initial Strategic Defence Review; and in
technological and training terms, nobody is closer to the Americans
than the British. But, as it pursues networked technology and
transformational capabilities, Britain is perilously close to dipping
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below that critical mass of deployable force that would allow it
to exercise real inﬂuence in the planning and execution of future
interventionist missions on the scale of Iraq. Whatever government
is in power in the coming years, it will have to look seriously and
closely at what level of investment it is prepared to maintain in
support of the country’s armed forces. Still, the military and NATO
contexts only can be one element of a much broader diplomatic
picture. “Strategic lift” and “precision-guided munitions” will not
be ultimate benchmarks of whether this partnership will endure.
And while America and Europe may have different ways of
doing things, different traditions, and different strengths—in a ﬂuid
world in which powers of huge potential like India and China are
on the rise—diplomatic engagement in an objective view must look
more proﬁtable than hostile for both America and Europe. This
is so, regardless of America’s current position as the world’s only
superpower and regardless of the European bloc’s status as America’s
biggest trading partner. Instinctively, both sides of the Atlantic divide
must also realize it surely cannot be in the interests of either America
or Europe—let alone Britain—for the “ugly Americans” to be forever
portrayed as wielding the big stick, while the “shifty Europeans” are
always seen as tacking and maneuvering, managing and bargaining
for everything but resolving nothing.
Yet the legacy of the last few years of ill will and suspicion is
not to be underestimated. The efforts to bridge this divide cannot be
helped by the fact that the domestic political standings of key actors
on each side of the Atlantic look relatively weak at the moment.
Europe and Britain must also be wary of the fact that there is a
debate within the right itself in Washington, not just between right
and left, over what is the proper tone and course for U.S. foreign
policy. For that reason, the jury must still be out as to the real
motivation of Washington in terms of its European overtures.
The second Bush term has certainly been focused very closely
on Europe so far. And Europeans can take some satisfaction from
the number of times President Bush and his top aides actually have
crossed the Atlantic to talk to them. The words emerging from
American lips for the most part have been soothing ones. But the
Europeans should not be complacent. It is not a foregone conclusion
that this administration will remain engaged across the Atlantic
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indeﬁnitely if it does not see positive results. There are probably
still some voices with inﬂuence on the White House arguing
that Europe should not be the center of its attention, that it is by
no means the indispensable partner on many of the issues which
exercise Washington at the moment, like North Korea or China. So
it will be working through Europe that Britain has the best chance
of maintaining the special relationship and ensuring it is a real one,
with real give and take, and real dividends for both sides.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9
1. Robert Woodward, Plan of Attack, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004,
pp. 237-238.
2. The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, March 31, 2005, p. 37.
3. Ibid., Covering letter from the Commission.

134

CHAPTER 10
THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP AND FOREIGN POLICY:
PANEL CHAIRMAN’S REPORT
Philip Stephens
What follows is the chairman’s report of the conference panel
sessions on foreign policy. Needless to say, it borrows heavily from
the excellent contributions of the panel speakers, John Hulsman and
Nicholas Childs, and from the dialogue in our sessions in Carlisle,
Washington, Shrivenham, and London. But, as with any synthesis,
its conclusions will obviously be partial and, to the degree that they
exclude some points and add others, the responsibility for errors and
omission lies fully with the chairman.
Our conference could not have been more timely. Events since
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), including the
war in Iraq, have exposed the enduring strengths of the special
relationship. Rarely have a U.S. president and a United Kingdom
(UK) prime minister worked so closely in pursuit of common foreign
policy objectives as George W. Bush and Tony Blair. The interlocking
strands of the relationship—historical, cultural, and economic as well
as those in the traditional security arenas of defense and intelligencesharing—are mutually reinforcing. The habit of cooperation is deeply
ingrained.
Yet even at this moment of maximum cooperation, our
proceedings recognized that the context for the relationship has
changed fundamentally. The transatlantic alliance has lost the glue
provided by a common enemy in the form of the Soviet Union; a
much expanded European Union (EU) has fractured over Iraq; and a
cultural chasm between conservative, religious America, and liberal,
secular Europe has raised deeper questions about shared values.
Britain’s foreign policy establishment knows East Coast America;
the Midwest and South are unfamiliar territory. The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), the vital hub of the postwar security
alliance, has failed fully to adapt to the new global environment. The
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big conclusion that policymakers in Washington and London should
draw from these changes is that theirs is no longer a friendship
that can be taken for granted, but rather a relationship that must
be worked at. Few could imagine divorce, but some of our number
worried that, over time, this could become a marriage of separate
lives.
The value for the UK of intimate engagement with Washington
is that, matched by its place in the EU, it allows the occupant of 10
Downing Street to lay claim to a role in international affairs that
would otherwise be denied a middle-ranking power. Tony Blair set
out this ambition in a speech in the autumn of 1999. He alluded to
Dean Acheson’s famous remark some 40 years earlier that Britain
had lost an empire and failed to ﬁnd a role. This had indeed been the
case, Blair said. But the world had moved on: “We have a new role . . .
not as a superpower but as a pivotal power, as a power that is at the
crux of the alliances and international politics which shape the world
and its future.”1 Blair’s foreign policy has thus been guided by the
hope, only sometimes fulﬁlled, that Britain can combine its position
as America’s closest friend with one of foreign policy leadership in
the EU.
For the United States, the beneﬁt lies in a reliable ally—a nation
that, by and large, shares America’s instincts and values and one,
by virtue of history and tradition, that is willing to stand alongside
Washington in moments of difﬁculty and conﬂict. During the Cold
War, this translated into solidarity in the face of the Soviet threat.
More recently, it has been reﬂected in Britain’s decision to stand
shoulder to shoulder with the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Even a sole superpower needs friends.
If most of the participants in our symposiums were optimistic
that the partnership would endure, there was agreement that nothing
should be taken for granted in a world as uncertain as the present
one. During the 15 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union and
the 4 years since the second geopolitical earthquake represented
by 9/11, most, if not all, of the postwar arrangements established
by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S Truman, and Winston Churchill
have come under scrutiny and strain. The world in 2005 is a different
place from that of 1945, and the tectonic plates are still moving.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the distinguished American political
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scientist, Francis Fukuyama, wrote a book characterizing the defeat
of communism as the end of history.2 It was a beguiling thesis, but
premature. Surveying today’s still-shifting geopolitical landscape,
the same author might agree that the beginning of history would
have been a more apposite choice.
If the post-World War II alliances and institutions are to endure,
they will have to prove themselves again and, in most cases, be
reshaped to meet the challenges of the 21st century. For the moment,
the United States is the world’s sole superpower, the “hyperpuissance”
in the description of former French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine.
The “status quo” power of the Cold War has since 9/11 become a
revolutionary one, determined at once to intervene preemptively
against its enemies and to embark on a long-term project to spread
freedom and democracy in the Middle East. The United States is
invincible but not invulnerable. The global order is being reshaped
to reﬂect these new realities. The special relationship is no exception.
Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic recognize the worth of
this particular alliance, but they have begun to appreciate that they
must demonstrate its continuing relevance.
The two nations share the same global outlook. Tony Blair
understood more clearly than most world leaders how profoundly
the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington of 9/11 had
changed forever the psychology of an America that has preferred
to eschew foreign adventures. That appreciation and a parallel
determination to stand alongside the United States, both reinforced
by the bombings in London itself in July 2005, explain the warmth
between London and Washington of recent years. Though Blair
and Bush come from different places on the political spectrum, they
have forged a strong personal relationship built on mutual trust.
Blair is a frequent visitor to the White House and the two men speak
regularly—often weekly—via a video link installed in the basement
of 10 Downing Street.
Threat perceptions—from Islamist terrorism, proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), rogue and failing states—
and assessments of the appropriate long-term responses, including
encouragement for the spread of democracy in the Middle East,
are also similar. After a period in which the White House seemed
indifferent to Tony Blair’s constant calls for action to resolve the
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Palestinian-Israeli conﬂict, George W. Bush has adopted a policy
of active engagement in the region. The transatlantic, and transEuropean, wounds opened by the Iraq war—encapsulated in
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s sardonic characterization of
the continent’s division between Old and New Europe—have begun
to close.
The participants in our conferences, though, also recognized
the challenges to the relationship that have ﬂowed from sometimes
different approaches to the ﬁght against terrorism, from the strategic
implications of rising powers in Asia, and from a diverging approach
to international institutions and law. Blair’s aim has been to keep
the United States committed to a vibrant transatlantic partnership,
to a rules-based international system, and to global cooperation.
The Bush administration often has been reluctant to accept such
perceived constraints on its national sovereignty.
We should not idealize the special relationship. It is as much a
product of national interests as of cultural afﬁnities and historical
affections. British prime minister Harold Macmillan once mused that
the UK could act as Greece to America’s Rome, steering “new world”
power with “old world” wisdom. This conceit, though, has through
the years both exaggerated British inﬂuence and underestimated
American self-interest. Both partners have shown they can be hardheaded when national and mutual interests have seemed to diverge.
In a masterful review of the historical roots of the alliance’s foreign
policy dimensions, Nicholas Childs reminded us of the many
moments when opinions and interests have collided, straining our
transatlantic ties. Dwight D. Eisenhower’s disdain of empire forced
Britain’s humiliation at Suez in 1956. During the following decade,
British prime ministers adamantly resisted pressure from Washington
to commit their troops to the war in Vietnam. Margaret Thatcher
danced on the world stage with Ronald Reagan in a close embrace,
but there were sometimes ﬁerce arguments when the music stopped.
France, not the United States, proved Britain’s most stalwart ally
during the Falklands war. Washington provided vital intelligence
and communications for the British task force in the South Atlantic,
but only after a period of equivocation which saw Thatcher speak to
her friend in the White House in the plainest possible terms. Reagan’s
ﬂirtation with a sweeping nuclear disarmament pact with the Soviet
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Union’s Mikhail Gorbachev at the Rejkjavik summit ignored British
interests. A few years later, George W. H. Bush deeply offended his
closest ally by declaring a reuniﬁed Germany his most important
strategic partner in Europe.
One could add to Nicholas Child’s list the casual disregard for
Britain’s nuclear deterrent shown by John F. Kennedy when he
cancelled the Skybolt missile system, and the deep divisions between
John Major’s government and the Clinton administration over the
Balkans during the early 1990s. For some in Washington—including
some in the present administration—the presumption that it should
consult London often has seemed an unwelcome encumbrance.
During the post-World War II decades, the relationship weathered
such storms—whatever their intensity, they were peripheral to the
binding imperative to preserve the coherence of the Western alliance
in the face of the Soviet threat—but they were a reminder that it
is an essentially lop-sided partnership. One of the recurring themes
of our conferences was a feeling that the British, with customary
self-deprecation, have often underestimated their inﬂuence in
Washington. That may be so. But while the occupant of 10 Downing
Street can claim inﬂuence in Washington, the lesson of recent history
is that power lies with his or her counterpart in the White House.
That said,our American participants stressed the importance of
the alliance to Washington. John Hulsman set the special relationship
in the broader transatlantic framework. The shifting sands of
geopolitics meant that ties with London had to change, but that did
not diminish their importance to the United States. The ingrained
afﬁnity between the two nations was a product of both common
cultural heritage and a remarkably similar worldview. Britain was
also one of only two European powers (the other is France) with the
military capability and political will to project power in the world.
In Hulsman’s view, that made the UK a vital partner in the pursuit
of America’s global goals.
We caught a glimpse of this during the Iraq war. In the weeks
before the toppling of the Baghdad regime, Secretary Rumsfeld
stated publicly that the invasion would go ahead with or without the
UK’s armed forces.3 The Defense Secretary’s wholly undiplomatic
remark spoke to the military reality: Britain’s contribution in men
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and materiel to the removal of Saddam Hussein was signiﬁcant but
not vital. Yet the presence of British troops in the invasion force spoke
to a political commitment of far greater signiﬁcance—the more so
as the security situation in Iraq deteriorated in the aftermath of the
war.
In this part of our discussion, there was a discernible difference
between some of our British and American participants. Childs,
like Hulsman, set the relationship in the familiar context of a wider
transatlantic alliance, but emphasized, from a British perspective, its
interaction with the UK’s European alliances. A unique friendship
with Washington has served as one axis of a triangle which has
also seen the UK seek to maximize its inﬂuence in an integrating
EU. For most (not all) postwar British governments, the two sets of
relationships have been seen as mutually reinforcing. Inﬂuence in
Washington has been parlayed into a louder voice in Paris or Berlin,
and vice versa. Such a balancing act, however, has rested on the
assumption of U.S. support for closer European cooperation. That
assumption has now been challenged as a consequence of German
and French opposition to the Iraq war. Some in Washington—and
John Hulsman put the case eloquently—believe that the United States
should withdraw its support for European integration. In particular,
it should see the development of a common European defense
and security policy as a threat to NATO. Instead, in his view, the
administration should focus on building up its bilateral relationships
with like-minded European allies—the UK most certainly, but also
newly democratized nations in the east such as Poland and the Baltic
states. There are many in Washington who favor such a strategy of
building coalitions of the willing instead of seeking accord with a
cohesive EU. But the implications for a British government of such a
policy would be serious: It would be forced to make the choice that,
since Suez, it has done its utmost to avoid—as between the United
States and Europe.
Such discussions invited the conclusion that policymakers face
three sets of challenges in sustaining and adapting the special
relationship. The ﬁrst task was to recognize the potential strains, as
well as the enduring strengths, in the relationship. Events since the
terror attacks on New York and Washington on 9/11 have exposed
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a clash of strategic cultures between a United States determined to
act decisively against its enemies and a Europe more wedded to the
projection of “soft power” than of military might. Britain ﬁnds itself
torn between the two: willing to act when necessary, but anxious
that intervention carry international legitimacy.
Tony Blair has paid a signiﬁcant political price for his staunch
support of the Iraq war. The conventional wisdom has it that Blair
joined the mission against Saddam Hussein in order to protect a
privileged position in Washington. That is far too simplistic a view.
The desire to preserve the strategic alliance certainly played a part in
the dispatch of British troops to the Gulf. But Blair was as convinced
as was George W. Bush that the Iraqi leader could not be permitted
any longer to defy the international community. He agreed that
the attacks of 9/11 had changed the nature of the threat posed by
Saddam. Where others saw British obsequiousness to Washington,
Blair saw a common foreign policy interest in upholding the will
of the international community and in sending a powerful signal to
those other nations that might be seeking to develop WMD.
These judgments were questioned, though, by the British
electorate and by many in Blair’s own Labour party. A widespread
view in the UK has been that Bush and Blair misled their voters
into war—a suspicion reinforced by the failure to uncover WMD in
Iraq and by the rising cost in lives and treasure of the post-invasion
insurgency. In spite of his third election victory in May 2005, Blair
has paid dearly in terms of trust and popularity for the war. One
consequence is that it would be difﬁcult, if not impossible, for the
prime minister, or indeed his eventual successor, to join the United
States in a similar preemptive strike against potential enemies. If
Bush had to struggle to secure congressional backing for such action,
the occupant of 10 Downing Street would almost certainly fail to win
the support of the House of Commons. More worryingly, the war
and its bloody aftermath have nurtured a growing anti-Americanism
among some sections of the British electorate. Events at Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq and the controversy over the rights of those held at
Guantanamo Bay have led to questions in the UK about the extent to
which values are still shared across the Atlantic.
Second, although Bush and Blair agreed to act in the face of
hesitation at the United Nations (UN), there remains an underlying
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divergence in attitudes toward multilateral institutions and
international law. Britain’s instinct is that of most of its European
neighbors, that threats to the global order are best met by responses
that carry the stamp of international law and assent. It was Blair
who prodded the President into seeking Resolution 1441 in the UN
Security Council, and he desperately wanted a second resolution.
Britain is part of the International Criminal Court, has signed up to
the Kyoto treaty on climate change, and has supported the additional
protocol for the chemical weapons convention. More recently, Blair’s
government has joined with those of France and Germany in seeking
a negotiated end to Iran’s uranium enrichment process. The present
U.S. administration has made it clear that it supports multilateralism
on sufferance. Most international agreements are seen as unacceptable
constraints on its national sovereignty. The differences between
Washington and London have thus far been bridgeable. It may not
always be so.
Third, the geopolitical context for the special relationship has
changed. For Britain, the close alliance with Washington was as
much a product of the Anglo-French debacle at Suez in 1956 as the
warmth of the wartime alliance between Churchill and Roosevelt.
The ignominious withdrawal from Suez at Eisenhower’s insistence
marked the moment when the UK ﬁnally acknowledged that the
sun had set on its great power status. As the retreat from empire
accelerated, Harold Macmillan, who succeeded the discredited
Anthony Eden, accepted that henceforth Britain could not engage
in foreign adventures against the wishes of the United States. It was
Macmillan who made the special relationship the leitmotif of British
foreign policy for succeeding decades, combining it with the policy
of active engagement with the leading powers of Europe. Blair’s
strategic vision of the UK as the pivotal power, or a bridge, between
Europe and the United States was born of Macmillan’s decisions.
The collapse of communism, however, has removed the
overarching framework provided by the Soviet threat. Europe is no
longer at the center of Washington’s geopolitical interests—American
security interests are linked more closely now to developments in
the Middle East and Asia. Equally, in the absence of Soviet troop
concentrations on the German borders, the U.S. security guarantee
is no longer the sine qua non of European security. The weakening of
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NATO as the essential forum for western security and the divisions
within Europe over the Iraq war reﬂected these new geopolitical
realities. They raise questions also over the durability of the UK’s
balancing act between the United States and Europe. For the past 40
years, it has avoided choosing between its American and European
friends. Can it continue to do so?
The answer is “Yes, but.” The strategic interests of Europe and
the United States, and thus London and Washington, remain the
same: Stability and freedom in the Middle East, a sustained path to
democracy in Russia, partnership rather than rivalry with emerging
great powers such as China and India, a global effort to separate
moderate Islam from al Qaeda terrorism, and an effective brake on
the proﬁleration of unconventional weapons.
Mutual interests, however, are not a guarantee of mutual
understanding. For 50 years the special relationship existed within
the interlocking network of global institutions and treaties created
after 1945. Many of these have been pushed to one side. The status quo
superpower of the Cold War has become a hyperpower determined
to remake the geopolitics of the Middle East and beyond. The United
States looks out on a Hobbesian world in which overwhelming force
is the most effective instrument of security; Britain views a terrain
which also demands multilateral order and rules to avoid conﬂicts.
Britain will strive to keep the special relationship, not only because
it offers vital emotional reassurance for a power which still hankers
after the inﬂuence of empire, but also because it depends on the
United States for its nuclear deterrent. The special relationship also
allows British prime ministers to take their place at the front of the
international stage. But Europe is no longer America’s front line.
Will Washington continue to think it worth the indulgence?
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SECTION IV:
SECURITY AND DEFENSE ASPECTS
OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

CHAPTER 11
OBSERVATIONS ON THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
IN SECURITY AND DEFENSE MATTERS
Leo Michel
The substance of the U.S.-UK special relationship in security and
defense matters was hardly mentioned during the 2005 parliamentary
election campaign. British commentators agree, however, that
broad public discomfort with Prime Minister Tony Blair’s decision
to cooperate closely with President George W. Bush on Iraq was a
key factor in Labour’s signiﬁcant losses in the House of Commons.
While it remains unclear how the voter’s message and the reduction
of Labour’s majority in Westminster will affect speciﬁc outcomes
on defense issues confronting the new Blair government (and its
new Secretary of State for Defence, Dr. John Reid), it is reasonable
to assume that Her Majesty’s Government’s (HMG) margin of
maneuver on three fronts—the level of cooperation with U.S. forces
in ongoing or possible future military operations; implementation of
recent initiatives to restructure UK non-nuclear forces and capabilities
(e.g., former Secretary of State for Defence Geoffrey Hoon’s July
2004 Ministry of Defence report, Delivering Security in a Changing
World); and looming future issues pertaining to the UK nuclear
deterrent and role in missile defense—will be reduced. Ironically,
these developments coincide with a marked increase in explicit and
implied U.S. interest in broader and deeper security and defense
cooperation with allies and partners, especially those—headed by
the UK—with proven capabilities and a demonstrated political will
to use them.
I intend, therefore, to focus on four areas:
• Impact of ongoing U.S. reviews affecting our defense
strategy, military capabilities, and global and domestic basing
posture;
• Future of nuclear cooperation;
• Missile defense; and,
• UK’s “bridging” role between the United States and EU.
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In addition, where possible, I will weave in some modest
recommendations on what might be explored to maintain and
strengthen the special relationship that has largely beneﬁted both
our nations.
Defense Strategy.
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is engaged in a number
of high-level assessments and planning efforts that will reshape
American strategy and capabilities for years, if not decades, to come.
These include the:
• National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy
(developed in parallel and released in early 2005);
• 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (now underway and due to
Congress in February 2006);
• Global Posture Review (now
implementation stage); and,

in

the

negotiation

and

• Base Realignment and Closure recommendations approved by
the Congress and President in November 2005.
Taken individually, none of these efforts represents a radical
departure from core concepts developed during the ﬁrst year or
two of the Bush administration. Together, however, they probably
represent a watershed in its efforts to “transform” American defense
and its relationship with allies. Having analyzed “lessons learned”
during the post-Cold War period and the aftermath of September
11, 2001 (9/11)—and, in particular, its heavy engagement in Iraq
and Afghanistan—the defense establishment and, in time, the White
House and Congress will need to make a series of tough decisions on
U.S. strategic priorities and resource allocations; the size, structure,
equipment, and basing posture of U.S. military forces; and, of course,
American relations with allies and partners.
To describe these processes as “complex” would be grossly
inadequate (even by British standards of understatement). Moreover,
they do not necessarily predict how the United States might act in any
speciﬁc crisis. But understanding how American strategists assess
the evolving international security environment, as well as the forces
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and capabilities needed to protect and advance American interests,
provides a good a set of clues to future American actions. This, in
turn, might be of some help in determining how the UK—alone, or
with the United States, or in cooperation with other nations—should
frame its strategy and conﬁgure its military forces and capabilities.
By way of background, here is a thumbnail sketch of the key
reports. In the National Defense Strategy, the Secretary of Defense
provides guidance to DoD on what it must do to implement the
President’s National Security Strategy of September 2002.1 (The
latter is still in force and covers the broad range of national security
concerns and tools, not just those under Defense’s purview.) A few
points deserve emphasis:
• First, the National Defense Strategy’s opening sentence—
“America is a nation at war”—speaks volumes. “Today’s
war,” the report continues later, “is against terrorist extremist
networks, including their state and non-state supporters.”
Although the term “Global War On Terrorism” rankles many
in Europe, who might see it as either simplistic or dangerous
or both, terrorism is the most acute manifestation of what
the document calls “irregular challenges,” i.e., challenges
coming from those using unconventional means to counter
traditional advantages of stronger opponents. However,
“irregular challenges” are not the only category of strategic
threat facing the United States. The document also identiﬁes
“traditional challenges” posed by states employing recognized
military capabilities and forces; “catastrophic challenges”
involving the acquisition, possession, and use of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD); and “disruptive challenges” from
adversaries seeking break-through technologies to counter
current U.S. advantages in key operational domains. Moreover,
these challenges might overlap; for example, al Qaeda is
an “irregular” threat but is actively seeking “catastrophic”
capabilities. Indeed, one reasonably could argue that, if
evaluated in terms of likelihood and U.S. vulnerabilities,
the potential combination of “irregular” and “catastrophic”
challenges is the most pressing security problem facing us.
That said, we do not have the luxury of focusing on only one
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or two challenges; thus, the strategy addresses the need to
ﬁght today’s ﬁght, while simultaneously reassuring allies
and friends and preparing to dissuade, deter, or defeat future
adversaries in an environment of “strategic uncertainty.”
• Second, against this backdrop, the National Defense Strategy
notes that U.S. forces currently are shaped and sized, at least
in principle, to meet four major objectives set by the 2001
Quadrennial Defense Review: (1) to defend the U.S. homeland;
(2) to assure allies and friends through forward deterrence in
four critical regions; (3) to swiftly defeat adversaries in two
overlapping military campaigns; and (4) to “win decisively”
(this includes the so-called “regime change” option) in one
of those campaigns. These objectives are to be met while
preserving the U.S. ability to conduct a limited number of
“lesser contingencies.” In Pentagon jargon, this is known as
the “1-4-2-1 planning construct.”
• Third, the strategy emphasizes that “battleﬁeld success” is
only one element of a long-term, multifaceted U.S. campaign
against terrorism. Other military activities (such as training
and assistance to humanitarian efforts) as well as nonmilitary
efforts (such as diplomacy, strategic communications,
law enforcement, and economic sanctions) also must be
employed. As underscored several times in the report, this
places a very high premium on strengthening alliances and
partnerships with nations (in both military and nonmilitary
spheres) that share our interests and principles—although, as
noted in the report, “even among our closest partners, threats
will be perceived differently and consensus may be difﬁcult
to achieve.”
• Fourth, notwithstanding the multiple references to working
with allies and partners to develop an “active, layered defense”
and to prevent problems from becoming crises, the strategy
states: “Allowing opponents to strike ﬁrst—particularly
in an era of proliferation—is unacceptable.” The strategy
refers to the President’s range of options, including a single
mention of “preempt(ing) a devastating attack,” but contains
a potentially sweeping statement of intent: “At the direction
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of the President, we will defeat adversaries at the time, place,
and in the manner of our choosing—setting the conditions for
future security.”
In the National Military Strategy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff takes the broad guidance within the National Security Strategy
and National Defense Strategy and translates this into a set of military
objectives from which U.S. combatant commanders and the military
services identify the capabilities they desire and against which
the Chairman assesses risk.2 Hence, the National Military Strategy
emphasizes the changing nature of military challenges, including:
a wider spectrum of adversaries, ranging from states to nonstate
organizations and individuals; a more complex “battlespace,”
encompassing densely populated urban areas (as experienced in
Iraq) as well as some of the most remote and inhospitable terrain
(as in Afghanistan); and the global proliferation of technology and
advanced weaponry that could “dramatically increase an adversary’s
ability to threaten” the United States.
To counter such challenges, the National Military Strategy lays out
a series of steps necessary to apply the three key principles to be
considered by combatant commanders in planning and conducting
operations: “agility” (i.e., the ability to rapidly deploy, employ,
sustain, and redeploy capabilities in geographically separated
and diverse regions); “decisiveness” (i.e., the ability to overwhelm
adversaries, control situations, and achieve deﬁnitive outcomes
without necessarily large force deployments); and “integration” (i.e.,
ensuring military activities are synchronized across military services,
other government agencies and nongovernment organizations, and
with overseas allies and partners).
In some respects, the National Defense Strategy and National
Military Strategy can be seen as the political and doctrinal foundation
of the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review, the congressionally mandated
report that recommends the capabilities needed to execute strategy.
In the 1997 and 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, the defense strategy
was an output of the reviews; this year, the National Defense Strategy
was decided ﬁrst. Speciﬁcally, the Quadrennial Defense Review will be
looking at four “core problems”:
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• What capabilities are needed to build partnerships to defeat
extremism?
• What capabilities are needed to defend the homeland in
depth?
• What capabilities are needed to shape the choices of countries
at a “strategic crossroads”?
• What capabilities are needed to prevent the acquisition or use
of WMD by hostile state or nonstate actors?
Among the six high-level civilian and military panels preparing
to execute the review, the three panels likely to produce the most
visible changes in military posture will examine: (1) “capabilities mix”
issues affecting force structure and modernization; (2) “manning and
balancing” issues focusing on personnel; and (3) “enablers,” i.e., the
capabilities essential to transforming the military, including airlift,
sealift, logistics, and command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). One should
not discount, however, the import of the panel examining “roles and
missions,” which will look inter alia at how DoD is organized, and
how it interacts with other U.S. government agencies, to address the
range of strategic challenges.
The review must tackle a number of tough questions, many of
which will have signiﬁcant consequences for how the United States
apportions its defense budget, what risks it is willing to take, and
what trades it might make among capabilities options to mitigate
those risks. (According to senior defense ofﬁcials, the review panels
are told not to assume continuing real increases in defense spending.
This leads some analysts to view the Quadrennial Defense Review
as a critical tool to determine how much “transformation” must
be trimmed to accommodate rising personnel costs. Of course, the
potential trades between transformation and personnel costs are
just one example among many others.) Examples of such potential
questions might include:
• How best to reconﬁgure and equip ground forces to confront the
stubborn, low-tech, but deadly insurgency-terrorist enemies
of the Iraqi type? How will the acknowledged importance
of certain capabilities required for such warfare—including
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information warfare, special forces, and civil-military affairs
and military police units—fare in the inevitable competition
over budgets?
• How best to reduce the ratio of administrative and support
personnel to combat forces, and to reduce the strain on
reserve forces? Regarding the latter, does the United States
need a permanent increase in the size of its active duty land
component (Army and/or Marines) and, if so, by how many,
in what areas, and how fast?
• How best to integrate and scale down redundant and costly
programs in areas such as missile defense and advanced combat
aircraft? (Congressional resistance to recently proposed budget
cuts affecting, for example, the F/A-22 “Raptor” ﬁghter and
C-130J Hercules transport plane illustrates the problem.)
• How should the United States construct its C4ISR capabilities
in ways such that valued allies can “plug into” U.S. systems?
More broadly, is the United States prepared to make tradeoffs
in its capabilities in order to cooperate better with partners
(European and non-European) who, in some areas, are not so
capable—and, if so, where and at what levels of risk?
• What DoD capabilities are needed to support the Department
of Homeland Security and state and local authorities in the
event of new terrorist attacks inside the United States? In
this regard, according to recent press reports, the Quadrennial
Defense Review will look at what would be necessary to
respond to a small number of simultaneous attacks involving
mass casualties.
Completing this picture are the Global Posture Review and the Base
Realignment and Closure process. Under the former, DoD is moving
to implement the President’s plan outlined in August 2004 (after
a 3-year review and extensive consultation with allies) to update
U.S. military presence overseas and leverage 21st century military
technologies. The plan follows major redeployments and adjustments
in U.S. force structure that have been underway since the early 1990s,
as American defense strategy adjusted to the end of the Cold War.
Over the next decade, this plan is expected to result in the return to
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the United States of some 70,000 uniformed personnel and 100,000
civilian employees and dependents.
Details of the plan are still under discussion with allies and
partners around the world, but the basic architecture is fairly well
set.
• In Europe, roughly two brigades of “heavy” forces designed
for Cold War-type scenarios—forces that have spent much of
the last decade operating outside the continent—will return
to the United States. In Germany, for example, General James
L. Jones, USMC (Combatant Commander for Europe) foresees
reducing the number of major U.S. Army communities from
14 to 4 and redeploying about 37,000 of the existing 62,000
troops back to the United States by late 2010. Meanwhile,
a U.S. Stryker Brigade Combat Team and enablers will be
stationed at Grafenwoehr, Germany, by late 2007, with an
additional rotational brigade combat team to operate out of
relatively austere forward operating sites in Eastern Europe.
Ground, air, and naval headquarters will be streamlined and
consolidated. Special forces, both forward-stationed and
rotational, will increase in importance.3
• In Northeast Asia, about 12,500 troops will be removed
from the Republic of Korea during 2005-08. U.S. military
headquarters will shift from Seoul to Osan, and U.S. forces
close to the Demilitarized Zone will move in phases to
locations south of the Han River, out of North Korean artillery
range. Additional advanced air and naval strike assets will
be stationed in the Western Paciﬁc. Washington and Tokyo
are discussing a possible realignment of U.S. forces in Japan,
but major reductions below the 45,000 troops currently
deployed appear unlikely. In Central and Southeast Asia, the
United States is working to establish a network of austere
sites to provide training opportunities and access both for
conventional and special forces.
• In the Middle East, cooperation and access provided by
coalition partners during Operations ENDURING FREEDOM
and IRAQI FREEDOM provide a solid basis for other forms of
future cooperation. Sites for rotational forces and contingency
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purposes, supported by forward headquarters and advanced
training facilities, are envisaged, subject to the approval of the
sovereign governments in the region.
In all of these regions, it is important to focus on capabilities—not
just numbers of forces. Thanks to decades of investment, U.S. armed
forces have achieved enormous advances in speed, reach, precision,
and combat power. The number of forward-based forces in a given
area is not the best measure of the military capability that the United
States can bring to bear. Those who have suggested that these
reductions will necessarily do grave damage to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) are mistaken. The United States will
retain substantial combat power in Europe, along with a robust
reinforcement capability to deal with unexpected contingencies.
The U.S. Joint Forces and European Commands are working closely
with NATO’s Allied Command Transformation to ensure that allies
and partners beneﬁt from advanced training and experimentation in
combined activities with U.S. forces.
The ﬁfth round since 1988 of the Base Realignment and Closure
process has resulted in the proposed closure of 33 major domestic U.S.
military bases and the realignment of an additional 29. Some existing
facilities might be expanded to accommodate troops brought home
from overseas. As in the past, this effort has involved difﬁcult political
negotiations and potential tradeoffs involving operations, training,
and readiness. Still, the potential long-term savings to the Pentagon
could amount to billions of dollars annually—freeing resources that
can be plowed into personnel, equipment, and operations.
Against this backdrop, one can identify two broad areas where
these various U.S. assessments and plans might affect the special
relationship.
Strategy—Implications for the UK.
There is substantial positive news for the UK, in my view, in
the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy. The U.S.
experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, in particular, seem to have
brought home the lesson that the United States needs stronger and
broader international partnerships to meet its strategic objectives and
155

to pursue an “active, layered defense” of its homeland and interests. As
the National Defense Strategy puts it bluntly: “The U.S. cannot achieve
its defense objectives alone.” Moreover, the Pentagon leadership
acknowledges with unaccustomed clarity that these partnerships
must be nurtured across a cohesive set of activities. These range from
working with others to develop a common appreciation of threats,
to increasing the capabilities and leadership roles of others, in both
military and nonmilitary spheres, to prevent and defeat “irregular”
challenges. Indeed, the National Defense Strategy’s language that “we
must confront challenges earlier and more comprehensively” seems to
echo that of the UK’s New Chapter of the Strategic Defence Review (2002)
and EU’s European Security Strategy (2003). In addition, the renewed
emphasis on broad security cooperation is eerily reminiscent of the
Clinton administration’s “engagement and shaping” strategy that
was not exactly embraced after the 2000 elections. More important,
perhaps, is the implicit recognition that “made in the USA” threat
assessments and strategies are not the best way to engage and sustain
the international partnerships that the United States so manifestly
needs.
In a slightly more speculative vein, the National Defense Strategy’s
acknowledgement that, in a more complex world, the United States
might not always agree with even its closest allies could be viewed as
a nod toward the special relationship. In other words, if differences
with the UK are anticipated, they probably can be better managed
without a divorce.
That said, certain concerns of UK news media commentators and
political-military analysts over the past few years likely will not be
allayed by the strategy documents. For example, UK ofﬁcials and
strategic reviews have shied away from references to the “Global War
on Terrorism,” although their perception of key threats to UK national
security are essentially identical to Washington’s: international
terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional conﬂict, and failed (or
failing) states. Moreover, with the deadly July 2005 terrorist attacks
against London’s mass transit system, UK public perceptions of the
threat may move even closer to the U.S. view. However, despite the
multiple (and patently deliberate) U.S. references to the key role of
“allies and partners,” neither strategy document speciﬁcally mentions
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NATO as the primary vehicle for U.S. cooperation with its European
allies on strategy or capabilities development. For those Britons who
have grown uncomfortable with the perceived U.S. proclivity for
“coalitions of the willing,” this might be a troublesome omission.
And while the UK certainly has never forsworn its willingness to act
alone if it deems its vital interests to be at stake, the aforementioned
statement of U.S. presidential prerogatives might strike some British
opinion leaders as unnecessary and possibly unhelpful.
Capabilities—Implications for the UK.
The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review and Global Posture Review
likely will have more visible and practical consequences for the
special relationship. Taking the Global Posture Review ﬁrst, based on
General Jones’ statement, the U.S. Air Force intends to maintain and,
indeed, recapitalize critical base infrastructure at Lakenheath (the
only U.S. F-15 ﬁghter wing based in Europe) and Mildenhall, UK.
At Mildenhall, U.S. air refueling, air mobility, reconnaissance, and
intelligence units apparently will not be repositioned, but the special
forces air component likely will be moved during the 2011-15 period
as part of a planned consolidation of permanent and rotational special
operations forces in Southern Europe.4 (Although not covered by
General Jones’ statement, one would assume that U.S. access to base
facilities in Diego Garcia will remain important for both countries.)
The UK enjoys a privileged position in the preparation of the
2005 Quadrennial Defense Review, as British Defence Ministry experts
are for the ﬁrst time “embedded” in the Ofﬁce of the Secretary of
Defense staff that coordinates the review. This is a tangible sign that
the promise of the National Defense Strategy to work closely with allies
in strategy and capabilities development is being implemented.
The Institute for National Strategic Studies does not participate
as such in the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review, and it would be
premature to predict the review outcomes. However, it is possible to
identify some of the issues that likely will be of particular interest to
the UK as the review progresses.
First, one must consider our respective military levels of
ambition. A senior Pentagon ofﬁcial recently indicated that the
previously mentioned “1-4-2-1 planning construct,” which was
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agreed to shortly before the 9/11 attacks, could change as a result
of the review. Although this might seem like an arcane exercise, the
planning assumptions that lie behind this construct, or its possible
successor, will help determine where the U.S. military is prepared to
trade some of its unparalleled capability in conventional warfare to
improve capabilities against the other types of threats identiﬁed in
the National Defense Strategy—that is, the “irregular,” “catastrophic,”
and “disruptive” challenges.
The thrust of the July 2004 Ministry of Defence report, Delivering
Security in a Changing World, is the UK’s level of ambition to “support
three concurrent small and medium scale operations,” while retaining
the “ﬂexibility to reconﬁgure for less frequent large scale operations,
while concurrently conducting a small scale operation.”5 The UK
report further states: “The full spectrum of capabilities is not required
for large scale operations, as the most demanding operations could
only conceivably be undertaken alongside the U.S., either as a NATO
operation or a U.S.-led coalition, where we have choices as to what
to contribute.” In such large-scale operations, the range of potential
UK contributions would include special forces, C4ISR assets able to
be integrated with the U.S. network, amphibious and carrier strike
task groups, an air expeditionary task force, and a land maneuver
division capable of conducting offensive operations.
What happens, however, if the U.S. “planning construct” were
to change? Would this change the desired balance among UK
capabilities? If the United States, for example, were to signiﬁcantly
enlarge its special operations forces (based on an assessment that
“irregular challenges” have become more pressing than “traditional”
ones), should the UK follow suit so that it can, to cite the Ministry’s
report once more, “add real weight to the campaign and hence the
UK’s ability to inﬂuence its outcome”?6 Or should the UK instead shift
its relative effort to one or more of its other areas of special strength,
such as forces and capabilities useful for post-conﬂict stabilization?
Would this translate into a requirement for a larger UK ground force
(as some American experts are arguing is the case for the United
States) or, at a minimum, not reducing its existing levels?
Second, assuming the planned size and mix of UK forces are
settled, a key to effective cooperation with the United States in
operations will be the ability to integrate respective C4ISR capabilities.
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The National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy place
such great emphasis on these key operational capabilities that it
is hard to imagine that the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review and
subsequent budgetary decisions will not follow suit. Recognizing
that the Ministry’s report also emphasizes the importance of C4ISR,
we then must ask: will the UK be able to keep apace with U.S. efforts
in this area? A host of ﬁnancial and technological issues, to include
sensitive issues of technology-sharing arrangements, are likely to
ﬂow from the review’s recommendations.
Third, as the United States determines what capabilities are
needed to shape the choices of countries arriving at strategic
crossroads (China and Russia come to mind, although these have
not been explicitly cited by American ofﬁcials) or to prevent the
acquisition of use of WMD by a hostile state or nonstate actor, what
will be the UK’s role? For the United States, missile defenses are one
means of dissuading, deterring, and if necessary defending against a
limited missile attack by a “rogue” nation. The twin strategy reports
also seem to presage a wider use of small-scale military activities (for
example, training and exercises) to build the capabilities of others.
Will the UK be similarly inclined to increase its current contribution
to such activities?
Fourth, as the Pentagon (and the U.S. government as a whole)
looks at its capabilities and structures to deal with homeland security,
what lessons can we learn from the UK’s experience over the years?
The need for close U.S.-UK cooperation in this area obviously
transcends defense-to-defense channels, and—as we saw from 9/11,
its aftermath, and now July 7, 2005 (7/7), in London—our common
security, political, and economic stakes in this area are enormous.
Future of Nuclear Cooperation.
The National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy barely
mention the role of U.S. nuclear weapons. This is understandable
for a few reasons: the changed relationship with Russia; the priority
given to capabilities needed to confront the “irregular” threats from
insurgencies and international terrorism; and, perhaps, a desire to
avoid any perceived brandishing of nuclear capabilities at a time when
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the United States is relying heavily on diplomatic tools to resolve
concerns with North Korean and Iranian nuclear developments.
An additional explanation might be that little of substance has
changed since the Nuclear Posture Review was completed in late 2001.
To brieﬂy recap some of the main ﬁndings of this review:
• Reliance on nuclear weapons should be reduced by developing
non-nuclear offensive and defensive capabilities that allow
the United States to raise the nuclear threshold.
• In keeping with the President’s guidance to reduce the number
of operationally deployed nuclear weapons to the lowest
possible level, and to do so without some of the drawbacks
of Cold War-style arms control negotiations and treaties,
the United States will look toward unilateral reductions. In
terms of force sizing, the Nuclear Posture Review set a goal of
1,700-2,200 operationally deployed warheads by 2012 (which
represents a reduction of approximately 3,800 warheads from
the level permitted by START I, which remains in force).
• Given the existing and emerging threat to the United States
and its allies and friends from WMD and missile proliferation,
U.S. nuclear planning needs to become more capable against
a range of contingencies and less country-speciﬁc. The
President needs a “more diverse portfolio of capabilities”—to
include nuclear forces, non-nuclear strike forces, and missile
defenses—to assure allies and friends, and dissuade, deter,
and, if necessary, defeat adversaries.
• So-called “life extension programs” would keep the current
types of delivery systems in service until 2020 or longer.
This represents an important budgetary and technical effort,
as the average ages of U.S. delivery systems (when the
review was completed) were 26 years for the Minuteman III
intercontinental ballistic missile, 9 years for the Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile, 40 years for the B-52
bomber, and 5 years for the B-2 bomber. Four of the 18 Trident
strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) would be taken
out of strategic service, and the remaining 14 SSBNs would be
ﬁtted with Trident II D-5 missiles. In addition, the Peacekeeper
land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) would
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be retired, and the B-1 bomber force would no longer be
maintained for a nuclear weapon role.
• The United States would rely on its “stockpile stewardship”
program designed to ensure the safety and reliability of the
nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear testing, but it
would not ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
It also would study options to reduce the preparatory time
needed—currently somewhere between 2 to 3 years—if the
President were to determine that a resumption of nuclear
testing was necessary to rectify a stockpile problem.7
The special relationship as related to nuclear weapon systems
has had a long and enviable history. Indeed, there exists no other
program where the United States has worked so intimately with
another country for such an extended period of time on the gravest
matters of national security. This aspect of our special relationship
remains very much alive. One could posit that this relationship grows
even more important as the size of our respective nuclear arsenals
has shrunk over the past decade.
It perhaps is worth recalling that a relationship that many take
for granted today has not always been problem-free. During World
War II, Anglo-American cooperation on nuclear matters was not
covered by any binding legal agreements, and postwar cooperation
was virtually stopped by the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954. That
law was not amended until early 1958, clearing the way, in July
of that year, for the U.S.-UK Agreement on Cooperation on the Use of
Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes. The agreement authorizes
a broad range of cooperation on information, training, material,
and equipment, but bars any transfer of a nuclear weapon by either
party. Less than 5 years later, however, the “Skybolt affair” came
close to wrecking U.S.-UK nuclear cooperation for a second time.
Fortunately, an extraordinary set of negotiations between President
John Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in December
1962—nearly 4 days of what Macmillan described in his memoirs as
“ﬁerce and sometimes painful (arguments)”—produced the “Nassau
Agreement,” which set the stage for formal arrangements for the U.S.
sale of Polaris missiles for UK submarines and, subsequently, the sale
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of Trident II D-5 missiles and launch systems for the UK’s Vanguardclass submarines.8
Accounts of the Nassau Agreement make for fascinating reading
in light of subsequent developments. For example, Macmillan wrote
that his government kept General Charles de Gaulle apprised of the
Nassau talks on a day-to-day basis. He also hinted that he encouraged
Kennedy’s subsequent offer of Polaris missiles to the French on terms
similar to those agreed for the UK. Another observation by Macmillan
seems particularly relevant. “The Americans,” he wrote, “were
willing to defend Europe and had the means to do so. Would they
always have the will? America must realize that the great nations of
Europe, with their different histories and varying responsibilities,
would demand a reasonable degree of dignity and security. Certainly
Britain with her world-wide commitments must continue, for the
present at any rate, to have some independent nuclear force.”9
The international security environment obviously has changed
since Macmillan’s days. And unlike the days of the Skybolt affair,
when some in the UK suspected the United States of wanting to
“force Britain out of the nuclear club,” Washington’s decades-long
record of strong support for an independent UK deterrent shows
no signs of eroding.10 Last year, the United States and UK agreed to
a 10-year extension of their 1958 Agreement, and President Bush,
in his letter to Congress on this subject, wrote that “the United
Kingdom intends to continue to maintain viable nuclear forces.” The
question now seems to be whether the UK in the coming years will
reach the same conclusion as Macmillan. Speciﬁcally, will the UK
opt to maintain its SSBN capability through cooperation with the
United States, or diversify its nuclear delivery capability (perhaps
in cooperation with France), or choose to allow its minimal nuclear
deterrent to atrophy?
Timing will no doubt play an important role here. In the case of
the Trident II system, the United States has been able to extend the
SSBN’s service life from 30 to 45 years. To address the mismatch
between SSBN’s service life and the nominal 30-year service life of its
D5 missile, the United States has begun a D5 “life extension” program
(which includes the purchase of additional missiles as well as the
replacement of some aging components) that will make it possible
to retain the Trident II system until 2020 or longer. However, for a
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number of reasons, the UK likely will need to decide on a followon to its Trident II system during the next Parliament—that is, in
advance of an eventual U.S. decision on its own Trident II followon.
I assume that the UK will want to keep a credible minimum
nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future, given the extant and
potential future threats of WMD and missile proliferation. How the
UK might deﬁne “credible” and “minimum” in the future are yet to
be determined; as demonstrated by the Strategic Defence Review in
1998, UK assessments of its nuclear force requirements are subject
to change over time. In any event, given the security, technological,
industrial, and budgetary ramiﬁcations of such decisions, the
importance of close and timely U.S.-UK consultations on their
possible future cooperation would seem self-evident. Neither side
can afford the type of missed signals and lack of forethought that
characterized the Skybolt debacle.
This leads to three ﬁnal observations. First, it seems to me that
the U.S. decision not to pursue traditional Cold War-style nuclear
arms agreements with Russia holds a signiﬁcant beneﬁt from a
UK perspective: it effectively moots any future Russian attempt
to limit the independent UK (and French) deterrent as a price for
further negotiated reductions with the United States. Second,
without discounting the importance, both real and potential, of
increasing British defense cooperation with its European partners in
conventional systems, it is hard for me at least to imagine alternative
UK arrangements in the nuclear ﬁeld—for example, either bilaterally
with France or within a broader European context—that would
match the strategic, technical, and cost beneﬁts of its established
relationship with the United States. Third, UK defense planners will
need to consider some difﬁcult budgetary trade-offs between future
conventional and nuclear capabilities if, as most observers believe,
signiﬁcant real increases in the defense budget are not in the ofﬁng.
Given the relatively recent “conversion” of New Labor to support
for a “minimum” nuclear deterrent and the increased political
sensitivities regarding close cooperation with the United States, a
well-thought-out public campaign to explain HMG’s nuclear policy
will be absolutely critical to sustaining any decision regarding a
Trident II follow-on.
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Missile Defense.
As of late December 2004, the United States had emplaced six
ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) interceptor missiles in
underground silos at Fort Greely, Alaska, and one GMD interceptor
at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. If current plans hold, by
the end of 2005 the United States will have deployed an additional
10 GMD interceptors at Fort Greely and a second interceptor at
Vandenberg, along with land-, sea-, and space-based sensors and
command and control systems to support those weapons and up
to eight Standard Missile-3 sea-based interceptors. These initial
deployments are only the ﬁrst step on the path to the administration’s
goal of an integrated, global missile defense to protect the United
States, its allies, and friends with deployed forces against limited
attacks by ballistic missiles of all ranges and in all phases of ﬂight.
The main concern driving this goal is not the ballistic missile force of
major powers such as Russia; rather, it is the proliferation of WMD
and ballistic missile capabilities of states such as North Korea and
Iran. Indeed, for the most part, the administration has been careful
not to oversell the initial U.S. defensive capabilities, characterizing
the ﬁrst deployments as “very basic” and a “nascent defensive
system.”
To date, U.S.-UK cooperation related to missile defense has
been limited but important. In February 2003, the UK gave the
United States permission to upgrade the U.S.-owned, RAFoperated Fylingdales early warning radar, which is important to
track potential threats from the Middle East region. Later that year,
the sides signed a new memorandum of understanding on missile
defense cooperation covering arrangements for joint work on system
research, development, testing, and evaluation. These arrangements
currently include British participation within DoD’s Missile Defense
Agency in Washington and Colorado Springs. In addition, reﬂecting
the high level of U.S. transparency with regard to the UK on missile
defense operational issues, British ofﬁcers are “embedded” in the
U.S. Strategic Command.
In addition to these bilateral arrangements, the United States and
UK have worked within NATO to reach an Alliance consensus on a
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missile defense feasibility study, which was due to be completed by
July 2005. That study examines the option of defending territory and
population centers against the full range of missile threats. It also
would complement Alliance agreement on an active layered Theater
Missile Defense against short- and medium-range missile threats,
wherein NATO would provide a command and control architecture
that would be interoperable with sensors and interceptors ﬁelded by
individual nations.
The United States has not asked the UK to base GMD interceptors
on its territory, and the UK has not decided to do so. That said, several
of the operational issues facing senior U.S. decisionmakers, military
commanders, and defense planners would need to be considered
by the UK or other Allies that might be weighing such moves.11 For
example,
• Who would have weapons release authority? The timeline
for decisions on launching interceptors is signiﬁcantly
shorter than the ﬂight time for offensive ballistic missiles,
which ranges from a few minutes for short-range systems to
20-30 minutes for missiles of intercontinental range. Given
such short timelines, it would seem infeasible to insist on a
speciﬁc prior authorization from the political leadership to
launch a defensive weapon. More likely, such authorization
would need to be delegated to an appropriate level of military
authority.
• Assuming limited defensive assets, at least in the initial stages
of deployment, what criteria should be employed in deciding
which enemy missiles to target and how many interceptors
should be allocated to them? Given the combination of possible
intelligence uncertainties about the number of missiles
available to the adversary and a defender’s preference to put
multiple interceptors against each threatening missile (to
have a higher probability of a successful intercept), defenders
might face tough choices. For example, would defenders
place highest priority on maximizing the population saved, or
protecting the ability of government to continue functioning,
or protecting other essential military capabilities? And if it is
unclear whether the target of the offensive missile (or missiles)
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is one’s own territory or that of a neighbor, how should this be
factored into a decision whether to launch interceptors and, if
so, how many to launch?
• What would be the appropriate role for senior government
decisionmakers on the employment of missile defenses? Under
the stress of attack, when defenders would be calculating
what interceptor assets they have left and how best to use
them, there would be precious little time for second-guessing.
Presumably, the government leadership would have
promulgated guidance during peacetime planning, subject to
review and revision in the buildup to a crisis. At a minimum,
government decisionmakers would need accurate, real-time
information about the ongoing missile defense engagements,
in part to determine whether to authorize either nuclear or
non-nuclear strikes against strategic targets. It should not
be forgotten, in this context, that effective missile defenses
would give the leadership greater latitude in choosing a
response to the attack—perhaps one that does not threaten
massive casualties on the part of the state from where the
attack originated.
These are instances of the complex and vital questions associated
with the deployment of missile defenses. While not unanswerable,
they will require timely and serious attention as the UK considers its
future level of cooperation with the United States in this area.
UK as a “Bridge” between the United States and EU.
Europeans can be forgiven for occasionally asking if Americans
really support the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy
(ESDP). Since NATO’s creation in 1949, Washington has alternately
encouraged and hectored its allies to assume a larger share of the
responsibilities and burdens of collective defense and—beginning
with NATO’s involvement in Bosnia in 1995—crisis response. At the
same time, Republican and Democratic administrations alike have
looked to NATO as the anchor of U.S. engagement in European
security affairs and the primary multilateral venue for shaping allies’
defense policies and capabilities.
166

Hence, when Prime Minister Blair and President Jacques Chirac
agreed at St. Malo, France, in December 1998 that the EU “must have
the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military
forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so,
in order to respond to international crises,” Washington’s initial
response was polite but distinctly chilly. Fresh memories of intraEuropean wrangling over the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s,
combined with growing worries about the situation in Kosovo, no
doubt played a role here. Some Americans worried whether, to use
then French Defense Minister Alain Richard’s analogy, the EU would
be capable of “taking care of ﬁres in its own backyard.” Or would the
EU, to be blunt, produce “all talk, no action”? More broadly, some
U.S. ofﬁcials wondered whether key consultations and decisions
on security matters might migrate over time from NATO, where
America’s unique political and military strengths ensure it has a
preponderant role in shaping Alliance policies and operations, to the
EU, where there is no U.S. seat at the table.
Oscar Wilde once observed, “There are many things that we
would throw away if we were not afraid that others might pick them
up.” Perhaps Wilde’s insight reﬂected the U.S. dilemma in trying to
elicit greater European spending and effort in behalf of their own
defense while at the same time seeming to refuse to take “yes” for an
answer for fear of losing its inﬂuence over them. Fortunately, time and
experience have improved U.S. as well as European understanding
of ESDP’s potential and limitations.
At the strategic level, one detects more convergent views on
security threats to the Euro-Atlantic community. The European
Security Strategy lists ﬁve key threats: terrorism; proliferation of
WMD; regional conﬂict; state failure; and organized crime. Except
for crime, the U.S. National Security Strategy of September 2002 and
NATO’s April 1999 Strategic Concept (as well as recent declarations)
list essentially the same threats. The European Security Strategy
emphasizes nonmilitary tools to prevent and diffuse crises but hardly
strikes a paciﬁst stance. And to be fair, the U.S. National Security
Strategy and NATO pronouncements recognize that states must use
all their tools, not just the military, to meet 21st century threats.
When it comes to military capabilities, the EU seems to have
become more realistic about its ambitions and pragmatic in its
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procedures. Its focus has shifted from the 1999 “Helsinki Headline
Goal”—i.e., to develop by 2003 the ability to deploy up to 50,00060,000 military personnel within 60 days and sustain them for at
least 1 year on missions ranging from humanitarian and rescue tasks
to peacekeeping and separating warring parties—to creating by
2007 a reservoir of 13 rapidly deployable 1,500-man “battle groups.”
According to EU plans, two of these battle groups should be able to
undertake concurrent operations, normally under a UN mandate,
lasting 1 to 4 months. The EU has pledged to make its battlegroup
concept complementary and mutually reinforcing with NATO’s
signiﬁcantly more capable Response Force—a U.S. initiative endorsed
by NATO leaders at their Prague Summit in 2002.
Much remains be done to improve EU military capabilities,
but the fundamental logic of close cooperation with NATO is
now obvious. Of the 25 EU members, 19 are in NATO and 4 are
in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP). Each has a single army, air
force, navy, and defense budget to meet NATO, EU, and national
commitments. There is no margin for wasteful duplication, and
divergent operational doctrines and practices would increase the
inherent risks in military operations.
The proof of ESDP’s worth will rest with its performance on
missions. On balance, its record so far has been positive, as the EU
launched a police mission in Bosnia in January 2003 (complementing
the NATO-led Stabilization Force, known as SFOR); assumed a
small follow-on mission from NATO in Macedonia 2 months later;
and conducted a 3-month “autonomous” operation (led by French
forces) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the summer
of 2003. On December 2, 2004, NATO-EU cooperation began a more
critical test in Bosnia when NATO terminated its successful 9-yearold SFOR mission, and the EU deployed a new military mission,
ALTHEA. NATO provides important support to ALTHEA under
the NATO-EU “Berlin Plus” arrangements ﬁnalized in March 2003,
and the Alliance will remain engaged with Bosnia through a NATO
headquarters in Sarajevo. The United States has fully supported this
transition.
In each of these major areas—i.e., EU strategy, capabilities,
and operations—one can ﬁnd evidence of a positive UK inﬂuence.
(Here I refer to the “UK” in the broadest sense of the term, meaning
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its government’s positions as well as the role played by very able
UK nationals serving in NATO and EU structures.) This is not to
suggest, however, that U.S.-EU or NATO-EU relations are or will
be problem-free. NATO and the EU remain profoundly different in
vision (NATO, for example, does not aspire to “ever closer union”),
structure, scope, and procedures, despite many shared democratic
values and security interests. Awkward moments between them are
inevitable. Thus, one should not expect the United States to adopt an
essentially laissez-faire attitude toward ESDP or to continue to rely
on the UK as heavily as it might have in the past to “protect” U.S.
security interests insofar as they might be affected by EU actions.
For the most part, I would not expect to see signiﬁcant differences
between Washington and London over the more theoretical—if not
theological—question of whether the EU should seek to become a
“counterweight” to the U.S. “hyperpower” or a new grand actor in
a “multipolar” world. Instead, I could foresee a continuing series of
irritations arising from seemingly disparate and (in some instances)
second-tier issues that take on a life of their own and, over time,
begin to have a corrosive effect on the special relationship.
Take, for example, the long-standing U.S. concerns (which
predate the current administration) with the slow pace of European
efforts to address acknowledged shortfalls in areas such as
deployability; mobility; C4ISR; precision strike; sustainment; and
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defenses. Arguably,
UK voices were more inﬂuential than those of other EU members
in assuring American ofﬁcials—some of whom were predisposed to
be skeptical—that the EU “label” could mobilize serious European
capabilities development in a way that NATO could not (at least,
not alone.) However, nearly 6 years into ESDP, it is not easy to ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant boost in real European capabilities attributable to the EU.
The NATO-EU “Capabilities Group,” which the United States had
hoped would be an important vehicle for building a close, cooperative,
and transparent relationship between the two organizations in this
crucial area, has been a serious disappointment.
One could cite other areas of palpable American disappointment,
as well, including:
• The emergence (albeit nascent and incremental) of an
EU operational planning capability that would appear to
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duplicate some of the planning functions of NATO’s Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) (seemingly in
contradiction to earlier European assurances);
• The festering stalemate over establishing useful NATO liaison
arrangements within the EU Military Staff, with a reciprocal
EU liaison at SHAPE;
• The apparently substantial and growing sentiment within the
EU that the “Berlin Plus” arrangements used in the transition
from the NATO-led SFOR mission to the EU’s Operation
ALTHEA in Bosnia have proved so cumbersome that the
EU should seek to avoid their use in the future (seeming to
contradict the general view within NATO); and,
• The absence of a sustained, multilevel, and strategic dialogue
between NATO and the EU on issues that should be of mutual
concern, such as Russia, Ukraine, the Caucasus, and African
ﬂash points.
To be clear, this is not to suggest that the UK is primarily responsible
for difﬁculties in these or other areas. Various other actors within the
EU and NATO have taken turns—some with demonstrably more
élan than others—at erecting obstacles in the way of what logically
should be a cooperative and mutually reinforcing relationship. The
impression remains, however, that the UK might not, or cannot, or
perhaps does not intend to “deliver” on every issue where U.S. or
broader NATO interests reasonably should be taken into account.
On the one hand, Americans should not ﬁnd this particularly
shocking. The UK, like other EU members, has a number of interests
at stake within that structure at any one time. Depending on
circumstances and, in some cases, personalities, compromises might
be necessary on some ESDP-related issues in order to better defend
UK interests in non-ESDP areas. The notion of “horse trading” is
not foreign to the U.S. Congress or Executive Branch, and even a
casual observer of the EU must conclude that the “Old Continent”
is just as practiced at it. The point remains, however, that when the
UK does line up with EU partners in ways that appear to promote
an “EU caucus” within NATO or to contradict or sidestep bilateral
assurances to Washington, it is not only U.S. conﬁdence in the EU as
a body that is likely to suffer.
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Although not an ESDP issue per se, the U.S.-EU imbroglio over
the possible lifting of the EU embargo on arms sales to China should
serve as a chilling example of how the special relationship could
suffer as a result of EU decisions. Fortunately, this impending train
wreck was avoided—or at least deferred. Hopefully, U.S., UK, and
other EU members will develop a future “strategic dialogue” on
China and avoid the transfer of potentially destabilizing capabilities
and technologies, which would incite Congress—perhaps with at
least tacit administration support—to enact some type of punitive
and ultimately counterproductive legislation.
Over the longer term, I believe the United States needs to consider
such steps as the following:
• We should look at developing an approach to ESDP that
puts greater emphasis on advance consultations with a broad
range of individual EU members and, increasingly, with
various staffs and structures within the EU. In other words,
we should put less reliance on the special relationship to gain
understanding into evolving attitudes within the EU before
the EU’s positions are ﬁxed and to explain U.S. perspectives
and potential concerns. As Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs Burns recently noted, the United States has
agreed to EU High Representative Javier Solana’s suggestion
to upgrade the “U.S.-EU Senior Level Group,” a forum for
high-level policy dialogue on a range of political and strategic
issues. This is a step in the right direction.
• In parallel, we also should try to better understand EU
procedures, decisionmaking timelines, the interrelationship
between ESDP and non-ESDP issues, and where those fall
in terms of the relative priorities of various EU members. To
accomplish this, we probably will need to reexamine how
we are organized—in Washington, our European embassies,
and our NATO and EU missions—to better identify, track,
and decide whether (and if so, how) to seek to inﬂuence (in a
positive sense!) EU decisions on ESDP issues of interest.
• In this context, one might consider a more routine, extensive,
and substantive program of “embedding” UK diplomats
and military ofﬁcers in appropriate State Department and
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Pentagon staffs, with reciprocal arrangements for American
diplomats and ofﬁcers in the Foreign and Commonwealth
Ofﬁce and Ministry of Defence. This would pay dividends
for both the special relationship and, more broadly, U.S.-EU
relations.
These are not trivial steps, but I think they can be accomplished
in time without falling into the trap of appearing to play off some
Europeans against others—an occasional tactic that would be a
disaster if elevated to an underlying strategy. I also think this can
be done without prejudice to U.S. relations with NATO, which will
remain the primary U.S. link to European security issues for the
foreseeable future.
It is encouraging, in this regard, that after meeting with
fellow Alliance leaders during his February 2005 visit to Brussels,
President Bush traveled downtown to become the ﬁrst American
President to meet the European Council, Presidency, and College
of Commissioners in the symbolic home of European integration.
His remarks during that trip clearly indicate that the United States
wants to deepen cooperation with its European allies and partners in
both organizations, and to strengthen NATO-EU links, as well. Such
a U.S., UK, and EU ménage à trois will not be a quick or easy affair,
but it is incumbent upon the entire transatlantic community—and,
of course, the special relationship—to nudge the relationship along.
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CHAPTER 12
THE DEFENSE DIMENSION
OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
Charles Dick
A Historical Perspective.
In the 19th century, there was no particular warmth in interstate
relations between Britain and the United States. There was one, albeit
short, war between them and periodic tensions. The United States
continued to follow the advice of the founding fathers and avoided
“entangling alliances,” concentrating on western hemispheric
concerns.1 The United Kingdom (UK) devoted its energies to the
empire and the maintenance of a balance of power in Europe. Even
World War I, when both countries fought a common foe, did not
bring the two noticeably closer together. Indeed, American hostility
to colonialism and the British exploitation of victory to expand their
empire left relations decidedly cool. Naval rivalry exacerbated this
coolness. The British soon realized they could not afford a naval
race and had to reach an accommodation on American terms, but
neither this nor the abandonment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance
modiﬁed the U.S. view that Britain was essentially a wicked colonial
oppressor fundamentally at odds with American idealism. Even
the growing threat of fascism failed to shift the United States away
from a disapproving isolationism born of disillusionment with the
Versailles settlement.
The “special relationship” was a product of the combined
endeavor to defeat Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. In origin,
it was thus a relatively recent phenomenon. Moreover, the close
wartime relationship, often stormy as a result of disagreements
over strategy, masked continuing differences over the desired
nature of the postwar world. Initially, as if little had changed, the
UK reverted to the pursuit of national interest—a Mediterranean
strategy and the maintenance of empire (though American wartime
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and postwar actions had fatally undermined Britain’s economic
capacity for independent action). By contrast, with the adoption of
the Truman Doctrine, the United States accepted that everything had
changed. Containment of communism became the guiding principle
of American foreign policy. As Britain, too, favored containment,
cooperation continued, for instance over the defense of Greece and
Korea and in the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). However, different perceptions of national interests clashed
in the Middle East. Imperial strategy led the British and French into
the Suez intervention of 1956, an adventure successfully foiled by a
United States impelled by a differing view of the Egyptian regime
and visceral anti-colonialism.
The British learned a painful lesson from Suez: the postwar UK
lacked the economic basis necessary to give substance to its pretensions
as a global power. Britain could no longer act globally without U.S.
support. Henceforth, the UK would eschew independent action and
direct its efforts to binding Europe and the United States together in
common defense and security policies to face down the emerging
Soviet threat.2 As British power and inﬂuence steadily became more
threadbare and the retreat from empire accelerated, Britain clung
ever more closely to the United States. It argued, to itself as much as
to other powers, that its inﬂuence over America, stemming from the
special relationship, still gave it the status of a great power—a status
underscored by its possession of a nuclear deterrent (even though
the independent nature of its force soon became illusory as it became
dependent on the United States for its delivery system).
The special relationship thus assumed a central place in London’s
worldview and strategy. It was not mirrored in Washington. The
United States was a genuine world power, pursuing a global mission
and interests. In doing so, it would cooperate with the UK where that
was advantageous, for example in NATO and over the Falklands
dispute. But where national interest dictated, it would cheerfully
ignore Britain. Actually it was apparently a close call whether or not
it would side with Argentina in 1982, and in the next year America
trumped up an excuse to invade a Commonwealth country, Grenada,
without so much as a word to its closest ally.
Nevertheless, the special relationship had substance during
the Cold War as both parties shared a common, and overriding,
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strategic goal. While differing over some issues, for instance the
desirability of closer European integration (favored by Washington,
resisted in London), the two countries were happy to work together
to give leadership and coherence to a sometimes wavering NATO.
Of course, the United States gave the direction and Britain gave it
loyal support. However, the end of the Cold War revealed important
latent differences in national interests and in attitudes to problems.
On a whole range of issues, from how to deal with the break-up of
Yugoslavia, through the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and intrusive
veriﬁcation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW)
convention to climate change and the importance of international
law and organizations (to name but ﬁve), Britain found itself at odds
with America. Britain was also ﬁnding that its relationship was not
so special that it could signiﬁcantly inﬂuence U.S. policy on many
issues dear to its government’s heart. American exceptionalism and
unilateralist tendencies, never wholly dormant even during the Cold
War years, were now proving singularly resistant to outside opinion,
including that of the most loyal U.S. ally.
It is clear that the 40-year-old Anglo-American special relationship
was a product of speciﬁc Cold War circumstances and based on
a common need. The ending of those circumstances and needs is
progressively revealing major differences in policy. The United
States has global interests and aspirations that are not always shared
by Britain. It could also be added that the relationship was never
based on mutual admiration; for cultural and historical reasons,
each partner traditionally has felt a measure of indifference, even
condescension and disdain, for the other.
The British Perspective Today on the Defense Relationship.
During the Cold War, U.S. armed forces were far and away
the most potent of those arrayed in NATO. Nevertheless, several
European powers ﬁelded signiﬁcant military capabilities to meet the
common threat. Those days are over. The implosion of the Warsaw
Pact and the collapse of Russian power led all European countries to
pay themselves large peace dividends (Britain, for instance, reduced
the personnel strength of its armed forces from 315,000 to 210,000).
Most European countries now maintain anachronistic militaries of
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limited relevance to the security and defense needs of the early 21st
century. And most have a strategic vision which extends little beyond
the continent of Europe. The only notable exceptions are France and,
particularly, the UK.
Britain is striving, though with greatly reduced resources,
to maintain a full spectrum of capabilities. The emphasis on
force restructuring has moved from meeting a deﬁned threat to
Europe to an international role in a disorderly world. The stress
is now on expeditionary operations in a multilateral environment,
doing everything from peace support through nation-building to
warﬁghting—i.e., engagement across the entire spectrum of conﬂict.
And when the British consider multilateral operations, they mean
primarily in conjunction with the United States. British defence efforts
are geared to ensuring that its armed forces can work intimately
with, and under the command of, American formations.
This British approach to defense reﬂects the conviction of Prime
Minister Tony Blair that Britain must conduct an active foreign policy,
when necessary reinforcing it with armed intervention, to make the
world a safer and better place. As the UK can do relatively little on
its own, this will require close cooperation with a similarly activist
United States. This, in turn, reﬂects—and dovetails nicely with—the
primary aim of foreign policy as set out by Blair in his deﬁnitive
address to British ambassadors in January 2003—that Britain should
remain America’s closest ally (in the hope and expectation that the
United States would reciprocate). In June of that year, then Defence
Secretary Geoffrey Hoon echoed his master’s words, setting out the
assumptions that guide his department’s work:
• there is a moral requirement for Britain’s armed forces to be a
force for good in the world;
• the reality is that, in all but minor affairs, little can be
accomplished without help from the Americans, who will
participate only if they lead;
• the special relationship is the bedrock of British foreign policy,
and, to sustain it, the country must be prepared to pay a price,
including blood, to prove that it is the most dependable U.S.
ally;
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• UK defense gains much from close association with America;
and,
• loyalty and reliability gain Britain signiﬁcant inﬂuence in
Washington.
Accepting that the assumptions above still hold sway, there is
much to be said in favor of Hoon’s analysis. On the other hand, the
conclusions he draws are open to question; so, too, given resource
restraints, is the ability of Britain’s armed forces to meet the challenge
that he lays down.
To start with capabilities, it is certainly true that Britain gains much
from defense cooperation with, and help from, the United States. It
enhances the effectiveness of British forces and thus the ability of the
country to “punch above its weight.” All three armed services, but
especially the Navy and Air Force, are better off for their privileged
access to American technology, and Britain’s defense industries are
closely tied to, perhaps even dependent on, their links with their
American counterparts. Like its predecessor, Britain’s nuclear force
(now the Trident system) was purchased on the cheap from America
and is dependent on the United States to keep it going.
Britain also proﬁts from intelligence cooperation. The intelligence
relationship goes back over 60 years (and cooperation continued even
during periods of wider policy disagreements). Until the explosion of
American investment in intelligence collection during the Cold War,
especially in outer space (which the UK could not match), Britain led
the ﬁeld. Even today, its expertise in analysis in the areas of imagery
intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and technical
intelligence (TECHINT) makes a signiﬁcant contribution to the joint
endeavor. But there can be no doubt that, deprived of uniquely
privileged access to the fruits of American collection efforts, Britain
would be critically lacking in situational awareness.
While Britain undeniably gains more than it contributes to
the defense relationship, a critical question for the country is how
important its contribution to the United States is. In many ways the
answer depends, at least in part, on how much inﬂuence Britain can
exert on American decisionmaking. Is British support essential to
America in the defense ﬁeld, or is it now merely a nice-to-have add-on?
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It is certainly important politically, for instance, by providing a ﬁg leaf
of multilateralism to cover the nakedness of American unilateralism
in launching the invasion of Iraq. The UK is also valuable to the
United States as a stable and reliable base and site for missile early
warning systems. But despite the wishful thinking, indeed boasting,
of most politicians and journalists and some military men, the harsh
reality appears to be that British participation is not highly valued
in purely military terms. In a few niche areas, such as intelligence,
mine clearance, photo reconnaissance, and special operations, the
contributions are indeed important. However, the Royal Navy and
Air Force as a whole are seen to be perilously close to critical mass and
add little of signiﬁcance to American strength. Similarly, in the realm
of ground forces, any British contribution is somewhat marginal;
numbers often still matter, as the Iraqi insurgency is demonstrating
anew, and the Army lacks them.
Consequently, British inﬂuence on American military doctrinal
development is marginal—at least unless and until events prove the
former’s ideas to be superior. Similarly, in both the 1991 and 2003
attacks on Iraq, while the British had an impact on tactical planning,
their say in deﬁning the end state and in campaign planning was
minimal. There was no reestablishment of the wartime Combined
Chiefs of Staff committee. British involvement was not critical to
American success.
The level of inﬂuence exerted on the United States at the policy
level is rather more difﬁcult to assess. Historically, it has waxed and
waned according to the international situation and the personalities
involved. Certainly, the British self-image of wise and discerning,
if not strong, Greeks guiding the powerful but naïve and ignorant
Romans was always, and is now more than ever, a product of
wishful thinking rather than fact.3 If appearances are anything to go
by, the UK’s staunchly Atlanticist stance, even when it has cost the
government dear (as over Iraq today), has given it little discernible
inﬂuence in Washington in the post-Cold War era. For political
reasons, not least to legitimize American actions, the British are
considered useful to have alongside. But the United States does not
consider it necessary to pay much of a price for the privilege. Rather,
Washington seems to calculate that London will always come “on
side” eventually, so no concessions are necessary. The UK tends to
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be taken for granted, like the loyal sidekick to the hero so beloved
in Hollywood movies. Thus, for instance, President Bill Clinton
undermined British policy over the wars of Yugoslav succession
and interfered egregiously in the internal affairs of the UK over the
Northern Ireland problem. President George W. Bush has conceded
little or nothing to Prime Minister Blair over issues dear to the
latter’s heart, such as involvement of the United Nations (UN) in
the invasion of Iraq, combating climate change, the International
Criminal Court, and the way in which the Israeli-Palestinian problem
should be approached. These examples rather suggest that the special
relationship has not survived the end of the Cold War in a fashion
palatable to a UK that seeks to promote its own national interests.
The imbalance in capabilities is likely to grow as it is unlikely
that the Defence Secretary and the British military can achieve their
ambition of fully taking up and exploiting the advanced technologies
produced by the latest revolution in military affairs. Costs are forever
spiralling, often logarithmically, and increased spending on defense is
not electorally rewarding these days. To compound the problem, the
government will soon have to decide on whether or not to purchase
a Trident replacement. If, as seems most likely, it decides that Britain
should remain a nuclear power, the cost of any new system will have
to be met at the expense of conventional forces as new money will
not be in the ofﬁng. What value the United States attaches to British
military assistance rests solely on the latter’s conventional forces.
British Tridents are irrelevant to American defense and security.
This problem of defense spending may become more acute if
the British public becomes progressively more disillusioned as a
result of the Iraq war and insurgency and with the government’s
interventionist proclivities. Moreover, however unfairly, there is
a widespread perception that Blair is merely Bush’s poodle, and
ﬁghting in what is widely regarded as a bad cause to pull Bush’s
chestnuts out of the ﬁre is not popular. Given the unfavorable
impression generated by the war and other high-handed, unilateral
actions, anti-Americanism is on the rise in the UK, both on the right
and left of politics. This perspective may grow more rapidly in the
aftermath of the suicide bombings in London in July 2005. As a result,
this may well act as a constraint on future combined operations. It
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may also undermine public support for the defense establishment’s
desire to ensure interoperability with the American armed forces.
Another factor brought to the fore by the Iraq war and other
American saber rattling also limits the perceived usefulness of a
British commitment to ﬁghting alongside the United States. There are
considerable transatlantic differences in interpretation of the role of,
importance of, adherence to, and development of international law.
What Hoon called “lawfare” can dominate British military planning
in a way that mystiﬁes the Americans. Just as the United States tired
of managing war by committee during the Kosovo conﬂict in 1999
when countries making a negligible military commitment insisted
on exercising inﬂuence on the conduct of operations, so they might
come to deprecate British insistence on perceived legal niceties.
All in all, Britain’s practical usefulness to the United States in the
military ﬁeld may well decline in the future (though its signiﬁcance
as a forward base will not). Britain may also cease to play its once
valuable role as champion of U.S. policies within NATO. European
members are mostly reluctant to expand the charter of the alliance
much beyond the narrow conﬁnes agreed in 1949, and some favor
the creation of a European Union (EU) military force that is not
dependent on America. Increasingly, for its part, the United States
favors ad hoc coalitions of the willing over working within the conﬁnes
of an alliance in which most members are seen not to be pulling
their weight. A combination of reducing conventional strength
and political inﬂuence in NATO would lead to a diminution of the
already small inﬂuence that London can exert in Washington.
Should Britain Remain in the Nuclear Club?
The original decision to acquire a nuclear capability was made
in response to a perceived growth of anti-British and isolationist
sentiment in the United States. The acquisition of an atomic bomb in
1952 and of a hydrogen bomb in 1958 was seen as restoring the country
fully to the ranks of the great powers. However, the UK possessed
a genuinely independent nuclear deterrent for only 10 years. With
the purchase, on very favorable terms, of the Polaris system in 1962,
Britain became dependent on the United States to keep its deterrent
functioning. However, as then Prime Minister Harold Macmillan
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put it, Polaris solved the “problem of being poor and powerful at the
same time.” The same rationale underlay the acquisition of Trident
in the early 1980s, the British Chevaline warhead having proved both
too expensive and not good enough as an upgrade to the existing
system.
Dependence on America to keep the nuclear “show on the road”
was not seen to be a major weakness. Solidarity in the face of the
Soviet threat made that vulnerability mainly theoretical. And if
war were to come, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
might calculate that, when the chips were down, the United States
might hesitate to risk nuclear immolation in retaliation for attacks on
Europe. But it would be far less certain about the actions of a Britain
that was more or less in the front line.
The British government accepts that the issue of a Trident
replacement has to be resolved in the current parliament. In its
election manifesto, the Labour Party committed itself to retaining
a nuclear deterrent. Now that the Soviet threat has gone, however,
the case for retention is far weaker. Proponents put forward several
arguments:
• Britain should keep a nuclear capability as an insurance policy
in an uncertain world;
• being a nuclear power confers prestige and is almost the sole
rationale for Britain’s continued holding of a permanent, vetowielding seat on the UN Security Council; and,
• Britain cannot allow France to be the sole European nuclear
power.
These rationales are not wholly convincing. It is hard indeed
to envisage a situation where Britain could alone face an enemy
deterrable with nuclear weapons—certainly a terrorist group armed
with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could not be intimidated
in the same way that a state can be. If countries facing a real threat,
such as Germany and Japan during the Cold War, felt able to rely on
American extended deterrence, why should not Britain do the same
in less threatening times? Could the United States really remain
indifferent to a serious military threat to Britain? A very expensive
insurance policy against an unspeciﬁable danger is not worth paying
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if the cost of the premium means that you cannot afford the upkeep
of real essentials. Any new nuclear system can be purchased only
at the expense of conventional capabilities that will assuredly be
needed—if only to sustain the special defense relationship with the
United States.
Does the British semi-independent nuclear deterrent provide the
only justiﬁcation for membership in the Security Council nuclear club?
Does Britain’s activeness in the UN, particularly in peacekeeping
and peace enforcement (both dependent on conventional armed
forces) count for so little? In any case, membership in the nuclear
club is no longer seen as a sine qua non of membership, now that
the admission of other powers is under active consideration. In any
event, the question arises once again, Is the cost too high? As to the
French, how much leverage does their force de frappe really confer in
today’s world? The cost of its maintenance certainly acts as a drag on
developing a modern conventional capability. And would it really
be to Britain’s disadvantage if France were Europe’s sole nuclear
power?
If it is deemed truly essential that Britain remain a nuclear player,
it is to be hoped that the country pays the lowest possible stake to
remain in the game. Another submarine-based system would put
an impossible strain on the defense budget, even if the Americans
waived the research and development (R&D) costs as they did with
Trident. Cruise missiles such as Tomahawk would provide a cheap and
cheerful—and dual-capable—alternative that should be adequate to
deal with any threat Britain is likely to face. Alternatively, it could be
worth pursuing an Anglo-French project. While France has showed
no interest in the past in nuclear pooling, it, too, feels the cost of
maintaining an independent system and could perhaps be induced
to come in with the UK if the latter were seen to be making a genuine
effort to put life into a European defense identity and capability.
Britain’s Future Strategic Direction.
Even after the disappearance of the Soviet threat, Britain and
other European countries still have plenty of security interests
and problems in common with the United States. These, as well
as bureaucratic inertia, help to explain the continued existence of
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NATO despite the decay of danger from the east. All are concerned
about:
• WMD proliferation;
• international terrorism, especially of the messianic and/or
nihilistic variety;
• the prevalence of ethnic/religious conﬂict and its potential
impact on wider stability;
• organized crime, especially narcotics and people trafﬁcking;
and,
• the emergence of weak and failing states and the possibility
that they will become (as Afghanistan and others have done)
havens for terrorists and criminal enterprises.
However, the states of mainland Europe are reluctant to raise
their strategic vision beyond their own continent. They have little
appetite for committing NATO to “out of area” tasks and less for
funding serious military capabilities to do so. They may bemoan
developments such as the apparent Iranian threat to acquire nuclear
weapons or the seemingly never-ending Israeli-Palestinian struggle,
but they are not willing to go beyond aid and diplomacy (not backed
by military power) in attempting to ﬁnd answers. Things are different
in the United States. As a result of the ending of the Cold War, the
eclipse of Russian power, and, especially, the galvanizing effect of
the September 11, 2001 (9/11), atrocity, America has apparently
decided to pursue global hegemony, not, of course, for its own sake
but as the only doable way to solve worldwide problems. It sees itself
as a benign hegemon, one whose dominance and decisions are, by
deﬁnition, good for all save so-called rogue states and other criminal
and anti-democratic regimes. America seems determined to reshape
the world in a way congenial to it, and in doing so not to be bound
by any restrictions such as antiquated notions of international law.
Rather it will follow its own judgments.
Most Europeans, save for the former Soviet satellites, distrust
American ambitions, even motives. To an extent, especially with
the French, this stems from the inevitable resentment against the
now sole superpower—exacerbated by America’s egregious lack of
sensitivity to the needs and opinions of others. There are, however,
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more substantive factors inhibiting the relatively close collaboration
that characterized the Cold War era:
• not all American interests and problems are seen as European
ones too, e.g., the increasing capability of China’s military and
the threat to Taiwan—indeed most developments in the Far
East;
• where they are held in common, perceptions of their causes
and cures often differ, as with the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict
and its signiﬁcance for the struggle against international
terrorism, not to mention the way in which that struggle is
conducted; and,
• while most values, like adherence to democratic norms, are
shared, there are important differences—for instance over
the central role and importance of international law and
institutions in ﬁnding solutions to international problems.
This divergence of interests and, even when they coincide, of
approaches between the United States and much of the EU, including
its most inﬂuential members, is now causing a problem for the UK.
Ever since the Suez debacle illustrated the hollowness of Britain’s
great power pretensions, the ﬁrst principle of British foreign policy
has been that Britain remains the closest ally of the United States.
As noted earlier, Prime Minister Blair reiterated this line as recently
as 2003 in his speech to British ambassadors. In the same speech,
however, he maintained that the country must also be at the heart
of Europe. “Britain must be at the centre of Europe . . . . It will grow
in power. To separate ourselves from it would be madness.” He
asserts that there is no incompatibility between the two aims. Britain
can, and must, be a transatlantic bridge between the two (also a
self-assigned task of previous prime ministers and always greatly
resented by French and German leaders).
However much Blair believes (or pretends) that there is no
contradiction between looking simultaneously west and east, the
Iraq war and other contentious issues have blown the idea apart.
The depth of acrimony and bitterness that has developed between
the United States and the traditional leaders of Europe will not be
overcome easily or quickly, whatever soothing words are spoken to
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paper over the cracks. Moreover,America is working to strengthen
ties with former communist, and more Atlanticist, central European
countries (especially those with large resident U.S. minorities) rather
than cultivating what U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
contemptuously dismissed as “old Europe.” Clearly, the United
States has abandoned its decades-old efforts to encourage a more
closely integrated and therefore stronger Europe (a policy which
used to cause much consternation in London. It no longer needs
a stronger European arm of NATO to balance the USSR and fears
that a stronger EU will be less malleable, perhaps even a competitor.
America now seeks to divide and rule NATO, even the EU, and this
will exacerbate divisions which have already come to light in several
areas. Ideas and interests are diverging in several important areas
of policy, and these differences will probably inhibit cooperation,
even over issues where there is actually much common ground. Both
sides of the Atlantic will demand that Britain choose between them.
Persisting with a third way is an illusion, not an option.
What should be the UK’s choice of strategic direction? Should the
country continue to follow its traditional, hitherto immutable policy
and cleave to the United States, clinging to a special relationship
that has lost most of its substance with the end of the Cold War
that sustained it? Or should it recognize and accept the realities of
geography and economic interest and genuinely put itself at the heart
of Europe? In essence, it is a choice between accepting the status of
a U.S. satellite—Britain can never aspire to be more than a nominal
partner—and being a shaping power in Europe where its weight
would give it real inﬂuence.4
Actually, the present Labour government (and any near-future
Conservative alternative) is all but certain to duck the issue and
continue sitting on the fence, insisting that the choice is artiﬁcial
and need not be made. Governments hate to make hard choices,
especially on such an issue as this with all the obfuscatory myths, false
perspectives, chauvinistic sentiments, prejudices, and uncertainties
that surround it. Adhering thus to the continuing balancing act will
be interpreted in Europe as a de facto continuation of the Americaﬁrst policy. Whatever its other beneﬁts, it will cost the country dear
in the EU, as it has done for the last 40 years since De Gaulle’s ﬁrst
veto on membership in the European Economic Community (EEC).
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Quite apart from French and others’ fears that Britain will act as a
Trojan horse for the United States in its aim to divide and rule, there
will always remain the fear that, when the chips are down, Britain
will abandon its European partners in favor of its transatlantic ally.
A country with such a suspicion hanging over it can never aspire to
a leadership role.
Such an outcome would probably be bad for the entire western
world, not least in the realm of security and defense. As the Iraq
entanglement and other contemporary issues are making clear, even
the uniquely powerful United States cannot resolve every problem
on its own. Indeed, overstretch in one area will weaken its ability
to exercise decisive inﬂuence in others—as is arguably happening
today in the cases of Iran and North Korea. Nor can Washington rely
on a tame NATO to do its bidding. The cement that held the alliance
together, a common fear of the USSR, has lost its power to bind and has
not been replaced by a commitment to new missions. The Americans
seem to have lost patience with NATO politics and its toothlessness
and relegated it to a minor role. They seem to wish it to continue
as the primary defense institution for Europeans mainly because it
gives them a say in European affairs, and it prevents the emergence
of any European decisional independence. The Europeans, for their
part, seem content with shufﬂing deck chairs instead of facing new
realities.
The Americans would beneﬁt from the creation of an effective
European security and defense policy backed by a strong military
arm, to share burdens where agreement exists. Problems will arise
in which the United States will not wish for involvement. There will
be others for which, thanks to commitments elsewhere, America
cannot ﬁnd the resources to intervene. An EU force might be able to
ﬁll the breach. There would indubitably be disagreements between
a strong EU and the United States, but, given fundamental values
and interests that are shared, these can be resolved, as they currently
are in the area of trade where the EU is now a power to be reckoned
with. A militarily powerful EU need not be a rival to America, or to
a NATO which will in any case always be ineffectual without the
participation of the principal EU players. On the contrary, in most
security and defense issues, it could and should be complementary.
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It has been persuasively argued that an effective European
defense organization is a pipe dream. It may well be so. Two things
are reasonably certain, though.
• Effective European defense is much more likely to happen
if Britain abandons its semi-detached attitude to the EU and
offers genuine commitment and leadership. Many countries
would welcome a lead from a major player that possesses a
well-respected military and is neither burdened with the sins
of the past nor driven by a visceral anti-Americanism.
• If Britain remains cool towards the project but it nevertheless
progresses, it will most likely do so under French direction.
France, the EU’s other serious military power, would seek
to make it a rival to, rather than an effective partner for, the
United States.
With the St Malo declaration of 1998, it appeared that Britain
was shifting from its reluctance to contemplate any defense
initiative outside NATO and was prepared, together with France,
to give substance to a European security and defense identity.
The two governments agreed that the EU “must have a capacity
for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the
means to decide to use them and the readiness to do so.”5 At the
same time, however, they both accepted that “the Atlantic Alliance
is the foundation of Europe’s collective security.” Has the acrimony
resulting from the split over Iraq and other nondefense-related
issues made it impossible to return to this promising road? Has the
embarrassment and shame resulting from the exposure of Europe’s
incapacity to act without reliance on the Americans over Bosnia and
Kosovo been forgotten? Or can the EU still get its act together and
assemble a military capability that somewhat matches its economic
strength? Obviously, this question looms particularly large in the
aftermath of the rejection of the draft EU constitution by French and
Dutch voters.
With Britain at least sharing the helm, European defense would
not be deﬁned by opposition to the United States in some zero-sum
game. Cooperation wherever and whenever possible would be the
goal, though the EU would not act as a mere satellite of America.
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Recognizing this, the United States would not, it is to be hoped, “cut
off its nose to spite its face” by severing its often close relationship
with the UK. After all, America gains something from it, too, and
it would still need a friend at the European court. Certainly, as a
shaper and leader of a signiﬁcant European security and defense
effort, Britain would enjoy more inﬂuence in Washington than it
does today as a loyal but unassertive ally that is too weak to compel
attention. This would be a better outcome for Britain than being coldshouldered in Europe and taken for granted in the United States.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 12
1. Ironically, America’s Monroe Doctrine relied more on the dominance of the
Royal Navy than on the power of the American ﬂeet to dissuade intervention from
the Old World.
2. Contrastingly, the French drew the lesson from Suez that the United States
was an untrustworthy ally and that France needed to acquire the means to act
independently. The difference in approach continues to this day.
3. This Greek-Roman analogy to describe the relationship between Britain and
America was coined by Harold Macmillan, a future prime minister, in North Africa
in 1943. It has been clung to ever since to rationalize and ease the pain of having to
accept inferior status. And Britain’s supposed inﬂuence over the superpower was
regarded as increasing Britain’s diplomatic weight.
4. Britain was faced with this choice as far back as 1957, when it chose an
illusory great power status and the special relationship over membership in
the ﬂedgling EEC. Subsequent regrets, consequent on the collapse of traditional
policy, led the UK belatedly to apply for membership, but this was blocked by
a France mistrustful of British Atlanticism. The Edward Heath government, in a
rare burst of Europe-ﬁrst enthusiasm, succeeded in gaining entry in 1973. But by
this time, the EEC had been shaped by France (mainly) and Germany in a fashion
uncongenial to British interests.
5. To demonstrate British seriousness, the UK has offered 12,500 men, 18 ships,
and 72 combat aircraft to give teeth to the new European Rapid Reaction Force.
It also, however, resists (lest the Americans be upset) the establishment of an EU
planning center at Tervuren, Belgium, separate from NATO.
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CHAPTER 13
WHEN YOU COME TO A FORK IN THE ROAD, TAKE IT—
DEFENSE POLICY AND THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP:
PANEL CHAIRMAN’S REPORT
Jeffrey D. McCausland
The famous American philosopher and baseball player, Yogi Berra,
once said that when you come to a fork in the road—take it. There is
common agreement that Britain today ﬁnds itself at a juncture with
respect to the defense aspects of the special relationship it has enjoyed
with the United States since World War II. While leaders in America
and the United Kingdom (UK) agree on this, it is curious that national
defense and Anglo-American relations played practically no role
in the 2005 British election. British politicians reﬂected the public’s
clear interest in immigration, healthcare, crime, and education. The
defense panelists argued that in the aftermath of the reelection of both
the American and British leaders, the United States must address
four areas of fundamental importance if the special relationship is
to ﬂourish. These four areas are grand strategy, military operations,
defense capabilities, and security organizations.
Prime Minister Tony Blair has on several occasions said that
the role for Britain is to be closely allied with the United States and
remain engaged in the heart of Europe.1 He (like his predecessors) has
argued repeatedly that the UK must be a bridge between the United
States and continental Europe. But can the UK continue to perform
this role in defense matters? This would seem daunting and perhaps
even contradictory in a future that now requires reconsideration
of the European Union (EU) Constitution, rejected by French and
Dutch voters, as well as coping with a possible European desire to
establish common approaches on defense and foreign policy. “Can
Britain continue this triangular relationship or ménage a trois?”
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Grand Strategy.
Strategy is the art of the possible. It requires successful management
of three variables—ends, ways, and means. Consequently, any
discussion of strategy and the special relationship must confront
several fundamental questions. What is the end state—the politicoeconomic future—that American and British leaders are attempting
to shape? And assuming they can agree on such a common vision,
what are the defense policies best calculated to assist in its realization?
And, ﬁnally, what are the means or resources both countries are able
and willing to devote to this effort?
Throughout the history of national partnerships and alliances,
the presence of a mutual threat has been fundamental to achieving
agreement on strategy. Benjamin Franklin famously said upon signing
the Declaration of Independence, “We now must all hang together
or we will surely hang separately.” The U.S.-UK relationship has
“hung together” in the face of threats to national survival. Initially,
the partners opposed imperial Germany, then confronted Hitlerian
fascism, and ﬁnally faced down the threat posed by the Soviet Union
and communism, acting in all three cases within the context of a
broader alliance. During this time, the United States accepted the
basic grand strategic principle that despite overwhelming American
power, it needed allies for the capabilities they provided as well
as the legitimacy gained from collective action. The two countries
might have periodic severe disagreements over such issues as
Suez, Vietnam, the Falklands, and Grenada, but both knew that the
common threat was so great that reconciliation was likely, if not
certain, in each case.
This common threat ended with the collapse of the Berlin Wall
and demise of the Soviet Union. But in terms of defense links, the
experience of 75 years established certain cooperative arrangements
that are now routine and indeed taken for granted. These include
unparalleled sharing of intelligence, regular consultations on military
doctrine, American support for the UK nuclear deterrent, robust
liaison teams in both the Pentagon and Ministry of Defence, and
now British representation at several American regional combatant
commands. Furthermore, American and British ofﬁcers regularly
cooperated on a host of issues at North Atlantic Treaty Organization
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(NATO) headquarters and during conﬂicts in Iraq, Bosnia, and
Kosovo over the past 20 years.
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 (9/11), many in continental
Europe, however, did not share the view that 9/11 changed the way
in which America should perceive the world and evaluate threats. In
spite of the attacks on Spain, Greece, Turkey, and now even London,
it appears, from the American side of the Atlantic at least, that
many Europeans still view 9/11 as fundamentally a U.S. problem
that somehow Europe can avoid if it chooses. In terms of the special
relationship, however, President George W. Bush observed following
the attacks in London in July 2005, “Just as America and Great Britain
stood together to defeat totalitarian ideologies of the 20th century,
we now stand together against the murderous ideologies of the 21st
century.”2
Many Americans worry that continental Europe has failed to
grasp the enormous impact 9/11 has had on the American psyche.
As Leo Michel pointed out, the U.S. defense strategy as ofﬁcially
published by the Department of Defense (DoD) in March 2005 opens
with the line: “America is a nation at war.”3 This view is not shared in
Paris, Brussels, or Berlin. Consequently, will it be feasible for Britain
to maintain its historical defense ties with the United States while
working toward the greater European defense integration within the
EU envisioned by the St. Malo agreement? How will British public
attitudes be affected by the horriﬁc events of July 2005?
Strategy begins with an analysis of threats, and Al Qaeda and its
associated groups do not provide as coherent a face in this regard
as did the Soviet Union. Both Britain and America agree on the
threats posed by nuclear proliferation, cyber terrorism, weapons
of mass destruction (WMD), bioterrorism, international crime, and
failed states. But many in the UK were unsettled, and rightfully so,
by America’s “global war on terrorism” for its lack of deﬁnition.
Many defense experts in both Britain and America have argued since
2001 that terrorism ultimately remains a technique as opposed to
an enemy. Consequently, establishing a common grand strategy to
confront terrorism as a shared threat is certainly challenging. Such
a strategy must both reﬂect and cement public support for policies.
In this regard, it is interesting to note that at least in the immediate
aftermath of the London attacks, pro-U.S. feeling actually increased
in some polls in the UK.4
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Military Operations.
Cooperation between the American and British militaries is
unparalleled not only with respect to U.S. relations with other states
but perhaps even in the annals of alliances. No other state has the daily
involvement in the planning and preparation of operations that the
UK has with the United States. U.S. and British forces have cooperated
well in Iraq and adapted quickly to the changing conditions on the
ground as the war evolved from its initial conventional phase to
counterinsurgency operations. Still, Charles Dick is correct when he
observed that many in Britain worry that this cooperation may occur
only at the tactical level. They are concerned that British inﬂuence on
American thinking at the operational or higher levels is limited.
Both Washington and Whitehall should be concerned that
“the coalition in Iraq is becoming less a coalition and more a clear
partnership.” The major European troop contributors to Iraq will
remove their forces by the end of 2005. Outside NATO, there are
no countries with sizable military forces lining up to assist. In
Iraq, the January 2005 elections, continued training of indigenous
security forces, and October 2005 referendum do, however, suggest
that Britain and America may have at least reached the “end of the
beginning.” But continued domestic political progress along with
sustained increases in the size and sophistication of Iraqi security
forces will be crucial if the insurgency is to be defeated. Even the
most optimistic analysts in both countries agree that a large-scale
presence by the United States and UK in Iraq for the foreseeable future
is inevitable. Plans exist, however, if these efforts are successful, for
British forces to be cut in half by the end of 2006.5 Even American
troop commanders have spoken publicly about the possibility of
signiﬁcant U.S. troop reductions in 2006.
In every challenge lies the seeds of opportunity, and this may
be the case now. American and British leaders should collectively
seek greater assistance not in providing combat forces for Iraq, but
in contributions particularly from European states in the training
of Iraqi police, border guardsmen, and military forces. Some of the
reports discussing a possible reduction of British forces in Iraq in
2006 suggest that this might result in a subsequent deployment by
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British troops to Afghanistan to lead NATO forces in the south of
that country.6 Such a move would clearly enhance British efforts to
be a bridge in the transatlantic relationship.
Defense Capabilities.
The eminent British historian Sir Michael Howard once observed
that “capabilities lead to opportunities which lead to options and
perhaps even intentions.” This aphorism must remind us that vision
without resources is a fairy tale. Here, both the United States and
the UK confront major budgetary choices. As both Michel and
Dick point out, at the top of the list may be the future of the British
independent nuclear deterrent. The UK has managed to maintain
its nuclear forces and the ability to project signiﬁcant conventional
forces abroad, even following the reductions that occurred as part of
the peace dividend at the end of the Cold War. It remains to be seen
whether the next government will be able to continue to do both in
the face of spiraling costs for conventional forces and the need to
replace the Trident nuclear force. Former Defence Secretary Geoffrey
Hoon stated that the ﬁrst principle of British defense planning is to be
interoperable with the United States. Consequently, a fundamental
question is, Should Britain retain an independent nuclear deterrent
and, if so, for what strategic purpose? If the new government chooses
to retain the nuclear deterrent, will there be sufﬁcient remaining
funds to transform British conventional forces for global deployment?
Obviously, this problem has become even more complex following
the July 2005 attacks in London that will likely demand far greater
investments in homeland security.
In the aftermath of the 2005 elections, it appears that the Blair
government intends to continue a British independent nuclear
deterrent. John Reid, the new Defence Secretary, has opened talks
with the United States on a successor to Trident. His government
appears determined to maintain a British submarine-launched
system because it is “invisible and invulnerable.”7 This represents
an apparent shift from the earlier position, which seemed open to
other less expensive options, such as ground or air-launched cruise
missile systems. The full cost of developing the Trident replacement
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is estimated to be $25 billion to $35 billion. Such an investment would
make even marginal increases in the size and continued technological
improvements in conventional forces increasingly difﬁcult.
The United States also faces tough budgetary choices, confronted
as it is by the rising costs of the war in Iraq, demands for greater
attention to homeland security, the mandate to transform U.S.
forces, and the aftermath of natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina.
As Michel pointed out, the U.S. administration must confront these
choices in the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), scheduled
for submission to Congress by February 2006.8 It is interesting to
note that representatives from the British military establishment are
participating in the American QDR effort in Washington. Tellingly,
DoD guidance for the QDR assumes no increase in American defense
spending in the coming years.
Finally, Michel suggested that three other issues regarding
defense capability deserve mention. The ﬁrst is the American
Global Restationing Plan. This will see a signiﬁcant reduction of
American forces in continental Europe while retaining, consistent
with UK agreement, air bases in Great Britain. These bases, as well
as the strategic British island of Diego Garcia, may in fact take on
even greater importance to American defense planning. Second,
the United States has begun the initial deployment of anti-ballistic
missiles in Alaska and California. This process will continue with
additional forces being readied for sea-based deployment in the
near future. There has been close UK-U.S. cooperation on this effort,
to include the establishment of an American radar system in Great
Britain. Anglo-American discussions will continue on future UK
participation in the ballistic missile defense system. This will not
only require the two parties to determine costs and deployments,
but also to establish an appropriate bilateral command and control
mechanism for these forces. Third, with respect to defense industrial
cooperation, there is a serious disconnect in the United States between
the executive branch’s longstanding desire for close defense and
security cooperation with Great Britain (and a few others), on the
one hand, and congressional restriction on foreign participation in
U.S. defense programs, on the other.
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Security Organizations.
As Dick observed, there has been a clear skepticism about the
relevance of NATO in the Bush administration. This is due in part to
the dramatic reductions in European defense spending over the past
decade that have brought most European conventional forces to the
brink of irrelevance. Such skepticism was demonstrated in the tepid
acceptance of the NATO countries’ offer to support the United States
under Article V after 9/11 and continued with the very unfortunate
comments by Secretary Donald Rumsfeld about “old Europe.”
Agreement exists among defense experts that Iraq has done severe
structural damage to the transatlantic bridge. In this ﬁrst year of the
second Bush term, efforts were made by the United States to repair
the relationship with NATO, consult more frequently, and use NATO
not only as a source of military capability, but also as a collaborator
through expanded discussions and planning. Time will tell whether
such positive steps translate into improved relations.9
Still, it is worrisome to reﬂect on former German Chancellor
Gerhard Schroeder’s comments at Wehrkunde, Germany, in 2005
when he suggested that NATO may have outlived its usefulness
and that a new organization needs to be envisaged to manage the
transatlantic relationship. In many ways the Chancellor, now turning
over the reins of government to Angela Merkel, may have been
speaking less to the Americans than to the continental Europeans and
the British. So what, then, is the future of NATO from the standpoint
of the special relationship and what, collectively, should British and
American leaders do to move the organization in the direction of
relevancy?
In answering this question, existing NATO operations must
also be taken into account. The Alliance conducted major out-ofarea operation in the last decade. It still has signiﬁcant forces and
its credibility deployed in the Balkans. Unfortunately, the ﬁnal
political decision on the future of Kosovo has not yet been made,
Montenegro’s independence movement may yet be successful, and
Macedonia will continue to confront enormous challenges. All of
these unsettling situations could lead to a future crisis.10 If another
Balkans crisis occurs, two things might happen immediately. First,
the United States, confronted by global overstretch, might well
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announce that the crisis is essentially a European problem. Second,
this announcement would cause major problems for an already
damaged transatlantic relationship.
Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and NATO
Secretary General Lord George Robertson have broached another
opportunity for Britain and America to provide leadership for the
Alliance. Both have endorsed the need to create military capabilities
and doctrine to take better advantage of network-based operations.
They observed in a recent study that “the era of static, large, armored
forces, in place to confront and deter the adversary’s massed
formations, is over. The era of forces that train and exercise together,
but are rarely used, is over as well.”11
A Final Word.
To mix metaphors, Britain may be at a fork in the road as it tries
to be the transatlantic bridge as both shorelines threaten to recede.
But the special relationship may itself be at a crossroads. There is a
greater need than ever for reinvigorated consultation by leaders on
a range of important issues that lie ahead and a need for leaders on
both sides of the Atlantic to celebrate this relationship frequently and
publicly. As we pass the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II,
the current generation and those who focus on international politics
are aware of the special relationship’s value. But both countries must
attempt to underscore its value more emphatically to their respective
populations now and in future.
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CONCLUSION

CHAPTER 14
“WELL, ISN’T THAT SPECIAL?”
CONCLUDING REMARKS ON U.S.-UK RELATIONS
AT THE START OF THE 21st CENTURY
Douglas T. Stuart
I am sure that when some Americans hear the phrase “special
relationship,” their ﬁrst reaction is to think of comedian Dana
Carvey’s “Church Lady.” When Carvey’s character is forced to
confront some form of behavior or lifestyle which she disdains, she
condescendingly replies: “Well, isn’t that special?”
The Anglo-American special relationship is nothing to sneer,
or sniff, at. It is extremely important to both the United States and
the United Kingdom (UK). It has also been, and continues to be, an
indispensable source of productive leadership for the international
community.
On the other hand, the special relationship needs to be viewed
realistically. Some of the contributors to this volume have highlighted
instances in which fundamental differences of principle or interest
have strained the Anglo-American relationship. In some cases, these
disagreements have been exacerbated by unrealistic expectations.
The most well-known example is the 1956 Suez crisis. The comments
of Lieutenant General Sir Hugh Stockwell, commander of the British
1st Corps during the planning for the French-British-Israeli operation,
illustrate the degree of misunderstanding on the UK side:
. . . as the British could fairly claim a “special relationship” with the
Americans, by which they would hope to maintain the neutrality of the
United States in the period of operation, Britain was the obvious choice
for leadership.1

London was not prepared for the intensely negative American
response to the Suez invasion, nor for Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles’ subsequent explanation that the United States, which had
extant defense arrangements with 44 other countries, “cannot have
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a hierarchy of relationships with allies around the world.”2 From the
British point of view, a “hierarchy of relationships” was precisely
the point.
Washington has also fallen prey to self-deluding fantasies from
time to time. One example is Lyndon Johnson’s efforts to convince
Harold Wilson to contribute “a token force” to support America’s
beleaguered troops in Vietnam. The President argued that “a platoon
of bagpipers would be sufﬁcient.”3 By the time that Johnson made
this request, however, Wilson’s government was fully engaged in
a campaign of retrenchment from East of Suez, and was unwilling
to risk guilt by association with America’s quixotic campaign in
Southeast Asia. The fact that many Britons believed that the United
States had contributed to the pressures which forced the UK to
abandon its empire made Wilson’s decision that much easier.
What is most interesting about the instances of disagreement and
misunderstanding between the United States and the UK since World
War II is their relative infrequency. In the overwhelming majority of
cases when the two nations have taken international actions, they
have acted either in unison or in harmony. Philip Stephens attributes
this to a “deeply ingrained . . . habit of cooperation.” But Nicholas
Childs and Leo Michel remind us that this habit is reinforced
by institutional arrangements which give the two governments
preferential access to each other’s intelligence and a “privileged”
role in defense planning.
Gaining and retaining this special status has been a top priority
for Britain since World War II. Indeed, Winston Churchill established
this as a principle of British foreign policy even before the United
States entered the war. In a statement before the House of Commons
in 1940, he predicted that the two nations “. . . will have to be
somewhat mixed up together” for the foreseeable future. He went on
to reassure his colleagues, however, that “I do not view the process
with any misgivings.”4 Churchill was, nonetheless, an unsentimental
realist who understood that if London wanted to be treated by the
United States as primus inter pares, it would have to provide more
than sage advice and accumulated wisdom. As a result, all British
governments since World War II have looked for ways to keep their
nation militarily strong, not just as a good in itself but also as a means
of sustaining the special relationship with the United States. The late
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Brigadier Kenneth Hunt once described these efforts as a policy of
“getting a quart out of a pint bottle” in the formulation of successive
defense budgets.5 For its part, the United States has helped Great
Britain to manage this difﬁcult task by various forms of bilateral
defense cooperation, including nuclear-sharing arrangements.6
No issue better illustrates the costs that both sides have been
willing to incur in support of the special relationship than the allied
invasion of Iraq. For Washington, the costs have been primarily
in the form of foreign policy adjustments. The George W. Bush
administration agreed to reign in its unilateralist instincts for a time
and allow its campaign against Saddam Hussein to be tied down in
the United Nations (UN) in large part out of respect for the advice and
interests of Prime Minister Tony Blair. Conversely, the British Prime
Minister was willing to incur severe and foreseeable costs in terms
of domestic public opinion and British relations with key European
governments when he opted to support the U.S.-led campaign against
Iraq. It is very likely that Mr. Blair also understood that by placing
the UK in the forefront of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), he
was increasing the risk that his nation would become the target of
retaliation. This very real threat was conﬁrmed on July 7, 2005 (7/7),
when coordinated terrorist attacks at four locations in London left 56
people dead and 700 injured.
Both governments accepted these costs and risks because they had
gained a new appreciation of the value of the special relationship in
the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). Indeed,
to the extent that there is a silver lining in such catastrophes, it is this
tendency to remind us who our friends are and why they deserve our
friendship. The speciﬁc circumstances of the 9/11 attacks were less
important than the shared recognition in Washington and London
that the two nations were once again confronting a global threat
to the survival of democracy. That shared recognition continues to
guide the foreign policy decisions of both governments.
It should come as no surprise that the other nation which
has most publicly associated itself with the U.S.-led GWOT is
Australia, which shares a cluster of values with Great Britain and
the United States. According to James Bennett, values include: “. . .
individualism, rule of law, honoring contracts and covenants, and
the elevation of freedom to the ﬁrst rank of political and cultural
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values.”7 Although these liberal values are prevalent among Englishspeaking democracies which can trace their roots back to the Magna
Carta, they are also celebrated among other nations—including some
Central European countries whose leaders developed their world
views in opposition to Soviet rule. That these nations have embraced
Anglosphere values since the end of the Cold War is testimony both
to the enduring validity of these principles and to the international
inﬂuence of Britain and the United States.
Both the U.S.-UK special relationship and the larger and still
protean Anglosphere community have the potential to endure
and grow in the 21st century. But both arrangements will require
cultivation. Several contributors to this volume have identiﬁed areas
for improvement in the Anglo-American relationship. First, there
is a fair degree of consensus that President Bush must do a much
better job of helping Prime Minister Blair to make the case that the
GWOT serves the interests of the entire international community.
Rhetoric matters in this regard, and the President would be welladvised to carefully study the ways in which Mr. Blair frames his
public statements. Perhaps the best example of Mr. Blair’s principled
eloquence is his ﬁrst statement following the aforementioned terrorist
attacks of 7/7. Speaking from the G8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland,
the Prime Minister noted that all of the participating governments
“have some experience of the effects of terrorism and all of the
leaders . . . share our complete resolution to defeat this terrorism.”
He then went on to place the London attacks in a larger context:
It is particularly barbaric that this has happened on a day when people
are meeting to try to help the problems of poverty in Africa and the long
term problems of climate change and the environment.8

Mr. Blair’s statement was more than a tactical device for garnering
public support. It demonstrated the Prime Minister’s appreciation
of Andrew Apostolou’s comment that the United States and the
UK need to “demonstrate leadership across the spectrum of policy
issues, not just security.”
But rhetoric must also be backed up by actions. The Prime Minister
was on fairly safe ground in this regard, since he had committed
his nation to a leading role in a 10-year, $25 billion aid initiative

206

for Africa prior to the G8 summit. Mr. Blair has also given a high
priority to environmental and climate change issues, as illustrated
by the fact that the UK economy grew by 36 percent between 1990
and 2002, while greenhouse gas emissions in the United Kingdom
were reduced by 15 percent.9 It remains to be seen whether the Prime
Minister’s example will convince President Bush to take a more
proactive position on such issues as Third World debt and climate
change. Whatever the outcome of these negotiations, however, the
two leaders are likely to continue to differ fundamentally in their
approaches to issues of international cooperation. Mr. Blair sees
international agreements as an indispensable element of British
foreign policy, while Mr. Bush is inclined to view them as a trap.
These very different points of view are partly attributable
to differences in power. But as Douglas Edlin has observed in
his discussion of the positions of the two nations with regard to
the International Criminal Court, Great Britain and the United
States also draw upon very different historical experiences. Most
importantly, there is no counterpart in American history to the
British experience of institutionalized cooperation with the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union
(EU). Britain has had a mixed record in its efforts to manage this
campaign of institutionalized cooperation. The UK has frequently
been frustrated in its efforts to play the role of “prefect” to America’s
“headmaster” within the NATO alliance.10 Successive British
governments also had to overcome intense resistance, both at
home and on the continent, before the UK succeeded in joining the
European Economic Community (EEC). Furthermore, Great Britain
continues to maintain a conditional relationship with the EU. These
facts notwithstanding, however, British experiences with NATO and
the EU have contributed to the conviction that active participation
in international organizations and submission to international laws
are essential for the nation’s security and prosperity. The challenge
for London is to help Washington to realize that it also stands to
gain more than it will lose by participating in institutionalized and
contractual forms of cooperation with other governments. The two
governments will not succeed in convincing the leaders of the world
community to actively support the GWOT until the United States
sheds its image as the “chief destabilizer” of international order.11
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The EU poses a special challenge for both the United States
and the UK. As John Hulsman accurately predicted during our
deliberations, the EU constitution has been rejected by two of the
founding members of the European Community. This throws the
entire European experiment into confusion and presents both
Washington and London with some fundamental choices. For the
United States, it will be interpreted by some of President Bush’s
neo-conservative advisers as an opportunity to press forward with
an offensive designed to ensure that the EU will never acquire the
capability to pose as an economic or political counterweight to the
United States. David Frum and Richard Perle make the case for
just such a strategy in their controversial book, An End to Evil. The
authors recommend that the U.S. “force European governments
to choose between Paris and Washington.” A key element in their
strategy involves prying London away from continental Europe.12
Timothy Garton Ash also recommends that the UK abandon its
status as the bridge between Washington and Europe, but he argues
that Britain should jump in the other direction. He criticizes London
for continuing to play the role of Jeeves (the wise but undervalued
butler) to a haughty and insensitive Washington long after the
beneﬁts of this role have disappeared. Ash concludes that “the
British tail will never wag the American dog. Europe, however, is
much more than a tail.” He calls upon the UK to “change tack” by
actively supporting the construction of an EU which is strong enough
to say no to the United States and develop its own unique identity
in the international system. Charles Dick echoes many of these
arguments in his discussion of British defense policy in Chapter 12.
The attractions of such a strategy are obvious, particularly at a time
when the UK holds the Presidency of the EU. Mr. Ash nonetheless
inadvertently highlights one of the major problems with this policy,
when he speculates that Great Britain could:
Give it [the EU] some military muscle. Help it to speak with one voice on
major foreign policy issues…[and] ﬁnd ways of concentrating its large
but still diffuse soft power.13

Absent some major changes in the ways that leading European
governments approach and conduct international relations, British
foreign and defense policies are likely to become more constrained,
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confused, and overextended if they become entangled in the EU’s
quest for a common foreign policy and a European security and
defense identity.
There are two circumstances under which London might feel
increasing pressure to choose between Washington and the EU.
First, the Bush administration could decide to pursue the divide
and conquer strategy recommended by Frum and Perle. Second,
certain West European governments could react to the collapse of
the EU constitution by attacking London as a “Trojan horse” for
U.S. domination and as a bastion of “Anglo-Saxon capitalism.”
But as Michael Calingaert and others have argued in this volume,
it would be extremely difﬁcult for the UK to turn away from the
EU, even if the British position within that organization becomes
much more uncomfortable. It would also be extremely unwise for
London to abandon the special relationship for an unpredictable
new relationship with the EU.
Most of the authors in this book would agree that there will
probably be no need for the UK to make such a choice for the
foreseeable future. Mark Gilbert goes a step further in his chapter,
describing the currently ﬂuid transatlantic situation as an opportunity
for imaginative statesmanship on the part of both the United States
and the United Kingdom. By working together and drawing upon
shared institutional, cultural, and political resources, the United
States and the UK can expand the opportunities for U.S.-European
cooperation, which continues to be an essential precondition for
international order and global economic progress.
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